TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY:
A STUDY OF AL-QUEDA'S RESSURGENCE IN POST BIN-LADEN ERA

BY

MOSES EBI FLORENCE
15/018244/ASS

BEING A PROJECT SUMMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES IGBINEDION UNIVERSITY OKADA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE AWARD OF B.Sc. (Hons) IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, IGBINEDION UNIVERSITY

JUNE, 2019

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SUPERVISOR: DR E. A. AGBA

JUNE, 2019

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that with matriculation number **15/018244/ASS** under my supervision carried out this project research and here approved as a requirement for the award of the Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.) degree in International Relations and Strategic Studies, Igbinedion University Okada.

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(PROJECT SUPERVISOR)

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DR. ROOSEVELT IDEHEN DATE
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

…… ……
(EXTERNAL EXAMINER) DATE

DEDICATION

This Project is dedicated to God Almighty.

DECLARATION

I, hereby declare that this research project titled **terrorism and global security: a study of al-Qaeda decimation (2012-2016)** is an Original work carried out by me. This work has not been previously submitted for any award of degree, Diploma or certificate in any institution.

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Signature and Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

The post 911 events coupled with uprisings in the middle east, challenge from the Islamic State and a shift in the U.S. counterterrorism efforts from foreign wars to AL Qaeda contributed to the decline and almost decimation of the core al-Qaeda organizational. The is the main feature of the Obama administration's counterterrorism fight was to to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future. This approach yielded success in the killing and capture of many al-Qaeda leaders. most notably the May 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden's safe house in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Around the same time, jihadist groups began taking advantage of the uprisings in various Arab countries in war zones such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen, where they sought to establish safe havens. In the year following the uprisings, al-Qaeda, its branches, and official media releases by al-Qaeda-aligned ideologues provided guidance for new and established groups on how to deal with the region's changed situation. In fact, the uprisings were quite timely for al-Qaeda, sweeping away, as they did, old regimes that had long served as U.S. counterterrorism counterparts. Additionally, fluid public spaces and new safe havens allowed al-Qaeda to operate more openly, recharge its network, and gain new recruits and leaders. Despite the several evets that lead to the decimation of Al-Qaeda, they have continued to be held together in some cases expanding. Al-Qaeda is thus positioned to potentially reclaim the banner of global jihadism. This project therefore will attempt to critically review this trend critically in the light of global security ad terrorism. This study therefore is an appraisal of terrorism and global security with special reference to Al-Qaeda decimation between 2012-2016. The method used in this study was qualitative approach. Secondary data were used in the gathering of information for this study. The just war theory was employed as the main thrust of this project. This study concludes that the emergence of ISIL took attention away from Al Qaeda thereby allowing them to resurge. It also recommends that they are not overlooked or ignored because it could be more difficult to curb their activities today if allowed to grow.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Over the past ten years, drones, uprisings, and a challenge from the Islamic State have forced the core al-Qaeda organization al-Qaeda's fortunes have ebbed and based in the Afghanistan/Pakistan (AfPak) region, and its various branches to adapt. When President Barack Obama was inaugurated in January 2009, he wanted to shift the focus of U.S. counterterrorism efforts from foreign wars to AL Qaeda. Instead of getting bogged down fighting in Iraq, a war Obama had opposed, the United States needed to reengage in destroying al-Qaeda's senior leadership, which was responsible for the 9/11 attacks and was still actively plotting attacks. This is why the main feature of the Obama administration's counterterrorism fight was to "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future" (White House, 2009).

In the following years, in contrast to the Bush administration's early efforts at nation building, the Obama administration sought to tread lightly in the campaign against al-Qaeda. The president's preferred tools were drone strikes and special operations. At first, such activities were focused mainly on the AfPak theater, but later they were expanded to other arenas such as Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Syria. This approach yielded success in the killing and capture of many al-Qaeda leaders, (Aaron, 2017), most notably the May 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden's safe house in Abbottabad, Pakistan. At the time, Obama argued that the death of bin Laden marked the most significant achievement to date in the US nation's effort to defeat al-Qaeda." (white House, 2011)

Yet around the same time, jihadist groups began taking advantage of the recent uprisings in various Arab countries, from Tunisia to Libya to Egypt to Yemen to Syria. At the beginning of the Arab uprisings, many within government and the analytical community viewed the monumental events unfolding across the region as discrediting al-Qaeda and its ideology, showing that dictators could be overthrown without the use of violence. Moreover, the fact that al-Qaeda and its branches were not involved in the protests evidently signaled the group's irrelevance. Indeed, al-Qaeda was not involved in the protests, which did demonstrate in certain cases (Tunisia and Egypt) that dictators could be overthrown peacefully. Here, however, it is important to remember that al-Qaeda was never a broad-based movement. Furthermore, while al-Qaeda operatives may have been surprised by the events, they saw fresh opportunities for recruitment and fighting in the emerging openness in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt and, separately, in war zones such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen, where they sought to establish safe havens. In the year following the uprisings, al-Qaeda, its branches, and official media releases by al-Qaeda-aligned ideologues provided guidance for new and established groups on how to deal with the region's changed situation (Daveed & Tara, 2012).

This altered landscape offered further opportunities still. In places such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia, al-Qaeda along with its branches and front groups acted to refine its methodology based on past failed jihad attempts in Algeria, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, but especially in Iraq, rooted in the excesses of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Such reforms centered largely on greater outreach to local communities, working with and through local insurgencies, as well as promoting a religious program through dawa (proselytizing) activities. Prior to the uprisings, many of these ideas were discussed in official media releases, but on a comparatively theoretical level.

That said, in the year or two before the uprisings, al-Qaeda was attempting to carry out the dawa outreach online through its media campaigns. After 2011, for the first time, al-Qaeda was implementing this program on the ground. The Obama administration was slow to recognize al-Qaeda's adaptive exploitation of the new regional reality. Continuing to view the group through a post-9/11 lens instead of a post-Arab-uprising one, the administration also bought into the false narrative that the uprisings and overthrow of some leaders had completely discredited al-Qaeda. For instance, Obama's Homeland Security advisor at the time, John Brennan, expressed the belief that "the al-Qaeda narrative is becoming increasingly bankrupt; there is a new wave sweeping through the Middle East right now that puts a premium on individual rights and freedom and dignity; and so, al-Qaeda, bin Laden—old news. Now is the time to move forward" (Carney, 2011).

In fact, the uprisings were quite timely for al-Qaeda, sweeping away, as they did, old regimes that had long served as U.S. counterterrorism counterparts. Additionally, fluid public spaces and new safe havens allowed al-Qaeda to operate more openly, recharge its network, and gain new recruits and leaders. Al-Qaeda front groups were created in Tunisia (Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia [AST] and Katibat Uqba bin Nafi, Libya (Ansar al-Sharia in Libya [ASL]),

Egypt (Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt), and Syria (Jabhat al-Nusra [JN]). Amid such developments, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) exploited the chaos in Yemen and held a swath of territory from mid-2011 to mid- 2012. Th core group's other main branch, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), benefited from the weapons bazaar that flourished in Libya after the fall of Muammar Qadhafi an insurgency was thus reignited in northern Mali, which led to AQIM controlling territory from spring 2012 into January 2013. Most critically, the burgeoning civil war in Syria provided a magnet for foreign-fighters, allowing al-Qaeda to recruit new individuals to its network from various parts of the world. It also allowed al-Qaeda to dispatch key leaders who had survived the U.S. drone campaign to a new safe

haven, while illustrating the shifting al-Qaeda center of gravity from South Asia to the Levant.

Despite this regional shift, the Obama administration remained focused on AfPak as the site of so-called core al-Qaeda operations. Between bin Laden's death and the end of Obama's tenure in early 2017, the president and his team invoked the al-Qaeda chief's death and the devastation of its top leadership in every major speech on national security. (White House, 2012). This focus on al-Qaeda in AfPak also blinded Obama to the rise of the Islamic State. He even referred to IS as the "jayvee team" as it took more and more territory in Iraq in spring 2014. (Remnick, 2014). The Islamic State's resurgence equally blindsided al-Qaeda, however, providing a major strategic and existential challenge to the network and its future. Right away, most foreign fighters who had joined al-Qaeda's Syria branch, JN, defected to the Islamic State. Furthermore, IS began a campaign seeking baya (a pledge of allegiance) to the new self-declared "caliph," Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, aimed at demonstrating IS's growing strength, appeal, and support across the global jihadist scene. The campaign also intended explicitly to poach individuals, groups, and networks from al-Qaeda. In late June 2014, the Islamic State, buoyed by battlefield triumphs, announced the reestablishment of the historic Islamic Caliphate, wherein its leaders would institute God's law on Earth. This successful message drew ever-growing influxes of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria, appearing to strain al-Qaeda's efforts to take further advantage of the changed post-Arab-uprisings environment.

Around the time IS was reintroducing itself to the jihadist world in April 2013, when it overtly entered Syria, a number of other exogenous factors led to a setback for al-Qaeda namely, a narrowing space for open operations in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. In July 2013, Gen. Abdul Fattah al-Sisi seized control of Egypt in a coup d'etat; in August 2013, the Tunisian state designated AST as a terrorist organization; and in May 2014, Gen. Khalifa Haftar began a military campaign against ASL and other Islamist factions in eastern Libya.

Likewise, outside the Arab world, France began its Operation Serval in January 2013 to retake northern Mali from AQIM and its alliance of more-localized jihadist groups.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Despite the several evets that lead to the decimation of Al-Qaeda, they have continued to be held together. None of its official branches (AQAP, AQIM, JN, or al-Shabab) or leaders broke their *baya* to al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda also saw an opportunity to operate with greater impunity amid the rise of IS, with its control of large swaths of territory threatening key regional American allies and its external operations campaign raising alarm in Western Europe, the Arab world, and Southeast Asia. Whereas previously the global counterterrorism architecture had directed its heat narrowly at al-Qaeda, now the focus is on IS. In using this cover to plan for the future, al-Qaeda is likely to seek sought reinforce its relationships with local populations and make itself indispensable to local insurgencies by planting ever deeper roots, thereby becoming inter twined with these milieus. And indeed, al-Qaeda branches have, in the past few years, become more tightly integrated with local insurgents and actors.

Related front-groups and mergers have included the following: Yemen: Ansar al-Sharia and Abna' Hadramawt/Abyan, both AQAP fronts, Syria: Jabhat al-Nusra with smaller jihadist factions to become Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later with local Syrian Islamist factions to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Libya: ASL's Benghazi and Darnah branches with local Libyan Islamist factions to become Majlis Shura Thwar Benghazi and Majlis Shura alMujahedin Darnah, respectively, Mali (most recently): AQIM's Mali branch with local Malian jihadist actors to create Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslim in Moreover, in September 2014, as al-Qaeda moved a number of its assets from the AfPak region to the Levant, it formalized the creation of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), with the

goal of coopting local militant networks in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

Since 2015, as the Islamic State began losing territory and legitimacy under pressure from the global anti-IS coalition, al-Qaeda and its branches remained intact and in some cases were expanding. Al-Qaeda is thus positioned to potentially reclaim the banner of global jihadism. This project therefore will attempt to critically review this trend critically in the light of global security ad terrorism.

1.3 Objective of the Study

The cardinal reason for undertaking this research is to appraise terrorism and global security with special reference to Al-Qaeda decimation between 2012-2016. However, the specific objectives of the study are:

i. To examine global terrorism and security
ii. Explore how the decimation of Al-Qaeda contributed to the rise of other insurgents like ISIL, etc.
iii. Identify the factors that may lead to a full resurgence of Al-Qaeda
iv. Proffer available options and Solutions to the global terrorist problem.

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study is expected to benefit researchers, analysts, and policy makers in formulating a framework to overcome the problems of terrorism in Nigeria. The appraisal will stimulate further research into the work of strategies to actualizing sustainable peace in terror laden regions and contribute to existing body of knowledge in the field of sustainable peace.

1.5 Scope of the Study

The scope of this work is to critical study on terrorism and global security as it relates to the decimation of Al-Qaeda between 2012 to 2016.

1.6 Methodology

The information for this work is mainly using the qualitative method and secondary data. The secondary data will collection consist of library sources like books and periodicals, the Internet, Academic Journals, and Magazines and Newspapers, etc. Analysis will be descriptive using literature.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

The limitation of this study is the time constraint to critically review the loads of available information on the subject. This however will not affect the quality of the research work as the most important materials will be reviewed adequately.

1.8 Definition of Terms

counter-terrorism: - Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

failed state: A dysfunctional state which also has multiple competing political factions in conflict within its borders or has no functioning governance above the local level. This does not imply that a central government facing an insurgency is automatically a failed state. If essential functions of government continue in areas controlled by the central authority, it has not "failed".

conflict: (Army) - A political-military situation between peace and war, distinguished from peace by the introduction of organized political violence and from war by its reliance on political methods. It shares many of the goals and characteristics of war, including the destruction of governments and the control of territory.

guerilla warfare: - Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

insurgency: - An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

narco-terrorism: -Terrorism conducted to further the aims of drug traffickers. It may include assassinations, extortion, hijackings, bombings, and kidnappings directed against judges, prosecutors, elected officials, or law enforcement agents, and general disruption of a legitimate government to divert attention from drug operations.

nation: A community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government, or a territorial division containing a body of people of one or more nationalities and usually characterized by relatively large size and independent status.

nation-state: A form of political organization under which a relatively homogeneous people inhabits a sovereign state; especially a state containing one as opposed to several nationalities.

terror tactics: Given that the Army defines Tactics as "the art and science of employing available means to win battles and engagements", then terror tactics should be considered "the art and science of employing violence, terror and intimidation to inculcate fear in the pursuit of political, religious, or ideological goals".

terrorism: - The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

terrorist: - An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.

terrorist goals: The term goals will refer to the strategic end or end state that the terrorist objectives are intended to obtain. Terrorist organization goals equate to the strategic level of war.

terrorist group: Any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism (U.S. Dept of State).

terrorist objectives: The standard definition of objective is - "The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable aims which every military operation should be directed towards". For the purposes of this work, terrorist objectives will refer to the intended outcome or result of one or a series of terrorist operations or actions. It is analogous to the tactical or operational levels of war.

transnational: Extending or going beyond national boundaries (Webster). In this context, not limited to or centered within a single nation.

underground: A covert unconventional warfare organization established to operate in areas denied to the guerrilla forces or conduct operations not suitable for guerrilla forces.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review

2.1.1 Background and Impact Assessment of terrorism

Terrorism and the security threats it poses to individual states and the global community currently dominate the public discourse. Scholars, policymakers, and ordinary citizens have become active participants in an endless inquiry into the nature, root causes, impacts, trends, patterns, and remedies of terrorism. Although serious academic research on terrorism goes back to early 1970s and 1980s (Crenshaw, 2014), the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States served as a catalyst that intensified research efforts within the academic circles (Sageman, 2014).

Since 9/11, many researchers in the fields of social sciences and humanities from the universities around the world have been engaged in the monitoring, data collection, and analysis of terrorism related violence (Freilich, *et al*, 2009). In the United States, the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) has been playing an important role since 2000 in collecting and collating data on terrorism related incidents around the world through its Global Terrorism Database. With available data on terrorism, researchers at the Institute for Economics and Peace found that 2015 was the second deadliest year on record with a total number of 29,376 deaths, and an economic loss of US$89.6 billion (Global Terrorism Index, 2016).

Several factors could explain the global spread of terrorism. First, it is believed that the emergence of ISIL from the Middle East as an international terrorist network accounts for the rapid spread of terrorism related violence in the western countries through its affiliates in many countries and its recruitment of lone wolves on social media (McCauley and

Moskalenko, 2014). Second, the militarized engagement of Boko Haram in the northeastern part of Nigeria by the Nigerian military forced Boko Haram members to flee to neighboring countries of Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, from where the group recruited more members and intensified its violent acts against the local populations, government facilities, and the law enforcement (START, 2015). The third factor is the regrouping and rebranding of Al-Qaeda after the killing of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011 in Pakistan, and the death of Muammar Gaddafi on October 20, 2011 which created a vacuum for the activities of terrorists in Libya. Al-Qaeda's activities are currently present in Africa - especially in the Maghreb region - and the Arab world through its affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Lebanon, Kurdistan, Mali, Algeria, and other countries (Crenshaw, 2014). Fourth, Al-Shabaab's continuous activities in East Africa, particularly in Somalia and Kenya, and its collaboration with other terrorist networks make the global counterterrorism efforts more difficult in that region. The fifth factor is that against the counterterrorism measures and the war on terror by the United States and its allies, the Taliban intensified its terror attacks and war in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with a 29 percent increase in terrorism related deaths and 34 percent increase in battlefield deaths, making it a total of 19,502 deaths in 2015 (Global Terrorism Index, 2016).

Without neglecting the other factors that are not mentioned here, the sixth point is the unpredictable nature of the transnationally connected but domestically executed terrorism related attacks by home-grown-lone-wolves in the Western countries (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014; King and Taylor, 2011; Moghadam, 2006). The transnational nature of the terrorist attacks that occurred in Western countries, for example, the terrorist attacks in Boston, San Bernardino, Orlando, Paris, Brussels, Ankara, London, Berlin, and so on, show that terrorism is no longer a Middle Eastern, Asian or African problem. Terrorism poses a serious threat to the national security of Western countries, and the world at large.

Researchers have identified some common drivers of terrorism. In developing countries, there is a correlation between state sponsored political violence combined with existing unresolved intractable conflicts, and terrorism (Testas, 2004; Piazza, 2006; Çınar, 2009). For example, it is believed that the extrajudicial killing in 2009 of Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, by the Nigerian law enforcement motivated the members of Boko Haram to revenge through violence. The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the dethronement of Sadam Hussein in 2003 are said to have planted the seed for anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in the Arab world (Moghadam, 2006). The killing of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, the war in Syria, and the interethnic war in Iraq created the conditions for the rapid spread of the Islamic State's ideology. It is estimated that between 1989 and 2014, about 93 percent of all the global terrorist attacks occurred in those countries where state sponsored violence and intractable interethnic or interreligious conflicts exist (Global Terrorism Index, 2016). In some developed countries, however, it is believed that youth unemployment, exclusion, underlying grievances, access to weapons, and so on, drive lone wolves to commit terrorist attacks (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; King and Taylor, 2011).

Although the security threat posed by terrorism is highly felt in countries around the world, it is reported that Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria and Nigeria have suffered the most, accounting for 72 percent of all deaths related to terrorism in 2015. Also, it is believed that ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida committed the highest number of terrorist attacks in 2015 while being responsible for about 74 percent of all terrorism related deaths globally (Global Terrorism Index, 2016).

Combatting the threats that terrorism poses to human and ecological security and peace will require concerted, coordinated, and proactive efforts from each of the affected countries as well as the international community. Each country, for example the United States, has initiated counterterrorism programs that involve all the relevant government agencies, civil

society, and faith-based organizations (Sageman, 2014). Nevertheless, the United Nations, through the General Assembly and the Security Council, has adopted many catalyzing and coordinating resolutions aimed at helping and empowering member states to successfully deal with the challenges they face in their counterterrorism activities. Prominent among the United Nations terrorism related resolutions is the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (United Nations General Assembly, 8 September 2006). It was recommended in this resolution that the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) should help member states develop a global action plan containing four key counterterrorism measures. The four key measures were: measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard; and measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (United Nations General Assembly, 8 September 2006). Each of these measures contain specific actionable items.

However, it is important to note here that the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), an international forum of 29 countries and the European Union that works "to reduce the vulnerability of people worldwide to terrorism by preventing, combating, and prosecuting terrorist acts and countering incitement and recruitment to terrorism," believes that applying the United Nations resolution to meet three specific needs is vital. Through its "Life Cycle Toolkit," the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum recommends that to successfully combat terrorism globally, member states should channel their efforts to three main areas: prevention, detection and intervention, and rehabilitation and reintegration (Global Counter-Terrorism Forum Life Cycle Toolkit).

With the above background knowledge on terrorism, the remaining sections of this literature review seeks to explore in detail five fundamental questions that are at the center of academic

research on terrorism. These questions are: Is there a globally accepted definition of terrorism? Are policymakers really addressing the root causes of terrorism or are they fighting its symptoms? To what extent has terrorism and its threats to peace and security left an indelible scar on humanity? If we were to consider terrorism to be a public illness, what types of medication could be prescribed to permanently cure it? What methods, techniques and processes would be appropriate to help affected groups engage in a meaningful discussion on the topic of terrorism in order to generate mutually acceptable and implementable solutions that are based on reliable information and respect for the dignity and rights of individuals and groups?

2.1.2 Definition of Terrorism

The definition of terrorism has generated numerous debates within the academic arena, just as the efforts to explain what terrorism is have been a contested endeavor among policymakers (Weiss, 2002; Schmid, 2005). Although the debate on the definition of terrorism could be traced to the 1960s and 1970s (Roberts, 2015), the current arguments on the definition of terrorism revolve around what exactly constitutes terrorism and a terrorist attack (Lentini, 2008).

Scholars and policymakers are stuck in their efforts to outline the criteria for distinguishing terrorism from other state and non-state violence. While some researchers argue that setting globally acceptable criteria for knowing and identifying terrorist acts is important, others believe that such criteria should be relative depending on the situation, location, motivations, and national policies (Weiss, 2002). In-between these opposing positions, the third argument takes a middle ground approach and argues that when we see a terrorist act, we will know exactly what it is (Greenstock, 2001, as cited in Weiss, 2002). This means that our knowledge or definition of terrorism should be derived from our perception of what we think and recognize as a terrorist attack. The idea of *when we see it, we will know what it is*, reminds us

of St. Augustine's answer to the question about time. What is time? St Augustine replies: "If you don't ask me, I know it; but if you ask me, I don't know" (Augustine, & Chadwick,1992).

Although these arguments on the definition of terrorism persist in the available research literature, there is a consensus among scholars and researchers that terrorism poses a serious threat to peace and security all over the world (Freilich, *et al*, 2009). Scholars also agree that the impacts of terrorism on societies in countries around the world are devastating, and that terrorism should be considered as an international crime under the statutes of the International Criminal Court (Lawless, 2007). For this reason, many scholars have argued that to define terrorism, it is imperative to go from the known to the unknown; that is, from the visible effects of terrorism on societies to the unexpressed motivations for committing acts of terror (Newman, 2006). This means that a definition of terrorism should include the impacts of terrorism on the victims, the consequences of terrorist attacks on societies, and the motivations that drive terrorists to inflict harm on others and cause substantial damage and loss to the society and families.

One question comes to mind regarding this visible impacts and motivation assessment argument of terrorism. Could those violent acts that are sponsored by the state actors qualify as terrorism? For the past two thousand years, state actors have directly or indirectly inflicted devastating acts of violence on some populations as a means to achieving their goals and realizing their interests (Laqueur 2001; Rapoport 2003, as cited in Lentini, 2008). Recently, it is reported by Democracy Now that about 1,500 civilians are directly killed by U.S. airstrikes in Iraq and Syria only in March 2017 (Democracy Now, March 30, 2017). Also, it is reported by Amnesty International that hundreds of civilians were recently killed inside their homes or refuge places in Mosul, Iraq, by the U.S. led coalition airstrikes after receiving orders not to leave their homes from the Iraqi government (Amnesty International, 28 March 2017). In

addition, report that the Assad government used chemical weapon against the Syrian civilians outweighed the normal impact of terror on innocent populations.

The arguments on defining terrorism from the level of impact it has on humans and their societies to the motivations for committing such atrocities, or from motivation to impact, show how complicated, complex and nuanced the use of the term terrorism is within the academic arena. Lentini (2003, as cited in Lentini, 2008) confirms that terrorism is a multifaceted phenomenon. Multifaceted in the sense that terrorism could be understood from many perspectives. It is like a coin with two sides, or a double-edged sword. World icons and Nobel peace prize winners like Nelson Mandela, Menachem Begin, and Yasser Arafat were once labeled as terrorists (Weiss, 2002).

Depending on how it is understood and defined and considering the motivations of those who resort to violence to achieve their goals, terrorism could have both favorable and unfavorable consequences. From this perspective, some scholars have argued that strategic bombing, for example, could qualify as a terrorist attack (Grosscup, 2006). Military strategic bombing on the civilians located on the side of the enemy, just like the targeted terrorist attack by bomb explosion or suicide bombing which are committed by the known terrorist networks, are all carried out to intentionally inflict psychological and physical damage, as well as a loss on the enemy. So, some authors like Grosscup (2006) question the difference between those military strategic bombing that are intentionally dropped on civilians to weaken the enemy and the suicide bombing or killings committed by those who are labeled terrorists.

In the last analysis, the question that stands out is: who has the authority, ethical standard, moral obligation, and legal parameters to determine and declare a particular group a terrorist organization? In 1995, Jordan and Weedon published an important research article where they argued that the powerful has always been the one to determine, name, and define

contentious global issues (Jordan and Weedon, 1995). For Weiss (2002), the use of violence to achieve a political goal is usually condemned by those who are unsympathetic to the struggle and applauded by those in solidarity with the cause. Boko Haram, an Islamic religious organization that started off peacefully in 2002 in the northeastern part of Nigeria, for example, was declared a terrorist organization on September 14, 2013 when the United States government through the office of the U.S. Secretary of State designated Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) after a series of violent confrontation with the Nigerian law enforcement, beginning from 2009 when the Boko Haram's founder was killed (Ugorji, 2016).

Moreover, scholars like Grosscup (2006) have consistently maintained that defining terrorism and establishing the criteria for determining what is or what is not terrorism have been the preoccupation of those who are in the position of power. Often the underlying conflicts or grievances that motivate groups to violence are not considered before these groups are branded terrorist organizations. A hasty labeling of a group as a terrorist organization without a careful examination of the underlying issues could have many consequences.

Roberts (2015) identifies three types of consequences associated with placing a terrorism label on a group. First, it could lead to misunderstanding and costly mistakes. For example, it was later recognized and acknowledged internationally that the labeling of the African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela of South Africa in 1988 by the United States and the United Kingdom as a terrorist organization was a regrettable mistake. Second, such labels could impede negotiation or mediation efforts with the group, to the extent that it will be impossible to utilize the "*dangerous* mediation" model proposed by Cloke (2001) in mediating fascism and oppression-oriented conflict. Third, labeling a group as a terrorist organization may hinder future efforts to fight an enemy of a higher order in partnership with the labeled group, just as the Turkish Kurdish organization (PKK), although labeled as a

terrorist organization by Turkey and some western countries, has been instrumental in fighting ISIS.

However, many scholars believe that to be able to set the parameters for determining what qualifies as terrorism, there is need to distinguish between state actions and non-state actions as they occurred in the past and as they are occurring in the present (Schinkel, 2009). According to this idea, terrorism is nothing but a spillover from what the perpetrators consider to be past injustices and oppression. Some scholars argue that "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" and that "Whom the Israelis call a terrorist, the Palestinians call a martyr" (Weiss, 2002, p. 11).

However, could the state sponsored violence be considered as terrorism? To this question, some scholars argue that the state sponsored military strategic bombing is governed by international laws, and when such laws or treaties are violated, the violators will be charged for committing crimes against humanity and gross violations of human and group rights to existence (Lentini, 2008). Rapoport and Wilkinson (1971, as cited in Roberts, 2015) were the first to emphasize the need to separate terrorism from other forms of political violence. Non-state actors on the other hand, are viewed differently. Through terrorist attacks, non-state actors are described to be involved in "a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence" (Thornton, 1964, p. 73, as cited in Roberts, 2015).

Based on this distinction, Hoffman (1998) proposes a definition of terrorism that excludes state sponsored violence on the civilians. Terrorism, according to Hoffman (1998) is defined as the use of violence or a declared threat to use violence against a population or non-combatants including their possessions in order to cause a political change by creating fear in the society. While maintaining that scholars should be cautious in their attempt to define

terrorism, Roberts (2015) argues that inasmuch as the core meaning of terrorism is largely accepted while the peripheral meaning is debatable and given that the meaning of terrorism is not static, the notion of state sponsored terror should be included in the definition of terrorism. Whether the perpetrators are state actors or non-state actors, it is believed that terrorism is "a form of political communication, violence intended to send a message to a watching audience" (Crenshaw, 2014).

Therefore, there is need to situate the definition and analysis of terrorism in a wider theoretical framework (Crenshaw, 2014). But most importantly, scholars and researchers should try to understand how policymakers and the law enforcement conceptualize and define terrorism in their counterterrorism activities. The pioneering research survey conducted by Freilich, *et al*. (2009) with the American State Police agencies about "terrorism threats, terrorism sources, and terrorism definitions" is very instructive. The researchers provided the respondents with a set of definitions of terrorism that includes those of the state agencies and academic scholars without telling them the sources of the definitions. It is reported that the law enforcement's understanding of terrorism has about 83.8 percent match with that of the FBI and 40.5 percent match with the state department's; and lower matches with those definitions from the academic fields, for example, the definitions by Brian Jenkins (27. 7 percent) and James Poland (27.7 percent) (Freilich, *et al*, 2009).

The four definitions that emerged from Freilich, *et al*.'s (2009) survey are stated below.

i. FBI: "Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."
ii. S. State Department: "Terrorism is the purposeful threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to

established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to influence the victim and or a target group wider than the immediate victim or victims."

iii. Brian Jenkins: Terrorism is "the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about a political change."

iv. James Poland: "Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience" (as cited in Freilich, *et al*., 2009).

Having reviewed the various arguments on the definition of terrorism, and with the understanding of terrorism through the four definitions stated above, one question that needs to be examined in the terrorism literature is it will be instructive to review what researchers think as the root causes of terrorism.

2.1.3 Root Causes of Terrorism

The root causes of terrorism, just like its definition, are contested in the available research literature. Since there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, it is difficult to agree on what constitutes the underlying causes of terrorism at the local and international levels (Schmid, 2005; Newman, 2006). However, a quick scan of the major research literature on terrorism from 2002 to 2017 reveals common themes identified by scholars as the primary root causes of terrorism. Central to these themes – which will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs – is the notion of existing or perceived injustices (Weiss, 2002).

Actual or perceived injustice, however, is a complex and vague term. Are these injustices found within the economic, political, social, demographic, psychological, religious, or family domains? In his analysis of previously identified root causes of terrorism, Newman (2006) distinguishes between "permissive structural factors and direct underlying grievances" (p.

751). The structural factors represent the structures that enable, ferment, and perpetuate all forms of injustices. They are the enablers of terrorism at the premanifest conflict processes level (Cheldelin *et al*., 2008, as cited in Ugorji, 2016). These structures could be local, national or international institutions that ferment poverty, unfavorable social change, unemployment, or forced migration, and so on. The underlying grievances are tangible political issues that have not yet been resolved, including "inequality, exclusion, repression, dispossession, sense of humiliation/alienation, sense of foreign occupation/hegemony, clash of identities/dispute with identity aspect, violent conflict, negative effects of globalization, sudden economic downturns" (Newman, 2006, p. 764). These manifest conflict processes, according to Sandole (Cheldelin *et al*., 2008, as cited in Ugorji, 2016) could escalate to aggressive manifest conflict processes of which terrorism is a good example.

Nevertheless, both the structural factors and the underlying grievances alone cannot escalate to terrorism. There is need for a catalyzing agency. The catalytic conditions according to Newman (2006) are "leadership, funding, and state sponsorship" (p. 764).

A deep reflection on Newman's (2006) analysis of the root causes of terrorism reveals some similarities with the works of his predecessors. In 1981, Martha Crenshaw published an important research article entitled, "The Causes of Terrorism" (Crenshaw, 1981) in which she identified two distinguishing categories of causes: preconditions and precipitants. The preconditions are those underlying factors that create the conditions for the emergence of terrorism, and they are a combination of root causes and situational or proximate causes. Examples of the root causes that Sirseloudi (2004) outlined in his research article entitled, "Early Detection of Terrorist Campaigns" (as cited in Schmid, 2005) are "lack of democracy, lack of rule of law, lack of good governance, lack of social justice, the backing of illegitimate regimes, high/rising distributive inequality, historical experience of violent conflict waging, support for groups using terrorist means, vulnerability of modern democracies, and failed

states / safe havens outside state control" (p. 133). The precipitants are those catalyzing actions or factors that immediately precede the occurrence of a terrorist attack, and they include a "counterterrorism campaign causing many victims to call "for revenge and retaliation, humiliation of the group or its supporters, threat, failed peace talks, elections, and symbolic dates" (Schmid, 2005, p. 133).

Both the preconditions and precipitants theory of Crenshaw (1981) and the permissive structural factors and direct underlying grievances theory of Newman (2006) show that that which has the potency of causing terrorism could also be found within the causes of war in the same way that the causes of war could be explained from the causes of conflict, conflict dynamics, situations, environment, and motives. The difficult question is: why do some groups or individuals in a conflict or crisis mode choose terrorism instead of other conflict styles or tactics? Schmid (2005) contends that the choice of terrorism as a conflict style is based on seven factors: the size of the group – small groups are more likely to resort to terrorism than large ones -; resources available to the group including having access to arms and bombs; media coverage of past terrorist attacks, creating the conditions for a sense of fame and heroism; internal group dynamics; "relative group strength compared to the political opponent; the group's ideology; and the conflict behavior of the opponent" (p. 135).

Although the above root causes of terrorism may seem very intriguing and accurate, some qualitative and quantitative research conducted in the last decade found that, contrary to the popular belief, factors such as poverty and economic downturn or income are not significantly related to terrorism (Testas, 2004; Pedahzur, 2005, Piazza, 2006; Çınar, 2009). Instead, these researchers found that higher education levels could even be an asset for transnational terrorism in some countries (Testas, 2004), and that increased state repression, structure of party politics, political injustices and ethno-religious grievances are significant predictors of terrorism (Testas, 2004; Piazza, 2006; Çınar, 2009). It is very difficult though to

explain how higher education could qualify as a root cause of terrorism. It is true that people who have higher education degrees would want to assume the leadership of an emerging political entity or a new state should the use of terrorism result in independence or self-determination. Also, people who have advanced knowledge in internet technology including social media and telecommunication could be a great asset to terrorist networks. However, could education alone motivate people to pursue their goals using terrorism? This question is yet to be answered by researchers.

However, existing interethnic or interreligious grievances and conflicts are most likely to escalate, serving as a radicalization pathway toward terrorism. Some scholars have argued that to understand the root causes of terrorism, it is important to explain how radicalization happens (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; King and Taylor, 2011); and what constitutes the profile of lone wolves, particularly "what moves an individual from radical opinion to radical action" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014). McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) argue that radicalization and its extreme outcome – terrorism - could be explained from the perspective of the social cleavage theory through the dynamics of existing intergroup conflict. People tend to identify with their own group and do everything possible to defend their group. For them, what is branded "terrorism" is nothing but a defense mechanism in solidarity with the group people identify with.

It is true that group members could have strong sentiments for and attachment to their group. But what exactly accounts for the shift from radical attachment to the group one identifies with to a radical action or a terrorist attack against another group? How could the radicalization of homegrown jihadists in Western countries, for example, be explained? These questions are the preoccupation of King and Taylor (2011). In their research on "the Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists," King and Taylor (2011) found that the root causes of radicalization and terrorism could be explained not only from the social cleavage

perspective, but primarily through a combination of three psychological factors identified as "group relative deprivation, identity conflicts, and personality characteristics" (p. 602).

Depriving a group of what belongs to that group, coupled with other identity-based conflicts, are necessary but not sufficient in explaining the gap between "radical opinion and radical action" or in understanding what motivates a terrorist organization or group. For this reason, some scholars argue that in the last analysis it is better to explore the root causes of terrorism through the constituting elements of the profile of lone wolf terrorists, especially through their "personality characteristics" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). In their research, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) discovered two important profiles of lone wolf terrorists which could explain the root causes of terrorism. These are "disconnected-disordered and caring-compelled" (p. 69). The disconnected-disordered are lone wolf terrorists with signs of psychological disorders who are motivated by existing grievances, and because of their access to or mastery of weapons and ammunitions, they are inclined to committing terrorist attacks on civilians or government property. The caring-compelled are those lone wolf terrorists who are motivated by the suffering of other individuals or groups to whom they are strongly connected and are compelled to act in order to "reduce or avenge this suffering" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). This explains to a high degree why individuals without previous criminal records could instantly commit suicide terrorist attacks in order to be recognized as a martyr by their group members (Moghadam, 2006; Pedahzur, 2005).

The preceding root causes of terrorism, especially suicide terrorism, tend to show that suicide bombers act from a rationally, well reflected, and willful decision making, which makes suicide terrorism "a rational tactical strategy (Pedahzur, 2005, p. 33). However, this position fails to recognize or account for hundreds of minors who are being kidnapped by terrorist organizations, hypnotized, and forced to commit suicide bombing on their behalf. It is our contention that these innocent children do not willingly choose to become terrorists. They are

victims of terrorism in the same manner that victims of suicide bomb explosions are. It is important therefore that researchers and policymakers devote more time and resources to understanding the plights and vulnerability of the kidnapped minors and how they could be rescued, as well as how the kidnapping by terrorists could be prevented.

Preventing terrorists from kidnapping minors and recruiting the vulnerable fall within the ongoing search for sustainable solutions to terrorism. In the next section of this literature review, efforts will be made to examine the various theories, methods, techniques and processes proposed by researchers to prevent and resolve terrorism related issues.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The theory that will form the main thrust of this research work is the just war theory. Just war theory is a doctrine, also referred to as a tradition, of military ethics. The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure war is morally justifiable through a series of criteria, all of which must be met for a war to be considered just. The criteria are split into two groups: "right to go to war" (*jus ad bellum*) and "right conduct in war" (*jus in bello*). The first concerns the morality of going to war, and the second the moral conduct within war. (Guthrie ad Quinlan, 2007). The Just war theory postulates that war, while terrible, is not always the worst option and that important responsibilities, undesirable outcomes, or preventable atrocities may justify war (Guthrie ad Quinlan, 2007). Wars fought to redress grievous wrongs or to put a stop to evil have been termed just wars.

Although Western law has slowly come to accept war as an inevitable instrument of national policy (Steiner and Alston, 2000), and turned its attention to setting standards for the conduct of war, important echoes of just war theory remain. A distinction was made at Nuremberg, and later embedded in articles 2 and 51 of the United Nations charter, between unacceptable aggressive war and acceptable wars of self-defense. (UN Article 6, 1945). The seven main

principles of just war theory are that, the cause must be just; a lawful authority must decide to resort to force; the intention of the war must accord with international law; the use of force must be a last resort; the probability of success should be high; the cost benefit ratio should be positive and finally the means used must conform with international humanitarian law. Below is a brief review of the US war in Afghanistan and the subsequent decimation of Al-Qaida.

The cause must be just

In modern interpretations of just war theory there are two legitimate reasons for aggressive war: self defence against an aggressor and humanitarian intervention against a sovereign state in response to acts that shock the moral conscience of mankind. A military response to the massive attack on the United States on 11 September could arguably be justified in terms of self defence. A case could convincingly be made that a malevolent global network of terror was responsible and ready to attack again. Intervention in the sovereign affairs of Afghanistan to pursue al-Qaeda could also be seen as legitimate. A counter to this position would either have to dismiss the gravity of the threat to the United States or to assert that the shocking act was insufficient to warrant intervention in Afghanistan.

A lawful authority must decide to resort to force

The higher (and more international) the authority, the stronger the standing. President Bush used his executive power to activate US armed forces without formally seeking a congressional declaration of war against Afghanistan. NATO and the UN were asked to support this decision and they did.

The intention of the war must accord with international law

Legitimate intentions for a just war include removal of threat and restoration or establishment of a lawful regime likely to uphold human rights and international law. Evidence of ulterior

motives (such as securing access to oil reserves or fulfilling a need for revenge) would undermine assertions of legitimate intent. Intention to remove the threat of international terrorism led to action against al-Qaeda. Although a war against non-state actors does not (in theory) provide legal justification for an attack on a sovereign state, it was unavoidable when it became clear to what extent al-Qaeda had infiltrated the leadership of the Taliban. The United States found that, to remove the threat, it was necessary to overthrow the Afghan government. The rapid rout of the Taliban allowed the United States to slip rapidly in and out of the uncomfortable legal position of overthrowing a sovereign regime.

The use of force must be a last resort

All reasonable political and economic means to effect the desired ends must be shown to have been seriously attempted and exhausted. It could be argued that from the outset the terrorist attack against the United States should have been defined as a criminal rather than a military threat, requiring a political and diplomatic response, including extradition manoeuvres, economic and political sanctions, and judicial proceedings. Military build up and deployment in this context could then have had a relatively minor tactical role. The counter argument, bolstered by the early military success, was that the Taliban was not seriously interested in negotiating, and only an all out military assault would expel the al-Qaeda network from Afghanistan.

The probability of success should be high

Determining whether a cause is just includes a practical determination of its likelihood of success. There was never any serious concern that the supremacy of the US military would be challenged in Afghanistan. But the capacities of a far-flung shadowy terrorist network are difficult to gauge.

The cost benefit ratio should be positive

In just war theory, the notion of proportionality boils down to saying that the good sought by the war must outweigh the evil it will produce. This difficult analysis requires balancing incommensurable goods (Afghan civilian lives lost versus al-Qaeda network disrupted; civil liberties curtailed versus security enforced). Only people with similar world views and value systems .

The means used must conform with international humanitarian law

Just war theory insists that the means used in any war accord with the rules defined in international law, such as the Geneva Conventions. These rules apply to states when they engage their forces in combat, whether the targets are states or non-state actors, and they set high standards for civilian protection, design and use of weapons, and treatment of combatant prisoners of war. The term "war" carries great potential for political, economic, and military mobilisation, which the United States has used to full effect, but it also has great responsibilities. These legal responsibilities apply without question to Afghan civilians and combatants.

CHAPTER THREE

TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY

3.1 Overview of Security in the face of Terrorism

The September 11, 2001 attack on the twin towers in New York and Pentagon building in Washington brought to the fore a general recognition that terrorism is a global problem that required urgent attention. The response was a war on terror against groups defined as a murderous, oppressive, violent and hateful, whose Islamic radicalism is fingered as responsible for the attack and seen as threat to peace, security and prosperity of the global community. What came in consonance with the war on terror is the phrase 'axis of evil' popularized by the former American president George W Bush and as the war assumed global dimension, terrorists were driven from their previous safe heavens as country's were either for or against in this war.

Since the end of the cold war the international Relations (IR) as well as international security environment has become more complex. A number of issues have been added to traditional concerns in the field such as international terrorism, cross-border security threats, failed states, internal conflicts, and consequences for global inequalities, weapon proliferation and the emergency of new interventionist foreign policies. The catastrophic and aftermath of September 11, 2001 have been dramatic that motivated contemporary IR scholars and practitioners to conclude that, the world has entered an "age of terrorism". Since then, the consciousness of terrorism has taken a quantum leap. Terrorism now looms as a new and menacing situation without end, calling for new approaches on many fronts including a new kind of preparedness and a new kind of struggle against it (Heywood, 2011; Mitchel and Smelser, 2002).

The magnitude of the disaster of 9/11 brought to bear a general recognition that required urgent attention. Terrorism has acquired global reach, and it destructive potential has greatly increased (Heywood, 2011; Ovasogie, 2013; Tella and Akintola, 2013). The activity of contemporary terrorists as non- State actors is a challenge to the sovereign States. The upsurge of terrorism (after 9/11) and perception of global insecurity have resulted from the changing in the power structure and ideological configuration of the IR caused by the collapse of the entire deterrence regime as previously defined, that is norms, rules and procedures of international system of governance (i.e. traditional approaches to IR). Today, it is impossible to read news headlines without seen terrorism as public phenomenon. In other words, it is inconceivable to think of a public event- the premier leagues, world cup games, an economic summit, any official gathering without worrying about security and threat of terrorist activities globally

3.2 Implications of the rise of terrorism in the contemporary IR

Today humanity is facing the risk of being exterminated as a result of terrorism. The impacts of terrorism (though positive and negative) in contemporary IR have left behind inestimable damages to every facet of life globally. There is no gainsaying that, the rise of terrorism has slowed down international economic relations growth and development. Indeed, no investors would prefer to invest in a crisis ridden nations (Agba E, 2015). The world now lives in fear like Hobessian theory of state of nature, "where every man is against everyman". No country goes unaffected by the upsurge of terrorism, for the reason that, global community is interconnected and interdependence (Nimma, 2007).

Terrorism threaten the viability of nation-states bringing about economic crises, political instability, a threat to tourism, energy-sector, civil-aviations, maritime, transportations (Oviasogie, 2013). In fact, terrorism is today considered to be the second most serious threat to global security after the fear of nuclear conflagration by or between superpowers in the

international system. Terrorism is a huge threat all round world to the extent that, they influence global politics due to their financial and resources capabilities. The Institute for Economic and Peace (IEP) released reports that, there is increased of deaths to 61% from 2013-2014 caused by terrorism globally (Naija.com- foreign news, 21 st November, 2014).

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI), reported that, there is rising from 11,133 in 2012 to 17,958 of deaths in 2013 and the numbers shows that, more than 80% of death occur in just five terrorist countries (i.e. Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and), and accounted for the global figures going up daily (Global Terrorism Index GTI 2014). Indeed, contemporary theorists of IR argued that, the upsurge of terrorism is a signed of 4th world wars with catastrophic destruction of human existence. Given the tight political, financial and trade relations of contemporary world, where no country is an island, terrorist attack carried out in out in one state bring greater consequences in many other states. Terrorism as an act of violence have changed the history and geography of the world, and ripples of its effect have reached international politics, of world policies and the domestically controlled environment of many countries including security issues across the globe.

The consequences of terrorist attack ranges from physical damages of infrastructure (example, bridges, buildings, electrical grids, communication system, computer networks, software etc), biological damages to people, animals, plants (causes epidemics, epizootics and epiphytic), environmental damages, psychological damages (example, panic, conflict, class warfare), economic disruption (example, suspension of trade, banking and supply etc) among others (Mitchel and Smelser, 2002). However, there are several implications of the upsurge of terrorism in the contemporary IR, but for the purpose of this paper the following are summed up as the major impacts of terrorism; Economic, Political, Psychological Repercussion and Foreign Policy.

3.3 Global Political Impacts

The upsurge of international terrorism is currently dominating IR as well as global politics due to it large impacts on the political systems. The upsurge is the aspects that are significant for strength/ failure of nations-states or the internal and external erosion of state capacity. Terrorism leads to problem of weak and failure of states today, such as Somalia, Afghanistan and Yemen, even Nigeria is moving towards collapsing. Terrorists have operated in many countries around the world. They have the capacities to strike any territory to destabilize domestic politics and promote their cause. Terrorist interfered in country's sovereignty and makes eventual peace efforts in the country more difficult, if not impossible. Terrorist acts lead to erosion of civil liberties on national level and undermining sovereignty in the relations between state in the international system (Koechler, 2002). The post 9/11 environment has also relegated the Israeli/Palestinian to the back burner thereby to a freeze in the peace process and the result is the renewed cycle of violence and growing tension in the region having great implication on global security (Kwangha and Robert 2011). For example, the upsurge of terrorism poses serious dangers to Nigeria's nascent democracy and economic development (Isayaku, 2013). Terrorism paves ways for vicious political violence in Nigeria, and lack of legitimacy of government in some countries in Middle East. Recent cross-national study shows that, terrorism affect voting behaviours and access to life satisfaction (William et al, 2012). Terrorist event could produce a rally effect among political parties (as the case of Nigeria) leading to more unified from across parties in opposition to terrorism demand.

3.4 Foreign Relations Impacts

One of the major features of the current conjecture in international politics and international security is the upsurge of terrorism on states relations. Terrorism has negative impacts on global security, which affect every nations of the world because of their interdependence and interconnected nature (Agba E, 2015). It is true the foreign policies of different countries are

changed due to international terrorism. Countries that help to expand international terrorism are ignored by the UN member's countries.

Today, the upsurge of terrorism not only affected IR, but also influences foreign policy of many nations. For example, the US reports from CIA, restricted its citizens to avoid travelling to terrorist countries including Nigeria. The failed attempt by a young Nigerian to US bound plane from Amsterdam on Christmas day, and the bombings by Boko Haram terrorist linked to Al-Qaeda impacted negatively in Nigeria's foreign relations (Isayaku, 2013). The upsurge of terrorist attack influences Nigeria's foreign relations, where foreign nationals had lost their lives due to bombings and hostage taking. The UN bombing which claimed the lives of 23 persons in Abuja Nigeria on the 26th, August, 2011, seriously affected Nigeria's relations to other nations in the globe. The killing of a British Mcmamus and his Italian counterpart, Franco Lamlingara by Nigerian terrorist attracted global condemnation and tarnished the image of Nigeria in the international politics (Adele, 2013).

3.5 Psychological and Socio-cultural Impacts:

The trauma caused by terrorism on the world stage and the consequences thereof are incalculable. Indeed, international terrorism has become a nightmare. The upsurges of terrorism have posed serious bias and ideological beliefs in the minds of people. Example, terrorism usually centered on the ideological fundamentalist of jihad, and rejection of western principles. People are so dogmatized with the notion to persuade violence. Terrorism could be perceived as criminal acts in IR. That is irrespective of ideology, terrorist acts are considered by all civilized societies to be at odds with social, moral and common decency (Ogundiya and Amzat, 2008). In their work, Mitchel and Smelser (2002) viewed that, regions that produce terrorist threat have notion on colonialism, economic and cultural penetration in accelerated process of globalization. Many contemporary terrorist ideologies single out

American or the West political and economic policies as object of opposition. This imparts a distinctive political cast to contemporary IR and establishes other forms of international conflicts. The impact of such relations of states results to economic and political dislocations and creation of new values. Consequently, this dislocation leads to terrorist organizations revolting in trying to retain their traditional purity (Mitchel and Smelser, 2002:13).

Closely related to that, many leaders of Islamic states/world perceived the US as threat, due to its policies of globalization and hegemonic culture. On the other hand, Western world portrays Islam as its main enemy and the Muslim world as a hotbed of terrorism that threaten civilization and its democratic values. Although this paper debunked the idea of equating islam with terror, because terrorism is purposive and goaloriented (Ogundiya and Amzat, 2008). Such image of linking Islam with terrorism is painted by the media, to motivate and aggravate more challenges to IR (Bruce, 2005, Khan, 2010). Muslim world sees the US promoting imperialism and hypocrisy by its aggressive use of force in toppling unfriendly regimes. For instance, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and the equivocal support of Israel (at the expenses of Palestinian people) have generated Ant-America sentiments on a global level. Thus, religious and cultural ideological and extremist believe from traditional enemies of the Western world and the Middle East countries, have impacted their hatred on the mindsets of the people (Ogundiya, 2009)

3.5 Economic impacts

The upsurge of terrorism is a threat to global economy. The impact is both positive and negative in nature. On the positive side, terrorism create economic boom for defense related industries and private contractors. It creates business opportunity and profits. Today, terrorists' group are richer than some national government in the world. For example, the International Business Time (2014) shows that, the money terrorist organizations get from robberies, kidnapping, drug trafficking, NGOs and even government organizations worth

billions of dollars, and is about 1 quarter of world budgets. The study shows these figures; ISIS worth $2000 million, Hamas Group worth $1000 million, People's Army or FARC $600 million, Hezbollah $500 million, the Taliban group $400 million, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates $150 million, Lashkar e-Taiba $100 million, A-Shabaah $70 million, Real IRA $50 million and Boko Haram $25 million (International Business Time Index, 2014). This above figure implies that, the financial strength of terrorist makes them goal-oriented and so powerful that governments hardly suppressed their actions globally. The negative side on the other hand, it is believed that, due to the upsurge of terrorism, international communities and societies have been badly touched.

3.6 Responses to 9/11

The response of the US and other coalition states to 9/11 also provides interesting insights into the interconnection between understandings of globalisation and the contemporary security agenda. One observation that has emerged from recent events after 9/11 is that the onset of globalisation is neither inevitable nor irreversible, and thus its impact on security can also be channelled and shaped. Contrary to the predictions of the hyper-globalists, the sovereign-state retains considerable flexibility to not only take a transformationalist path under conditions of globalisation, but also to firmly re-orient or even reverse the process if necessary. The concerted action by the US and its allies against international money laundering is one demonstration that the sovereign-state, especially in the developed world, lives on and still possesses considerable resources to respond to trans-sovereign terror movements.

At the same time, the response of the US to 9/11 provokes the observation that globalisation and security are interconnected in terms of the increasing globalisation of military strategy. This occurs not just in the domain of the US ability to co-ordinate a global coalition

stretching from Europe and even to Japan, with more passive support from the likes of China, but also to its ability to project its own military power unilaterally. If globalisation is conceived of as the transcendence of territorial and sovereign barriers, then US military action can be depicted in certain ways as the apogee of this. The US in the Afghan campaign has certainly demonstrated its progression, again driven by the leveraging of advanced technology, towards being able to exercise power with declining reference to geographical distance and time, and across the four dimensions of land, sea, and especially air and space. For instance, US commanders were able to deploy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to gather real time information on enemy activities and to enable real time responses. In this sense, the US has moved one step closer to the realisation of the long-envisaged Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the global reach of its power to match that of its terrorist counterpart (Rogers, 2000).

The conflict in Afghanistan, though, has also demonstrated that the US has still not affected a totally globalised or post-modern military strategy. The US was not entirely free from territoriality in projecting its power in the Middle East, intent as it was to secure bases for its military forces in Saudi Arabia (unsuccessfully) and in the central Asian republics (with more success) for the assault on Afghanistan. The US was also forced to fight a ground war for the possession of territory, even if this was limited to the deployment of its own and coalition special forces, as well as the Northern Alliance as a proxy ground army. Above all, the US may have been able to limit its own engagement on the ground and resulting casualties, but its military campaign in traditional fashion wreaked untold devastation and pain on its enemies and non-combatants in Afghanistan (Rogers, 2000).

3.7 Some Global Terrorism Trends

Four of the five countries with the highest impact from terrorism recorded a reduction in the number of deaths; Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan. Together with Iraq, these five countries accounted for three quarters of all deaths from terrorism in 2016. A total of 77 countries recorded at least one death. This is an increase from 65 countries in 2015. Iraq experienced a 40 per cent increase in deaths in 2016 in reflecting the increased intensity of ISIL activity following attacks by the Iraqi Armed Forces to reclaim several major urban centres. There have been nearly 10,000 deaths from terrorism in OECD countries between 1970 and 2016 with 58 per cent of these deaths occurring prior to 2000. The OECD for one per cent of global deaths from terrorism in 2016. This is an increase from 0.1 per cent in 2010. Since 2014, there has been a shift in tactics toward simpler attacks against non-traditional targets. ISIL has also shown that attacks against soft targets using unconventional tactics are more likely to be effective than elaborate schemes. Since 2014, ISIL-directed or ISIL-inspired attacks have occurred in 18 of the 33 OECD countries and account for three quarters of all deaths (global terrorism index, 2017).

Since 2002, eight of the nine regions in the world experienced an increase in terrorism. North America was the only region to experience a reduced impact. Over the last 15 years, South Asia experienced the most terrorist activity while Central and South America were least affected. The MENA region had the sharpest increase in terrorism. Egypt and Turkey witnessed very large increases in terrorism following government crackdowns. In Egypt, terrorism deaths increased nine-fold and in Turkey this figure has increased by 16 times (global terrorism index, 2017).

Globally, attacks against civilians increased by 17 per cent from 2015 to 2016. The primary targets of terrorists are private citizens and property. Deaths from terrorism have risen in tandem with battle-related deaths. From 2006 to 2016, deaths from terrorism increased 67 per

cent while battle deaths increased by 66 per cent. Terrorist attacks are deadlier in conflict-affected countries where there is an average of 2.4 fatalities per attack in 2016 compared to 1.3 fatalities in non-conflict countries.

The four deadliest terrorist groups were responsible for 59 per cent of all deaths in 2016. ISIL was the deadliest group in 2016 with a 50 per cent increase in deaths from its previous peak in 2015. The group killed 9,132 people in 2016 with the majority of these deaths occurring in Iraq. However, ISIL is now near complete military defeat in Iraq and Syria and has a greatly diminished revenue base and capacity. ISIL's revenue is estimated to have declined threefold from US$ 81 million per month in 2015 to US$ 16 million per month in 2016. They undertook directed attacks in 15 countries, which is four more than the previous year. ISIL-affiliated groups killed a further 2,417 people and undertook attacks in 11 other countries, although this is fewer than in 2015.

The three other most deadly terrorist groups, Boko Haram, al-Qa'ida and the Taliban, were each responsible for fewer deaths from terrorism in 2016. There are many ways in which terrorist groups end. Since 1970, around a third of groups have ended following the attainment of their political goals, a third due to internal splintering and a third following defeat by the military or police.

Over the last 17 years, 99 per cent of all terrorist deaths occurred in countries that are either in conflict or have high levels of political terror. There are multiple paths to radicalization and individuals can exhibit both high and low levels of education, income, religious or political knowledge. Relative deprivation can also be a driver of terrorist recruitment as it leads to the creation of an 'us vs them' mentality. In the last ten years lone actor terror attacks have increased in OECD countries, from one in 2008 to 56 in 2016. The greatest number of these attacks have occurred in the United States.

The global economic impact of terrorism was US$ 84 billion in 2016. This represents a seven per cent decline from the previous year and a 19 per cent decline from the peak in 2014. This calculation is conservative and does not include costs associated with countering terrorism and countering and preventing violent extremism nor the indirect costs on business from terrorism. The four largest terrorist groups have diverse revenue sources including money transfers, donations, trafficking, taxation and extortion. The cost of conducting an attack in Europe has decreased significantly with a shift towards simpler attacks. Most attacks in Europe cost less than US$ 10,000 in total. This means most attacks are self-funded and do not require any external support.

CHAPTER FOUR

AL-QAEDA'S RESURGENCE

4.1 The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq

By the middle of 2010, Al-Qaeda in Iraq was dead on its feet. The organization suffered critical setbacks in late 2006 and early 2007 as Sunni Arab tribal militias – the Sahwa (Awakening) – turned against Al-Qaeda. In parallel the U.S.-led military effort protected the Sahwa and executed high-tempo remorseless counter-terrorism operations that ripped Al-Qaeda in Iraq to pieces. The group's foreign volunteers and money started to dry up. Al-Qaeda cells began to process of disintegrating into local criminal franchises that now kidnapped and extorted to pay their salaries rather than fund insurgency. In April 2010 Al-Qaeda in Iraq lost its two most senior leaders – AQI emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and war minister Abu Ayyub al-Masri – and stood in the verge of "disintegration" according to the US commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno. In a press conference on June 4, 2010, Odierno noted: "Over the last 90 days or so, we've either picked up or killed 34 out of the top 42 Al-Qaeda in Iraq leaders" (Knights, 2013).

In the summer of 2010 new leadership was announced by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the protocaliphate and umbrella movement led by Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The new ISI emir was named as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husayni al-Qurashi (alias Abu Dua), an Iraqi Salafist from Samarra who received doctorate in Islamic jurisprudence before 2003 and was detained in Camp Bucca until his release in 2009. The new ISI war minister was named as Al-Nasir Li-Din Allah Abu Sulayman, a figure about whom little is known (he is rumoured by press reporting to be a Moroccan Arab-Afghan and a former detainee). By early 2012 it was clear that the deaths of AQI's senior leaders were a watershed event that unfolded just as the movement sought to find a new way to operate in Iraq. Numerous processes have unfolded

since Al-Qaeda's defeat in 2006-2009, including the release of large numbers of experienced militants from U.S. detention facilities, changes in the balance of foreign and Iraqi fighters within the movement, the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and determined attempts by Al-Qaeda in Iraq to learn from its mistakes. These changes crystallized in the year after the deaths of Abu Omar al Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri, culminating in a successful re-launch of the movement in April 2011 and a significant recovery of operational space within Iraq's Sunni Arab communities. The movement appears to have rationalized its near-term objectives and synchronized its propaganda with the mounting concerns of Iraq's Sunni Arabs (Knights, 2013).

4.2 The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda

It is eight years since Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda, was killed by US forces in the Pakistani town of Abbottabad. The organisation he led was considered one of the deadliest jihadist groups in the world, commanding thousands of fighters. It was also believed to have had considerable financial resources. But with the demise of its leader and the emergence of the Islamic State group (IS), al-Qaeda's power and influence have weakened considerably. So how influential is the group today, and what threat does it now pose to global security?

Quiet resurgence

While IS has dominated the headlines in recent years, al-Qaeda has been pursuing a strategy of quietly rebuilding and forging alliances with regional groups. In its latest report, US National Intelligence has warned that senior al-Qaeda leaders are "strengthening the network's global command structure and continuing to encourage attacks against the West and the United States." The UN, in a report published earlier this year on the threat of global terrorism, said that al-Qaeda "appears to be growing more ambitious…it remains resilient and

active in many regions and retains the ambition to project itself more internationally." In February this year the UK's intelligence chief, Alex Young, also warned of a resurgence of al-Qaeda. (UN, 2019).

4.3 Network of affiliates of Al- Qaeda

A fierce drone campaign by US forces, the killing of its leader in 2011 and the challenge from the Islamic State group more recently has forced al-Qaeda to change tactics. It has successfully fostered a network of affiliates or "branches" in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. These affiliates are local militant groups who are embedded in local communities and have sworn allegiance to al-Qaeda's leadership. Unlike IS, al-Qaeda has been careful not to alienate local populations. Part of its new strategy is to build local alliances and engage in community development projects. In 2013 al-Qaeda issued a "General Guidelines for Jihad" which introduced significant reforms within the organization. The document, among other things, stresses a more restrained and community-based approach, instructing fighters to avoid behavior which could trigger a "revolt of the masses." "Al-Qaeda has made an art of homing in on local concerns, like corruption or marginalization, and slotting them into its

agenda of global jihad", according to Dr Elisabeth Kendall, senior fellow at Pembroke College, Oxford. "In so doing, it acts a local 'Saviour' and positions itself as 'the good guys of jihad' as opposed to the brutal thugs of IS," she says. Al-Qaeda has been steadily increasing its attacks through its various branches and affiliates.

In 2018 it carried out a total of 316 attacks around the world, according to data collected by The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).



Number of fighters in al-Qaeda affiliates Data as of August 2018

Source: CFR/UN/CTC

Al-Qaeda branches

- **Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)** came into being in 2006 when an Algeria-based militant group affiliated with al-Qaeda. Following a crackdown by Algerian forces it has moved into the Sahel and West Africa.
- **Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)** was formed in 2009 in a merger between two regional offshoots of the international jihadist network in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
- **Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)** operates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Myanmar and Bangladesh, and was established in September 2014.

- **Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)** is an al-Qaeda-affiliated organisation formed by the merger of several militant groups in Mali and West Africa.
- **Al-Shabab** is active in Somalia and East Africa and swore allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012.
- **Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)** is a merger of several Syrian militant jihadist groups which controls Idlib province in northern Syria. Although HTS insists it is independent, the United Nations and the US both regard it a group associated with al-Qaeda.
- **Al-Qaeda in Egypt** consists of al-Qaeda-aligned groups operating in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula.

4.4 Future leadership

In a speech in 2015, al-Qaeda's current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, introduced a young man as a "lion from the den" of bin Laden's terrorist network. That young man was Hamza bin Laden, a son of Osama bin Laden who is widely seen as the future leader of al-Qaeda. The US has officially designated Hamza as a global terrorist and has offered a reward of up to $1m (£750,000) for information on his whereabouts.

Image copyright AFP Image caption Hamza Bin Laden's whereabouts are not known

The 30-year-old has been promoted as a rising star on pro-al-Qaeda websites, someone they hope will inspire the next generation of jihadists, and reinvigorate the group. In recent years, he has released audio and video messages calling on followers to attack the US and its Western allies in revenge for his father's killing. In an audio message in March 2018 he urged citizens of Saudi Arabia to prepare for jihad against their monarchs. He hasn't been from since then. According to Lina Khatib, head of Middle East and North Africa at Chatham House, "the end of IS caliphate has pushed al-Qaeda networks to be more thoughtful and strategic about their operations. "Al-Qaeda is more dependent now on having a strategic leader. This is helping Hamza Bin Laden to gain support in his bid to replace his father as al-Qaeda's leader," she says (Zulfiqar, 2019).

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Summary

The United States was able strategically defeat, significantly degrade and decimate al Qaeda. Despite the fact that al Qaeda is weaker than it was in 2001 it still poses a serious terrorist threat and have consistently be on its wat to resurgence. Those who argue that al Qaeda remains a serious threat (some asserting that it is perhaps more dangerous now than it was on 9/11) base their assessments on several factors. Al Qaeda's periphery remains strong, even though its center has been hollowed. The West has lost the ideological battle. Al Qaeda's allies increasingly embrace its ideology of global struggle. Where there were once organizational boundaries, there is now fluidity among the jihadist groups. Al Qaeda continues to radicalize and recruit homegrown terrorists.

Some analysts credit al Qaeda's boast that by continuing its terrorist campaign even with low-level attacks, it will eventually exhaust an already economically weakened United States as it did the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Others point to al Qaeda's resilience. Thy contend that while al Qaeda was in decline, American withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan will open the way for its resurgence. Some believe that the Arab Spring created a new space for al Qaeda. Some of these differences among assessments derive mainly from the fact that al Qaeda

is many things at once and must therefore be viewed in all of its various dimensions. It is a global terrorist enterprise, the center of a universe of like-minded fanatics, an ideology of violent jihad, an autonomous online network. It is a virtual army. Increasingly, it is a conveyer of individual discontents.

For over ten years, the United States has pounded on al Qaeda's operational capabilities, which

clearly have been reduced. Th organization's Taliban protectors were toppled in Afghanistan. Its easily accessible training camps, at one time the destination for jihadist volunteers worldwide, have been dispersed. Al Qaeda attacks in Indonesia, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey between 2002 and 2006 prompted those governments to Al Qaeda survives best where it can attach itself to deeply rooted local movements, which it then proceeds to radicalize. Over time, some of al Qaeda's partners become affiliates, adopting al Qaeda's ideology, incorporating its tactics, eventually assuming the al Qaeda brand name.

There is no evidence indicating that al Qaeda's determination to continue its campaign has diminished.

Al Qaeda today is far more decentralized than it was 10 years ago and far more dependent on its autonomous field commands, its affiliates, its allies, and its ability to inspire homegrown terrorists. It has moved from centrally directed and supported strategic terrorist strikes, which culminated in the 9/11 attacks, toward individual jihadism and do-it-yourself terrorism. This has created a more diffused terrorist threat—less-destructive but still dangerous terrorist plots that often are harder to detect.

Th effort is supported by extensive online communications aimed at inspiring and instructing would-be jihadist warriors, which itself is a decentralized project. Official websites

carry messages from Ayman al-Zawahiri and other al Qaeda commanders and spokesmen, increasingly in local languages. these are augmented by communications from a second tier

of jihadist theorists and commentators. A third tier of websites embellishes these messages and

provides opportunities for widespread discussion. These are the forums in which followers endlessly fantasize about terrorist scenarios, exhort one another to action, threaten their foes, and boast of what they intend to do. Most of it remains talk.

5.2 Conclusion

Terrorism is a major threat to global security. Al Qaida was decimated but with their decimation a myriads of terror groups took up in their place. Since their decimation they have adopted new strategies including decentralizing their operations and operating with several international groups. The emergence of ISIL also took some attention away from them and allowing them to resurge. It is important they are not overlooked or ignored because it will be more to curb their activities today than 10 years ago. In light of the global threat of terrorisms, the capacity of Al-Qaeda at that time and the success in the decimation of Al-Qaeda, it could it could be concluded that the US were just in going to war in Afghanistan.

Despite the war on global Terrorism and insecurity, today we have seen the Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda-linked groups, Boko Haram and other extremist movements are protagonists in today's deadliest crises, complicating efforts to end them. They have exploited wars, state collapse and geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East, gained new footholds in Africa and pose an evolving threat elsewhere. Reversing their gains requires avoiding the mistakes that enabled their rise. This means distinguishing between groups with different goals; using force more judiciously; ousting militants only with a viable plan for what comes next; and looking to open lines of communication, even with hardliners. Vital, too, is to de-escalate the crises they feed off and prevent others erupting, by nudging leaders toward dialogue, inclusion and reform and reacting sensibly to terrorist attacks. Most important is that action against "violent

extremism" not distract from or deepen graver threats, notably escalating major- and regional-power rivalries.

The reach of "jihadists has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Some movements are now powerful insurgent forces, controlling territory, supplanting the state and ruling with a calibrated mix of coercion and co-option. Little suggests they can be defeated by military means alone. Yet, they espouse, to varying degrees, goals incompatible with the nation-state system, rejected by most people in areas affected and hard to accommodate in negotiated settlements. Most appear resilient, able to adapt to shifting dynamics. The geography of crisis today means similar groups will blight many of tomorrow's wars.

IS has reshaped the jihadist landscape: its strategy bloodier than that of al-Qaeda, from which it split in 2013; its declared caliphate across much of Iraq and Syria and grip on a Libyan coastal strip; thousands of foreigners and dozens of movements enlisted; its attacks in the Muslim world and the West. Fighting on multiple fronts – against Iran's allies, Sunni Arab regimes and the West – it has woven together sectarian, revolutionary and anti-imperialist threads of jihadist thought. Its leadership is mostly Iraqi but the movement is protean: millenarian and local insurgent; to some a source of protection, to others of social mobility and yet others of purpose; with strands aiming to consolidate the caliphate, take Baghdad or even Mecca, or lure the West into an apocalyptic battle. Primarily, though, its rise reflects recent Iraqi and Syrian history: Sunni exclusion and anomie after the disastrous U.S invasion; harsh treatment under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and the brutality of President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its allies. Any response must factor in IS's many faces. But mostly it needs to address Sunni suffering in the Levant and the dangerous sense of victimisation that has helped spawn across the Sunni Arab world.

In part obscured by IS's rise, al-Qaeda has evolved. Its affiliates in the Maghreb, Somalia, Syria and Yemen remain potent, some stronger than ever. Some have grafted themselves onto local insurrections, displaying a degree of pragmatism, caution about killing Muslims and sensitivity to local norms. Around the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, the latest in a string of revivalist movements rooted in the marginalized political economy and structural violence of northern Nigeria, has morphed from isolated sect to regional menace, though formally joining IS has changed little about it. Movements of different stripes – the largely nationalist Afghan Taliban, resurgent as foreign troops draw down from Afghanistan, and Pakistani groups including sectarian movements, tribal militants fighting the central state and Kashmir- or Afghanistan-focused elements aligned to its military establishment – comprise an evolving South Asian jihadist scene.

The roots of this expansion defy generic description. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village, individual to individual. Autocrats, political exclusion, flawed Western interventions, failing governance, closing avenues for peaceful political expression, the distrust of the state in neglected peripheries, traditional elites' declining authority and the lack of opportunity for growing youth populations have all played their part. So, too, has the dwindling appeal of other ideologies, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood's peaceful political Islam – jihadists' main ideological competitor – diminished by President Muhammed Morsi's ouster and the subsequent crackdown in Egypt. Proselytising of intolerant strands of Islam has, in places, helped prepare the ground. The sectarian currents coursing through much of the Muslim world both are aggravated by IS and give it succour.

But if roots are complex, the catalyst is clear enough. The descent of most of the 2011 Arab revolutions into chaos has opened enormous opportunity for extremists. Movements have gathered force as crises have festered and evolved, as money, weapons and fighters flow in,

as violence escalates. Mounting enmity between states means regional powers worry less about extremists than about traditional rivals, leverage the fight against IS against other enemies or quietly indulge jihadists as proxies. Especially in the Middle East, jihadists' expansion is more a product of instability than its primary driver; is due more to radicalisation during crises than beforehand; and owes more to fighting between their enemies than to their own strengths. Rarely can such a movement gather force or seize territory outside a war zone or collapsed state.

Geopolitics hinders a coherent response. The starting point should be to dial back the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that drives Sunni and Shia extremism, deepens crises across the region and is among the gravest threats to international peace and security today. Easing other tensions – between Turkey and Kurdish militants, for example, Turkey and Russia, conservative Arab regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan and India, even Russia and the West – is also essential. In Libya, Syria and Yemen, tackling jihadists requires forging new orders attractive enough to deplete their ranks and unite other forces. Of course, none of this is easy. But redoubling efforts to narrow other fault lines would be wiser than papering them over in an illusion of consensus against "violent extremism".

5.3 Recommendation

The following recommendations are made from the lessons learnt from the mistakes mistakes since the 9/11 (2001) attacks. This is necessary since each movement, notwithstanding the links between and transnational ties of some, is distinct and locally rooted; each requires a response tailored to context. They can, however, pose similar dilemmas and provoke similar blunders. Major and regional powers and governments in areas affected should:

1. **Disaggregate not conflate:** Making enemies of non-violent Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, prepared to accept political and religious pluralism and engage in politics is self-defeating. Also important is to distinguish movements seeking a place within the international order from those wanting to upend it. Even IS, its local branches and al-Qaeda affiliates, despite belonging to the latter category, are not monolithic. They have dedicated cores with transnational goals, but rank-and-files with diverse, mostly local motives whose loyalty can shift, and perhaps be shifted, with changing conditions. Governments should disaggregate even radical movements with an eye to ending violence, not lump others in with them looking for a fight.

2. **Contain if no better option exists:** Foreign powers should always have a viable plan for what comes next if they undertake to oust militants; the same applies to governments in their hinterlands. Today's strategy in Iraq – razing towns to defeat IS in the hope Sunni leaders in Baghdad can regain lost legitimacy through reconstruction – is unlikely either to meet Sunnis' grievances or create conditions in which they can forge a new political identity. In Libya a heavy bombardment or deployment of Western troops against IS without a wider political settlement would be a mistake, likely to deepen the chaos. In both cases, slowing military operations also carries grave risks but, without a workable alternative, is the safer option – for those contemplating going in and those in areas affected alike.

3. **Use force more judiciously:** Although force usually must be part of the response, governments have been too quick to go to war. Movements with roots in communities, tapping genuine grievances and sometimes with foreign backing are hard to extirpate, however unappealing their ideology. Wars in Somalia and Afghanistan show the shortfalls of defining enemies as terrorists or violent extremists and of combining efforts to build centralised state institutions with military action against them absent a wider political strategy that includes reconciliation. Nor can Russia's scorched-earth approach in Chechnya – even

leaving aside the human cost – be replicated in areas affected today, given porous borders, collapsed states and proxy warfare.

4. **Respect rules:** Too often military action against extremists helps them recruit or leaves communities caught between their harsh rule and indiscriminate operations against them. Jihadists' ability to offer protection against predation by regimes, other militias or foreign powers is among their greatest assets, usually more central to their success than ideology. While often guilty of atrocities, they fight in conflicts in which all sides violate international humanitarian law. Recovering the rulebook must be a priority.

5. **Curb targeted killings:** Drone strikes can, in places, hinder groups' operations and ability to hit Western interests and their leaders' movements. But they feed resentment against local governments and the West. Movements weather the deaths of leaders, and the replacements that emerge are often harder-line. Foreseeing the impact of killings is hard in a reasonably stable order; doing so amid urban warfare and jihadist infighting – with al-Qaeda and others confronting IS – is impossible. Even leaving aside questions of secrecy, legality and accountability, targeted killings will not end the wars jihadists fight in or decisively weaken most movements.

6. **Open lines of communication:** Notwithstanding the difficulties, governments should be more willing to talk, even with radicals. Opportunities to engage in ways that might have de-escalated violence – with some Taliban and al-Shabaab leaders, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, for example – have been lost. The decision whether a group is irreconcilable rests with its leaders not governments. Although policy-makers can entertain no illusions about the nature of the IS and al-Qaeda top commands, opportunities to open unofficial, discreet lines of communication, through community leaders, non-state mediators or others, are usually worth pursuing, particularly on issues of humanitarian concern, where there may be shared interest.

7. **Narrow the "countering violent extremism" (CVE) agenda:** As a corrective to post-9/11 securitised policies, the CVE agenda, pioneered mostly by development actors, is valuable; so, too, are recognising the underlying conditions that can, in places, enable extremists' recruitment and shifting funds from military spending to development aid. But re-hatting as CVE activities to address "root causes", particularly those related to states' basic obligations to citizens – like education, employment or services to marginalised communities – may prove short-sighted. Casting "violent extremism", a term often ill-defined and open to misuse, as a main threat to stability risks downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimising political grievances and stigmatising communities as potential extremists. Governments and donors must think carefully what to label CVE, further research paths of radicalisation and consult widely across the spectrum of those most affected.

8. **Invest in conflict prevention:** IS's and al-Qaeda's recent expansion injects new urgency into prevention, both during crises, to halt their radicalisation, and upstream. Any further breakdown in the belt running from West Africa to South Asia is likely to attract an extremist element – whether these movements provoke crises themselves or, more likely, profit from their escalation. Although generic prescriptions are of limited value, nudging leaders toward more inclusive and representative politics, addressing communities' grievances and measured responses to terrorist attacks usually make sense. Overall, in other words, preventing crises will do more to contain violent extremists than countering violent extremism will do to prevent crises.

9. It is recommended that the war om Al-Qaeda and its affiliates network be given a close attention and monitored. A Multi-national approach to stopping the continued resurgence of Al – Qaeda should also be put in place.

10. Further Studies should be done in this area.

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