

# **TERRORISM AND THE CHALLENGES OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF BOKO HARAM IN INSURGENCY (2014-2024)**

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## **Abstract**

*The study examined the state of knowledge on international terrorism and National Security in Nigeria, with focus on Boko-Haram, specifically, the study investigated how international terrorism and National Security explores the origins and future trajectory of Boko-Haram and especially why its ideology of violence has found resonance among a small number of young Nigerian's, and also provide guide to policy makers, government officials and the general public in dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency. Utilizing the Relative deprivation theory, qualitative research method, qualitative descriptive research and content analysis, these are crucial instrument of understanding terrorism and Boko Haram sect. accordingly, the study maintained that Boko Haram movement is to make Nigeria an Islamic state as they are in the habit of spreading particular interpretation of Islam beyond Western oriented secular Status claiming that Islam as a religion has not been fulfilling its mandate on the Nigerian Society.*

## **Introduction**

The Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria has been one of the most devastating security challenges the country has faced in recent times. The roots of this crisis can be traced back to the early 2000s when the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, also known as Boko Haram, emerged as a radical Islamic group in the northeastern part of Nigeria.

The group, led by Mohammed Yusuf, initially advocated for the establishment of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. However, their ideologies soon took a violent turn, and they began launching attacks against government institutions, security forces, and civilians (Agbibo, 2013).

In 2009, the Nigerian government launched a crackdown on Boko Haram, resulting in the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf and several of his followers. This event marked a turning point in the group's trajectory, as they became more radicalized and embraced a more violent ideology under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau (Onuoha, 2014).

From 2010 onwards, Boko Haram intensified its campaign of terror, carrying out numerous attacks, including bombings, assassinations, and abductions. One of the most notable incidents was the abduction of over 200 schoolgirls from Chibok in 2014, which garnered international attention and condemnation (Zenn, 2020).

The Nigerian government, in collaboration with regional and international partners, has made efforts to combat Boko Haram through military operations and counter-insurgency measures. However, the group has proven resilient, adapting its tactics and exploiting local grievances and socio-economic disparities to recruit new members (Alozieuwa, 2012).

The Boko Haram crisis has had devastating consequences for the affected regions, particularly in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, and the humanitarian situation has been dire, with widespread food insecurity, lack of access to healthcare, and disruption of education (Ladan, 2016).

In addition to the human cost, the crisis has also had significant economic consequences for Nigeria. The ongoing violence and instability have disrupted economic activities, deterred investment, and strained the country's resources as it grapples with the challenges of counter-insurgency operations (Olayinka & Fatima, 2020).

Over the years, the Nigerian government has adopted various strategies to address the Boko Haram crisis, including military offensives, negotiation efforts, and the establishment of specialized task forces. However, the complex nature of the crisis, coupled with the group's ability to exploit local grievances and porous borders, has made it difficult to achieve a lasting resolution (Akpan et al., 2014).

One of the key challenges in combating Boko Haram has been the group's ability to adapt and evolve its tactics. Initially relying on guerilla-style attacks, the group has since adopted more sophisticated techniques, including the use of suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, and the recruitment of child soldiers (Bamidele, 2016).

The regional dimension of the Boko Haram crisis has also been a significant concern. The group's activities have spilled over into neighboring countries, such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, leading to a regional security crisis and the involvement of multinational forces (Assanvo et al., 2016).

In recent years, there have been efforts to address the underlying socio-economic factors that have contributed to the rise of Boko Haram. This includes initiatives aimed at promoting development, education, and job opportunities in the affected regions, as well as efforts to counter the group's ideological narratives (Onuoha, 2017).

Despite the challenges, there have been some successes in the fight against Boko Haram. The Nigerian military, with the support of regional partners, has reclaimed significant territory previously held by the group. Additionally, the group has suffered setbacks, with reports of internal divisions and the loss of key leaders (Zenn, 2020).

However, the Boko Haram crisis remains a complex and multifaceted challenge that requires a comprehensive and sustained approach. This includes not only military and security measures but also addressing the underlying socio-economic and ideological factors that have fueled the group's rise and perpetuated the cycle of violence (Agbibo, 2020).

As Nigeria and its partners continue to grapple with the Boko Haram crisis, it is crucial to learn from past experiences and adopt a holistic approach that addresses the root causes of the conflict while also addressing the immediate security concerns. Only through a combination of military, political, and socio-economic strategies can a lasting resolution to this crisis be achieved (Agba E, 2015)

### **Statement of the Problem**

Nigeria is a large country densely populated with all manners of people and as a result, the country is faced with various insecurity issues such as the Niger Delta crisis and Boko Haram crisis, proliferation and availability of small arms and weak intelligence data base. This has of late has gained increased attention in the international scene (Reich, 2019).

Crude oil pollution and the issue of compensation has been quite endemic in Nigeria, particularly Niger delta in recent times. Perhaps, this could be the result of the economic hardship faced by the inhabitant of the host communities whose land, water and river are being polluted seriously such that the aquatic life like fish and other water animals destroyed with nothing left for them to contend with. Hence the nation has not attained the needed peace and security for development especially in the Niger delta region.

### **Research Questions**

The following research questions guide this study

1. Is terrorism in Nigeria linked to economic problems like unemployment, poverty, or lack of empowerment?
2. Is terrorism in Nigeria linked to political ideology or religious extremism?
3. Is the Nigerian security not doing enough in addressing the challenge of terrorist insurgency?
4. Should government adopt other strategies like non-kinetic approaches in handling the problem of insecurity in Nigeria?

## **Objectives of the Study**

The general objectives of this study are to find out time challenges faced by government in security management in Nigeria. Specific objectives are as follows

1. To ascertain the correlation between socio-economic factors in Nigeria, such as unemployment, poverty, and lack of opportunity, and the incidence of terrorism.
2. To determine whether religious or political, play a role in fueling terrorism in Nigeria.
3. To investigate the challenges faced by Nigerian security forces in addressing the threat of terrorist insurgency? (This rephrases to focus on the difficulties encountered by security forces)
4. To ascertain the alternative strategies, alongside military action, are effective in tackling insecurity in Nigeria.

## **Hypotheses**

1. There is no terrorism in Nigeria linked to economic problems like unemployment, poverty, or lack of empowerment?
2. There is no terrorism in Nigeria linked to political ideology or religious extremism?
3. There is no Nigerian security in addressing the challenge of terrorist insurgency?
4. There is no government strategy like non-kinetic approaches in handling the problem of insecurity in Nigeria?

## **Scope of the Study**

This study seeks to find out terrorism and the challenges of security management in Nigeria: a case study of Boko Haram in insurgency (2014-2024). This study is limited from 2014 to 2024 with the North East zone/region of Nigeria.

## **Significance of the study**

This study is significant because it emphasis is on the various insecurity in the country, their causes and possible solution. Secondly, it will be of immense importance to the government and people of Nigeria in achieving a more secure nation. This study will enrich the literature on insecurity in Nigeria. Data generated from this study can be used for policy formulation in Nigeria.

## **Literature Review**

The purpose of this project is to examine the challenges faces by government in security management in Nigeria, with focus on Boko Haram. It will also help locate the gap in literature. The term Boko Haram terrorism is inherently difficult to use in a precise or unequivocal way. This view is generally accepted by experts, jurist and policy makers despite the fact that countless acts of Boko Haram terrorism have been documented (Agba, A, E 2020)

As Wilkinson (2019) noted, three important reasons help to explain this difficulty. First, Boko Haram terrorism is frequently employed in a number of undifferentiated ways to mean variously a concept, human activity felony, specific event. It is an emotion, method of intimidation or condition of being terrorized.



Second and perhaps more importantly, the concept of Boko Haram terrorism itself is emotion – laden because it has expressive content, the function of which is to evoke feelings attitudes, or emotions. Inherent in this usage is the notion of fear, with the consequence that the concept automatically acquires an emotive meaning. This emotive quality causes distortion when attempting to communicate a precise definition, one that would be universally acceptable. Essentially, English words such as terror, terrorize, terrible, Boko Haram terrorism and deterrent are derived from the Latin verbs *terrere* that means or cause to tremble and *deterreere* that means to frighten. The definitional problems and the divergence of political perspectives which produce them, have important practical consequences. They have impeded the building of international norms and international cooperative practices. To a significant degree on remedies. In spite of the difficulties discussed above, efforts have been made to explain the meaning of Boko Haram terrorism from two major perspectives, namely Liberal and Radical perspectives (Agbiboa, 2019).

Edward (2019), for instance, defined the concept as “the use or threat of use of anxiety inducing extra normal violence for political purposes by an individual or group, whether acting for, or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider than the immediate victim”.

Sample (2019) defined Boko Haram terrorism as “clandestine act of violence against non-combatants for the specific purpose of brining about political change”. According to him, Boko Haram terrorism is usually characterized by a variety of tactics, such as assassination, hijacking, kidnapping, sabotage and by the exploitation of innocent victims to affect a third party. It is intended moreover to produce fear in a population in order to force the existing system to meet the terrorist's demands. The United States Department of State has on its part defined Boko Haram terrorism as “politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents” (USDEPT, of State 2019). Essentially, the United States government uses the label “Boko Haram terrorism” to tag any group fighting against American interest.

Mojekwu (2019), for instance, argued that these acts of Boko Haram terrorism and violence and political crimes that produce psychic fear should be looked upon as the normal behavior expected of a desperate people in our human society. According to him, these atrocities, although highly reprehensible, could be acts of protest which our technological and modern society has neglected to look into at the initial stage.

Oots (2019) observed that Boko Haram terrorism is, first and foremost, a violent aggressive act of political participation. According to him, “Boko Haram terrorism is an act of political participation because its perpetrators seek political goals. Thus, terrorists are not simply insane socio-paths bent merely on destruction”.

Reels (2019) observed, Boko Haram terrorism is “warfare on the cheap” that enables small and large countries, political groups and lunatics to attempt to achieve by coercion, what they are unlikely to achieve by political means, diplomacy or conventional warfare.

According to Moghadam (2019), “ideologies are links between thoughts, beliefs and myths on the one hand, and action on the other hand ... [providing] a 'cognitive map' that filters the way social realities are perceived, rendering that reality easier to grasp, more coherent, and thus more meaningful.”

Kydd & Walter (2019) indicates that terrorist organizations are usually driven by political objectives, and in particular, “five have had enduring importance: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control and status quo maintenance.”

According to Forest (2019), these objectives have led to terrorist groups forming in Northern Ireland, Italy, Egypt, Germany, Sri Lanka, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, the United States, and many other nations. The members of these groups have viewed Boko Haram terrorism as an effective vehicle for political change, often pointing to historical examples of Boko Haram terrorism driving the United States (and later Israel) out of Lebanon, and convincing the French to pull out of Algeria. Ethnic separatist groups like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain all want the power to form their own recognized, sovereign entity, carved out of an existing nation-state, and believe terrorist attacks can help them achieve this objective. Groups engaged in the Middle East intifada—like the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Palestine Liberation Front—want the power to establish an Islamic Palestinian state. Other groups want the power to establish an Islamic state in their own region, including Ansar al-Islam in Iraq the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria Al-Gama 'a al-Islamiyya in Egypt the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia and al-Qaeda. In all cases, these groups seek power to change the status quo, to forge a future that they do not believe will come about peacefully, and are determined to use Boko Haram terrorism as a means to achieve their objectives.

Forest (2019) observed that at the same time, it is important to recognize that support for Boko Haram terrorism among community members can rise and fall over time and is influenced by the choices made by individuals within an organization about the kinds of terrorist activities they conduct. How organizations choreograph violence matters; in particular, terrorist groups must avoid counterproductive violence that can lead to a loss of support within the community.

Finally, our analysis of Boko Haram must take into account research on why some individuals may choose direct involvement in actions that kill, while others choose to engage in activities like providing funding, safe havens, or ideological support for a terrorist group. A variety of factors influence a person's decision to engage in terrorist activity—from kinship and ideology to the availability of weapons and criminal network connections (Ajiboye, 2019)

Taylor and Horgan (2019) offer a framework for analyzing developmental processes— “a sequence of events involving steps or operations that are usefully ordered and/or interdependent”-through which an individual becomes involved with (and sometimes abandons) terrorist activity. Their research highlights the importance of understanding the dynamic context that individuals operate in, and how the relationships between contexts, organizations, and individuals affect behavior. This returns us to the initial discussion provided in this chapter: context is key.

Each day, countless individuals grapple with situations and environmental conditions that may generate feelings of outrage and powerlessness, among many other potential motivators for becoming violent. But an individual's view of these situations and conditions—and how to respond appropriately to them—is clearly influenced by their family members, peers, and personal role models, educators, religious leaders, and others who help interpret and contextualize local and global conditions. Because these interpretive influences play such a key role in how an individual responds to the challenges of everyday life events and trends that generate political grievances among members of a particular community, we sometimes see a contagion effect, whereby an individual's likelihood of becoming involved in Boko Haram terrorism is increased because they know or respect others who have already done so. Further, as Taylor and Horgan (2019) note, “There is never one route to Boko Haram terrorism, but rather there are individual routes, and furthermore those routes and activities as experienced by the individual change over time.”

The dynamics of an individual's connections to others—including, for example, family, friends, small groups, clubs, gangs, and diasporas—also help an individual interpret the potential legitimacy of an organization that has adopted Boko Haram terrorism as a strategy. Individuals are often introduced to the fringes of violent extremist groups by friends, family members, and authority figures in their community, among others (Letter, 2019). For example, psychologist Sageman (2019) has argued that social bonds play a central role in the emergence of the global Salafi jihad, the movement whose members comprise organizations like al-Qaeda and its affiliates in North Africa and Southeast Asia. As described earlier, an organization that is perceived as legitimate is then able to exert influence on the individual's perceptions of environmental conditions and what to do about them. Thus, the religious dimension of Boko Haram's ideology - and its perceived capability of providing that critical legitimacy—must be taken into account.

For many contemporary terrorist groups, a compelling ideology plays a central role at the intersection of religious, political, and socioeconomic grievances, organizational attributes, and individual characteristics. Religion can be a powerful motivator for all kinds of human action, because as psychologist Mack (2019) has noted, religion “deals with spiritual or ultimate human concerns, such as life or death, our highest values and selves, the roots of evil, the existence of God... Religious assumptions shape our minds from childhood, and for this reason religious systems and institutions have had, and continue to have, extraordinary power to affect the course of human history.” Like many religious terrorist groups around the world, Boko Haram's ideology portrays the world in terms of an epic struggle between good and evil, and they are convinced in their own revealed truth from God. Many religious terrorist groups share a common belief Boko Haram's ideology portrays the that they are following the will world in terms of an epic struggle of God, and that only the true between good and evil... believers are In terms of environmental conditions and grievances, Boko Haram's ideology articulates a vision of social and political order that is more pure and religiously grounded.

As Boko Haram's founding leader Yusuf preached, “Our land was an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it to a kafir land. The current system is contrary to true Islamic beliefs” (Salkida, 2019). Boko Haram's ideology describes how white European colonial powers drew lines on a map in a somewhat arbitrary and capricious plan to carve up the African continent, and in many cases empowered local tribes—frequently, many of which had embraced Christianity—to rule as proxy landlords until the end of WWII and a wave of independence movements that saw the end of colonial rule. But what came next has been even worse: rampant corruption among a political and wealthy elite that is heavily invested in the status quo; a huge gap between aspirations of Nigeria's youth and the opportunities provided by the system for achieving a better life; a lack of critical infrastructure and basic support services; a history with long periods of military dictatorship and political oppression; a swelling population amid economic despair; and a system in which entrenched ethnic identities are politicized and constrain opportunities for meritocratic advancement or for being able to worship one's faith in accordance with a strict interpretation of the Koran (Cyril, 2019).

The cumulative result of these things is an environment in which radical extremist ideologies can thrive among communities that see themselves as politically and economically disadvantaged and marginalized. Throughout the Muslim communities of northern Nigeria today, there is a sense of unease and insecurity about the spiritual and moral future of their children, and concern about the fading influence of religious leaders like the Sultan of Sokoto (Last, 2019). In addition, there are also specific political and socioeconomic frustrations found predominantly in northern Nigeria—poverty, unemployment, and lack of education are much higher here than in the rest of the country.

Boko Haram, like other religious terrorist groups throughout the world, thus capitalizes on local conditions by offering envisioned solutions to the grievances shared by the surrounding communities (Cyril, 2019).

Boko Haram terrorism is also seen as a violent product of an unequal distribution of power on local, national, or global levels. The unequal distribution of power feeds a perception of “us versus them,” a perception found in all ideologies associated with politically violent groups and movements. The hardships and challenges “we” face can be framed in terms of what “they” are or what “they” have done to us. From this perspective, “we” desire a redistribution of power in order to have more control over our destiny, and one could argue that many terrorist groups use violence as the way to bring this about. As Bruce Hoffman notes, Boko Haram terrorism is “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change . . . [and] to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little.”

There are few places on earth where the unequal distribution of power is more common than in sub-Saharan Africa. And in Nigeria, ethnic fissures are politicized and negatively impact a person's overall quality of life and their relative power to bring about change. Further, Muslims in Northern Nigeria at one point in history enjoyed considerably more power relative to others in West Africa, but they have witnessed the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate, the rise of Western European colonization followed by successive military regimes, and now a secular democracy. Furthermore, unemployment and illiteracy are highest in the northern parts of Nigeria, where Muslims are predominant. In essence, power—or lack thereof—plays an important role in the narrative of Boko Haram (Eme, 2019).

When a government fails to adhere to the conventional social contract between government and the governed, its citizens become disenchanting and seek the power to force change. This, in turn, has resulted in a variety of revolutionary movements throughout history. Corrupt governments seek to maintain and increase their power over others and over resources by any means necessary, while the powerless see the corruption and look for ways to combat it— even through violent acts of Boko Haram terrorism, as that may be perceived as their only form of recourse. In When a government fails to ad-the African context, corruption has here to the conventional social indeed been a common underlying contract between government and factor in various forms of political violence, and is cited often by the governed, its citizens become disenchanting and seek the power to force change (Horgan, 2019). Beyond grievances, the study of Boko Haram terrorism also looks at a range of facilitators, loosely defined as the structural or temporary conditions at the community or regional level that provide individuals and organizations with ample opportunities to engage in various forms of terrorist activity. In all three cases, the rise of violence has been aided by the availability of small arms and light weapons.

Meanwhile, traffickers in drugs, humans, and weapons cohabit with the warlords, militia leaders, and political opportunists in an environment that precludes good governance and judicial oversight. Countries like Nigeria with a robust “shadow economy”— economic activities that are underground, covert, or illegal—can provide an infrastructure for terrorist organizations to operate in, whereby financing becomes easier and detecting it becomes more difficult.

Isa (2019) there are some indications that key members of the Nigerian Taliban, including Aminu Tashen Ilimi, were integrally involved in the founding and early evolution of Boko Haram. However, there are differences in opinion over the precise date and conditions under which the group that became known as Boko Haram was first established. Onuoha (2019) suggested that the group has existed in some form or another since 2019, while others have written that it was founded in 2006 or 2016. Madike (2019) contends that the group began in 2019 as Sahaba under the leadership of the conservative Islamist cleric Lawan Abubakar, who later left for the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia for further studies. Isa (2019) further suggests that the origins of the group can be traced to a group of Muslim students who dropped out of the University of Maiduguri around 2002.

According to Forest (2019) despite the existence of various conflicting accounts, it is agreed by most observers that in 2002, a 32-year old charismatic Muslim cleric, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, established a religious complex with a mosque and an Islamic boarding school in Maiduguri in Borno state, along with a prayer group which he called “Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad” loosely translated from Arabic as “people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and jihad.” Nossiter (2019) describes Maiduguri as “a hot, low-rise city of about one million people near the border with Cameroon. Exhortations to Allah are posted at traffic circles, women are veiled and bands of ragged boys carry plastic begging bowls.” The “ragged boys” he refers to are the almajiri, children sent by their parents to Islamic boarding schools in northern Nigeria, where they receive little education beyond rote memorization of the Koran. They receive no money, and are forced to beg in the streets in order to survive.

Saidu (2019) noted that some teachers at these schools have been known to abuse these children, in some cases taking a portion of whatever people give them, and in other cases using them as foot soldiers in religious clashes. This is the kind of school that was established by Yusuf. Islamic Sharia law was adopted in Maiduguri during the late 1990s, as it was across Nigeria's northern states, but it was not enforced strictly enough for the conservative Yusuf (Nossiter, 2019). A devout salafist, Yusuf embraced the view, first promulgated by the 13th century religious scholar Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, which the reason Muslim communities are made to suffer is because their leaders have not been true to the faith. He preached that it was necessary to engage in active jihad in order to defend the ummah (global community of Muslims) and spread the faith, and that a leader who does not enforce Sharia law completely, and wage active jihad against infidels, is unfit to rule.

This was a much different conception of jihad than what the Sufi sects of Nigeria promoted, where the concept of “greater jihad” was viewed as being an internal struggle necessary for spiritual insight. According to Johnson (2019), Yusuf originally intended his Salafist prayer and self-isolation movement to promote the religion of Islam and encourage the enforcement of Sharia law in the country's northern states. He attracted mostly disaffected young people and unemployed university students and graduates, many of them animated by deep-seated socioeconomic and political grievances like poor governance and corruption. In his preaching, Yusuf criticized northern Muslims for participating in what he believed to be an illegitimate state and encouraged his followers to protest and withdraw from society and politics (Johnson, 2019). Both the Maitatsine and Yusuf's followers rejected Western civilization and called for the strict enforcement of Sharia law.

In essence, Boko Haram - as the group came to be called by locals and eventually by the government, because of its anti-Western focus - sought to create a 'better' Nigeria through strict adherence to Islam. Over time, the group's members saw themselves increasingly at odds with the secular authorities, whom they came to view as representatives of a corrupt, illegitimate, Christian-dominated federal government. Their disappointment in local government leaders was worsened in the summer of 2019, when authorities in Bauchi refused to allow them to preach and recruit publicly (Onuoha, 2019). Then on 11 June 2019 an encounter with the police turned violent. Nigeria had recently passed a law mandating the use of motorcycle helmets, but during a funeral procession to bury some of their members who died in a car accident, Boko Haram members refused to adhere to this law. This was perceived by the police as an open defiance of authority, reflecting a continuing pattern of behavior by Boko Haram that had to be dealt with (Junger, 2019).

During the confrontation, 17 members of Boko Haram were shot; they were hospitalized at the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital, but none died (Madike, 2019). Johnson (2019) points that nger at what were perceived to be heavy-handed police tactics then triggered an armed uprising in the northern state of Bauchi and spread into the states of Borno, Yobe, and Kano. Similarly Onuoha (2019) agrees that the violence began on 26 July when Boko Haram members attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi. Over the next four days, in the towns of Maiduguri, Lamisulu, and Gamboru, members attacked the state police headquarters, a primary school, a maximum security prison, the national Directorate of Employment, the Makera police station, the Police Mobile College barracks, and several churches. The violence left at least 50 civilians, 22 suspected militants, two police officers, and one prison officer dead. On the same day, the group attacked several targets in nearby Yobe, including the Calvary Baptist Church, the National Population Commission, and the Federal Road Safety Commission office. And in Kano, members attacked the Wudil police station (Onuoha, 2019).

The Nigerian army was deployed to reinforce and assist the overwhelmed local police forces, and when it was over more than 800 people were dead (Adedeji, 2019). Many Boko Haram members were arrested, and some were paraded in humiliating fashion outside the police stations. Yusuf—along with his father-in-law Baa Fugu and other sect members—were publicly executed on 30 July 2019 outside the police station in Maiduguri. The police initially claimed that they died after an intense gun battle with officers on duty, but video clips that later emerged showed that they were executed in cold blood (Nnochiri, 2019). Many observers and human rights advocates described these as extra-judicial killings, and eventually the Nigerian government agreed: in late 2019, five police officers were brought to trial for allegedly murdering Yusuf (Ahanotu, 2019).

This brief period marked a turning point for Boko Haram, whose new leaders—Imam Shekau, considered a spiritual leader and operational commander; Kabiru Sokoto, the alleged mastermind of the Christmas 2019 attacks described below; and Shaikh Abu Muhammed—have been described by some observers as more radical and extremist than Yusuf was (Forest, 2019). For many members of the sect, the unjust circumstances surrounding the death of Yusuf served to amplify pre-existing animosities toward the government.

Their communities, Isa (2019) notes, had been wrecked by “poverty, deteriorating social services and infrastructure, educational backwardness, rising numbers of unemployed graduates, massive numbers of unemployed youths, dwindling fortunes in agriculture... and the weak and dwindling productive base of the northern economy.” The accumulation of a broad range of socioeconomic and political grievances now justified, in their minds, a terrorist campaign. There are few other terms that could be used to describe the steady drumbeat of terrorist attacks that have taken place since 2019. None emphasized the effects of governance in the development and spread of the Boko Haram in Nigeria. This work therefore, seek to determine if poor governance in Nigeria instigated the Boko Haram insurgency. It also aim to examine how civil society and non-governmental organizations' strategies can resolve the Boko Haram insurgency.

Discussing the Boko-Haram as a terrorist organization, one need to be very careful, not to engage in the trap of re-inforcing. As already known, Boko-Haram has emerged into the Nigerian scene as Islamic Warlords overwhelming much of North-Eastern flanks of Nigeria through the onward March of young men willing to Martyr Themselves for the cause they believe in. The objectives of the Boko-Haram movement is to make Nigeria an Islamic State as they are in the habits of spreading particular interpretation of Islam beyond Western oriented secular status claiming that Islam as a religion has not been fulfilling its mandate on the Nigerian society (Cyril, 2019)

In secular ideologies, such as socialism or capitalism, reference is continually made of the founding theorists, within the movement, there will be inevitably be

differences of views about how far to put the belief into practice and about how far to compromise in adapting the system to a necessary imperfect works (Eme, 2019).

In Islamic World, what they perceive to be a corrupt and unprincipled behaviour on the part of the government seems to be the cause of the uprisings. Negative stereotyping in the west by radical Islamic movements provoke their response. An interesting consequence of this process is seen in Nigeria where the growth of religious fundamentalism among the Muslim population in Northern Nigeria has created an ardent difference of Islamic religion by those challenging the secular status of Nigeria. This is the cause of Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria (Horgan, 2019).

Recent happenings have indicated a strong base of criminality and networking in support of Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria by some leading gentries in North Nigeria. Latest information indicated reports of Helicopters dropping arms, food, for the insurgents by the Borno elders in a news conference. In the said conference, political elders in Borno and Yobe States raised the issues of support of Boko-Haram our the supply of food and medicine to areas known as strongholds of Boko-Haram by some unknown persons. The authorities in the North – East could not claim ignorance of this development and described it as the bad omen if a convoy of about 20 – 30 Toyota Hilux vehicles could freely move without being detected despite imposition of curfew in the area (Junger, 2019).

The elders who spoke at the press conference in Abuja on Monday, April 7, 2014, asked the government to provide amorers to the attack on Maidguri Air-Force Base by members of the Boko-Haram sect, who reportedly demobilized and set ablaze aircrafts and other military equipments despite the state of Emergency and curfew in the town (Ngwube, 2019). Speaking on the platform of Yobe-Borno peoples forum, the elders who asked Federal government to tace Nigerians those that authorized the withdrawal of security personnel from the federal Government College Buni –Yadi, few hours before the recent attack that claimed the lives of 59 innocent children (Nwagboso, 2019).

A former chief of defence staff, Air Marshall Al-amin Daggash (retd) spoke on behalf of the forum at the press conference, Flanked by a former minister of finance, Mallam Adamu Ciroma and Ambassador Babagans Kingibe (Sahara Reporters, 2019). According to Amah, (2014), the Goodluck administration has done what any responsible government ought to have done about tackling internal Boko-Haram insurgency. In a dwindling economy, it is truly impressive that government has continued to commit enormous resources in terms of money, military hardwares in order to overcome the bloody distractions and manacing spectre of Boko-Haram.

It is severally believed that the Northern Muslim officers as well as the Islamic North's political establishments has made the army's task a lot more cumbersome. First, the Northern Muslim Officers as well as the ranks and files of the troops are themselves suspected to be members of the Boko-Haram who provide intelligence, aid and comfort to follow Muslims fighting to unseat the government controlled by a Kafir or infidel Christian president from the South.

The Northern political elites had at the beginning of Jonathan's administration never hid their intention to “make the country ungovernable until power is returned to the North (Okpara, 2019)

In fact they have repeatedly stated their intention to end the insurgency once the presidency is handed back to them (Junger, 2019).

### **Theoretical Framework**

The need for a theoretical framework was emphasized in the late 1960's when a commission appointed to investigate the causes of violence found that one of the major obstacles in the way of understanding this social phenomenon was “the lack of a general theoretical framework with which to order our perceptions of the motives and attitudes that impel groups towards violence and the social conditions conducive to it” (Salisu, 2019).

The Frustration-Aggression Theory was formulated by John Dollard and his colleagues Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, Orval Mowrer, and Robert Sears in 1939. The theory emerged from their collaborative work in the book "Frustration and Aggression," which aimed to explore the psychological roots of aggression. The theory was influenced by earlier work in psychology, particularly the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud and the behaviorist principles of B.F. Skinner. Freud's ideas about the innate drives and the redirection of these drives into different behaviors provided a backdrop for considering how unfulfilled desires might lead to aggression. Behaviorism's focus on stimulus-response relationships also contributed to understanding how external circumstances, like frustration, could lead to aggressive responses.

#### **The Frustration-Aggression Theory posits that:**

1. Frustration always leads to some form of aggression: When an individual is prevented from achieving a goal, this blockage creates an internal state of frustration.
2. Aggression is always a result of frustration: This implies a direct causal link between the experience of frustration and the manifestation of aggressive behavior.

The theory suggests that aggression is a natural, albeit not the only, response to frustration. This aggression can be direct (targeted at the source of frustration) or displaced (targeted at a safer or more convenient object or person).

### **Research Design**

The study will employ a cross-sectional survey design. The cross sectional survey refers to a method whereby the researcher select representative samples of individual within the various specified stages of development. This design was adopted because it will enable the researcher gather wide range of date, on challenges faced by government in tackling security especially Boko Haram. A total of 120 respondent was used and examine.

### **Population of the Study**

The population of the study consist of the six states in the North East of Nigeria, Adamawa, Bombe, Yobe, Bauchi and Taraba which has a population of 16,873,876 as at the 2006 censors population (Anthony, 2019). The target population is 240.

### **Sample Size of the study**

In this study, a sample size of 120 respondents was used. This will be drawn to reflect the various segment of the population in the six states in the North East zone of Nigeria.

Since the population of the study is known, Taro Yamane formula (1962) second edition was used to calculate the sample size from the study. The sample size for this study is 120. Simple random sampling was used for the purpose of this study. It is a means of selection where each unit in the population has an equal chance of being selected.

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

**n = the sample size**

**N = population Size = 240**

**e = Coefficient of confidence or error terms = (0.05)**

**1 = constant**

$$= \frac{240}{1 + 240(0.05)^2}$$

$$= \frac{240}{2} = 120 \text{ Respondents}$$

### **Sampling Technique**

In conducting a study on terrorism and the challenge of security management in Nigeria this simple random sampling method was used to select respondents while the purposive sampling method was utilized to select respondent who are presumably knowledgeable on challenges faced by government in tackling security which was affected by Boko Haram. Employing a rigorous Sampling technique is imperative for ensuring the integrity and reliability of the research findings. The process begins with the identification of all community leaders in the area, followed by the establishment of clear inclusion criteria for eligible participants, which typically include frontline professionals directly involved in patient care. From there, a comprehensive sampling frame is developed, encompassing all eligible security workers, Utilizing a probability sampling method, such as simple Random sampling or stratified sampling, ensures that every eligible government officials has an equal chance of being selected, thus minimizing bias and enhancing the representativeness of the sample. Random selection of participants from the sampling frame is then conducted, adhering to standardized procedures to maintain consistency and transparency. Prior to inclusion in the study, participants are provided with detailed information about the research objectives, procedures and potential risks and benefits, and informed consent is obtained. Data Collection, analysis, and dissemination of findings follow, ultimately contributing valuable insights to inform security strategies and interventions aimed at mitigating the spread of terrorism in the area.

### **Research Instrumentation**

The data collected involved a wide range of research instrument including structure questionnaire and in-depth interview. The use of primary and secondary sources of data in which structured questionnaire was extensively used. According to Eheduru (2019) primary data comes from original sources that have experience within or not have previously collected or used. While the section “A” secondary give aid to the primary data of a used in the course of bio-data. While the section “B” consist of related question to the study. It consist of closed – ended question.

### **Validity of Research Instrument**

The validity of the instrument was certified by the supervisor by approving the questionnaire. The responses gathered from the various pilot points, suggestion that were given by the scholars were adopted as operational instrument before administering the questionnaires.

### **Reliability of Research Instrument**

The test-re-test reliability technique was used to estimate the reliability. The same measuring instrument is used to take two separate measurements on the same population at different time. The higher the correlation between the two measurements, the higher the reliability of the measuring instrument. My project supervisor confirms the reliability of the search instrument.

### **Method of Data Presentation and Analysis**

In order to analyses the data collected simple percentage, bar graph, chi-square was used to describe and test hypotheses.

#### **Data presentation**

This chapter focused on the data presentation and analyses of data collected from respondent in the course of this study presentation of data was causes on in a biography form a total of one hundred and twenty (120) questionnaires were in their study.

### **Data Presentation and Analyses Bio- Data of Respondent**

Table 1 Gender of Respondents

Gender	Frequency	Percentage %
Male	80	667%
Female	40	33.3%
Total	120	100

Source: - field work, 2024

Table 1 and biography above shows that 80 (66.7% of the respondent in this research are male. While 40, (33.3% of respondents are female

Table 2: Age distribution of Respondent

Age	Frequency	Percentage %
20- 30	20	16.7%
31-40	60	50.0%
41-50	18	15
51-60	22	18.3%
Total	120	100%

Source:- Field work, 2022

Table 2 and biography above researcher that 20 (16.7% of the respondent in the research are between the ages of 20 yrs -30 yrs while 60 (50% of the respondent in study are between the age of 31 yrs to 40 yrs. 18 (15% of respondent are between the age packet of 41 yrs to 50 yrs of age while 22(18.3%) of respondents in this study are between the age short of 51 yrs to 60 yrs.

Table 3: Marital Status of Respondent

Marital status	Frequency	Percentage %
Single	50	41.7%
31-40	40	33.3.0%
41-50	20	16.7%
51-60	10	8.3%
Total	120	100%

Source field work, 2024

Table 3 and biography above 50 (41.7% of respondent, are single while, 40 (33.3% of respondents are gainfully mentioned 20 (16.7%) of respondent are dicore 10 (8.3%) are separated

Table 4 Religion Affiliation Respondent

Religion	frequency	Percentage %
Christianity	48	40.7%
Muslim	52	43.3.0%
African Traditional	20	16.7%
Total	120	100%

Table 4 and barograph base religion affiliation of the respondent in this study 48 (40%) of respondent are Christians while, 52 (43.3%) of the respondent are minister, 20 (16.75) of respondents are African traditional worshippers

Table 5: Educational Qualification of Respondent

Qualification	frequency	Percentage %
PSLC	20	16.7%
WASCE/GCE/NECO	60	50.0%
OND/HND/ B.Sc.	30	25%
Post Graduate	10	8.3%
Total	120	100

Source: - field work, 2024.

Table 5 and the biography above shows that 20 (16.7%) respondent possess primary school leaving certificate while 60 (50%) respondents possess WASC/ GCE/NECO. 30 (25%) of the respondent possess OND/ NCE/ HON/BSc while 10 (8.3%) of respondent possess post graduated certificate

Table 6: Boko Haram's activities have significantly impacted Nigeria's national security between 2014-2024

Responses	Frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	60	50.0%
Agree	10	8.3%
Strongly disagree	30	25%
Disagree	15	12.5%
Undeclared	5	4.2%
Total	120	100%

Source field work, 2024

Table 6 and biography above shows that 60 (50%) of respondent strongly agreed that Boko Haram's activities have significantly impacted Nigeria's national security between 2014-2024 while, 10 (8.3%) of respondents posit that they strong agreed to the aforesaid ascertain 30 (25%) respondent stipulate that they strongly disagreed with the afore- mentioned ascertain 15 (12.55) of the respondents disagree with ascertain while, 5 (4.2%) of the respondents are undecided

Table 7: The Nigerian governments' counter-terrorism strategies have been effective in combating Boko Haram

Responses	frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	70	58. %
Agree	8	6.7%
Strongly disagree	22	18.3%
Disagree	14	1.7%
Undeclared	6	5%
Total	120	100%

Table 7 and barograph above reveals that 70 (58.3) of respondent strongly agreed that the Nigerian governments' counter-terrorism strategies have been effective in combating Boko Haram while 8 (6.7%) respondent Agreed to the above ascertain 22 (18.3) of the respondent opine that they strongly disagreed that then is no relationship, between Boko Haram and religion doyma 14 (11.7%) of respondent disagree with the afro said while 6 (50) of respondent was undecided.

Table 8: Poverty and unemployment in Northern Nigeria have contributed to Boko Haram's recruitment success

Option	frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	58	48. 3%
Agree	12	10.%
Strongly disagree	30	25%
Disagree	8	6.7%
Undeclared	12	10%
Total	120	100%

Source:- filed survey, 2022

Table 8 and barograph above renewal that 5.8 (48:3%) of respondents' opine that strong agreed poverty and unemployment in Northern Nigeria have contributed to Boko Haram's recruitment success while. 12 (10%) of the respondent, agree that the 5 a relationship. 30 (25% respondent strongly disagreed with the above a 8 (6.7% respondent disagreed 12 (10% of the total number of respondent posit that they are underlined

Table 9: International cooperation has played a crucial role in Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram

Response	Frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	70	58.3%
Agree	15	12.5%
Strongly disagree	15	12.5%
Disagree	6	5%
Undeclared	14	10%
Total	120	100%

Source: - field work, 2024

Table 9 barograph above show that 70 (58.3% respondent strongly agree while, 15 (12.5% respond agree to the above said ascertain 15 (12.5%) respondent strongly disagree with the above ascertain 6 (5%) of respondent disagreed with the above a ascertain 14 (11.7%) was undecided.

Table 10: The Nigerian military is adequately equipped to handle the Boko Haram insurgency

Response	Frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	54	45%
Agree	20	23.3%
Strongly disagree	18	15%
Disagree	14	11.7%
Undeclared	6	5%
Total	120	100%

Source field work, 2024

Table 10 and biography above, show that 54 (45%) of respondent, strongly agree that Nigerian military is adequately equipped to handle the Boko Haram insurgency while 28 (23.3%) of respondent agree to the afore- mentions ascertain with the above ascertain 14 (11.7%) of respondent disagree with the afro-said issue while 6 (5%) respondent were underdid

Table 11: Inter-agency cooperation in Nigeria has been effective in combating the Boko Haram insurgency

Response	frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	67	55.8%
Agree	18	15.%
Strongly disagree	15	12.%
Disagree	11	9.7%
Undeclared	9	7.5%
Total	120	100%

Source:- field survey, 2024

Take 11 and biography above re that 67 (55.\*) respondent strongly agree that inter-agency cooperation in Nigeria has been effective in combating the Boko Haram insurgency. While, 18 (15%) respondent agree with the aforesaid 15 (12.5%) strongly disagreed with the above ascension 11 (9.2%) of the respondent disagree with the aforementioned ascertain 9 (7.5%) of respondent were underdid.

## Test of hypotheses

### Hypothesis One

Ho:- There is no terrorism in Nigeria linked to economic problems like unemployment, poverty, or lack of empowerment

Hi There is terrorism in Nigeria linked to economic problems like unemployment, poverty, or lack of empowerment

Gender	Options strong agree	Agree	Strong disagree	disagree	Undecided	Undecided	total
Male	50	12	11	6	6	10	91
Female	10	8	8	5	40	5	29
Total	60	20	19	11	10	15	120

Source:- field work, 2024.

Table formal for  $X^2 = \frac{efo - fex}{efe}$

Calculating expected frequency =  $\frac{9(CT \times RT)}{GT}$

$$(a) \frac{60 \times 85}{120} = \frac{5100}{120} = 42.5$$

$$(f) \frac{60 \times 35}{120} = \frac{2100}{120} = 17.5$$

$$(b) \frac{20 \times 85}{120} = \frac{1700}{120} = 14.17$$

$$(g) \frac{20 \times 35}{120} = \frac{700}{120} = 5.83$$

$$(c) \frac{19 \times 85}{120} = \frac{1615}{120} = 13.46$$

$$(h) \frac{19 \times 35}{120} = \frac{665}{120} = 5.54$$

$$(d) \frac{11 \times 85}{120} = \frac{935}{120} = 7.49$$

$$(i) \frac{11 \times 35}{120} = \frac{385}{120} = 3.21$$

$$(e) \frac{10 \times 85}{120} = \frac{850}{120} = 7.10$$

$$(j) \frac{10 \times 35}{120} = \frac{350}{120} = 2.92$$

Table: Calculation of x<sup>2</sup> (chi square) statuses

fo	Fe	Fo-fe	(fo-fe) <sup>2</sup>	(fo-fe) <sup>2</sup>
50	42.5	7.5	56.25	1.3235
12	14.17	-2.17	4.7089	0.3323
11	13.46	- 2.46	6.0516	0.4496
6	7.49	-1.49	2.2201	0.2964
6	7.49	-1.10	1.21	0.1704
10	17.5	- 7.5	56.25	3.2142
8	5.83	2.17	4.7089	0.08077
8	5.54	2.46	6.0516	1.0923
5	3.21	1.79	3.2041	0.9982
4	2.92	1.08	1.1664	0.3995
			X <sup>2</sup>	9.8856

Degree of freedom

$$Dff = (r-1) (c- 1 ) = (2-1) (5-1) = 1 \times 4 = 4$$

### Rejection region

Calculated x<sup>2</sup> 9.8836 conical tables calculated x<sup>2</sup> is 9.488. Since calculated x<sup>2</sup> > conical x<sup>2</sup> the will alternative hypotheses (4) is rejected while of the alternative hypotheses accepted which opine that there is terrorism in Nigeria linked to economic problems like unemployment, poverty, or lack of empowerment.

### Hypotheses Two

Ho – There is no terrorism in Nigeria linked to political ideology or religious extremism?

Hi – There is terrorism in Nigeria linked to political ideology or religious extremism?

Option	Attitude strongly agree	Political class agree	(strongly disagree	(disagree
political ideology or religious extremism	70	8	5	6
Non- political ideology or religious extremism	10	50	6	3
Total	80	13	11	9

Source; = filed survey, 2024

$$\text{Table formal for } X^2 = \frac{e(fo-fe)}{efe}$$

$$\text{Calculating expected frequency} = \frac{(CT \times RT)}{GT}$$

$$(a) \frac{80 \times 93}{120} = \frac{7440}{120} = 62$$

$$(f) \frac{80 \times 27}{120} = \frac{2160}{120} = 18$$

$$(b) \frac{13 \times 93}{120} = \frac{1209}{120} = 10.08$$

$$(g) \frac{13 \times 27}{120} = \frac{351}{120} = 2.925$$

$$(c) \frac{11 \times 93}{120} = \frac{1023}{120} = 8.525$$

$$(h) \frac{11 \times 27}{120} = \frac{297}{120} = 2.475$$

$$(d) \frac{9 \times 83}{120} = \frac{837}{120} = 6.975$$

$$(i) \frac{9 \times 27}{120} = \frac{243}{120} = 2.025$$

$$(e) \frac{7 \times 93}{120} = \frac{651}{120} = 5.425$$

$$(j) \frac{7 \times 27}{120} = \frac{189}{120} = 1.575$$

fo	Fe	Fo-fe	(fo-fe) <sup>2</sup>	(fo-fe) <sup>2</sup>
60	42.5	7.5	56.25	1.3235
10	14.17	-2.17	4.7089	0.3323
11	13.46	-2.46	6.0516	0.4496
6	7.49	-1.49	2.2201	0.2964
6	7.49	-1.10	1.21	0.1704
10	17.5	-7.5	56.25	3.2142
8	5.83	2.17	4.7089	0.08077
8	5.54	2.46	6.0516	1.0923
5	3.21	1.79	3.2041	0.9982
4	2.92	1.08	1.1664	0.3995
			X <sup>2</sup>	9.8856

Degree of freedom

$$Df = (r-1)(c-1) = 2-1(5-1) = 1 \times 4 = 4$$

**Rejection region calculate  $\chi^2 = 16.32$** 

Calculate  $\chi^2 = 9.488$  since calculate hypotheses ( $H_0$ ) accept the alternative hypotheses which state that Terrorism in Nigeria is linked to political ideology and/or religious extremism. This alternate hypothesis posits that there are indeed terrorist activities in Nigeria that have connections to political motivations or extremist religious beliefs, contrary to the original statement. This formulation allows for investigation into potential ideological or religious drivers behind terrorist incidents in the country.

**Hypotheses Three**

$H_0$  – There is no Nigerian security in addressing the challenge of terrorist insurgency.

$H_1$  – There is Nigerian security in addressing the challenge of terrorist insurgency.

Option	Attitude strongly agree	Political class agree	(strongly disagree	(disagree
Equal distribution	70	8	5	6
Unequal distribution	10	50	6	3
Total	80	13	11	9

Source; = filed survey, 2024

**Table formal for  $\chi^2 \frac{fo-fe}{efe}$**

**Calculating expected frequency =  $\frac{(CT \times RT)}{GT}$**

$$(a) \frac{80 \times 93}{120} = \frac{7440}{120} = 62$$

$$(f) \frac{80 \times 27}{120} = \frac{2160}{120} = 18$$

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8	5.83	2.17	4.7089	0.08077
8	5.54	2.46	6.0516	1.0923
5	3.21	1.79	3.2041	0.9982
4	2.92	1.08	1.1664	0.3995
			X <sup>2</sup>	9.8856

Degree of freedom

$$Df = (r-1)(c-1) = 2-1(5-1) = 1 \times 4 = 4$$

### Rejection region calculate $\chi^2 = 16.32$

Calculate  $\chi^2 = 9.488$  since calculate hypotheses ( $H_0$ ) accept the alternative hypotheses which that there is Nigerian security in addressing the challenge of terrorist insurgency?

### Hypotheses Four

$H_0$  – There is no government strategy like non-kinetic approaches in handling the problem of insecurity in Nigeria

$H_1$  – There is government strategy like non-kinetic approaches in handling the problem of insecurity in Nigeria

Option	Attitude strongly agree	Political class agree	(strongly disagree	(disagree
intervention strategies	70	8	5	6
non intervention strategies	10	50	6	3
Total	80	13	11	9

Source; = filed survey, 2022

$$\text{Table formal for } X^2 = \frac{e(fo-fe)}{efe}$$

$$\text{Calculating expected frequency} = \frac{(CT \times RT)}{GT}$$

$$(a) \frac{80 \times 93}{120} = \frac{7440}{120} = 62$$

$$(f) \frac{80 \times 27}{120} = \frac{2160}{120} = 18$$

$$(b) \frac{13 \times 93}{120} = \frac{1209}{120} = 10.08$$

$$(g) \frac{13 \times 27}{120} = \frac{351}{120} = 2.925$$

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$$(i) \frac{9 \times 27}{120} = \frac{243}{120} = 2.025$$

$$(e) \frac{7 \times 93}{120} = \frac{651}{120} = 5.425$$

$$(j) \frac{7 \times 27}{120} = \frac{189}{120} = 1.575$$

Fo	Fe	Fo-fe	(fo-fe) <sup>2</sup>	(fo-fe) <sup>2</sup>
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4	2.92	1.08	1.1664	0.3995
			X <sup>2</sup>	9.8856

Degree of freedom

$$Df = (r-1)(c-1) = 2-1(5-1) = 1 \times 4 = 4$$

**Rejection region calculate  $x^2 = 16.32$** 

Canticle  $x^2 = 9.488$  since calculate hypotheses ( $H_0$ ) accept the alternative hypotheses which that there is government strategy like non-kinetic approaches in handling the problem of insecurity in Nigeria

**Discussion of Results**

The statutory duties of the Nigerian police force as spelt out in section 194(2)(b) of the 1979 constitution as enacted in section 4 of the police act 1967 as amended by act no 23 of 1979 charges the police among other duties, the duty of investigation, prevention and detection of crime. As a basic general duty of the Nigerian police, prevention of crimes and provision of security appears to be a simple expression applied to its real sense, thus prevention of crime is fostered by good and efficient crime investigation and detective ability and actions, the prompt apprehension and prosecution of offenders, produces repressive and deterrent effects on habitual or potential offenders (membere, 2019).

Boko Haram issues therefore presents to the police officer perhaps the greatest challenge which may confront him in the performance of his duties. The inability of the police to effectively tackle insecurity in Nigeria is traceable to low funding of the force, inadequate logistics, poor motivation and remuneration, lack of modern communication facilities and crime fighting equipment, inadequate and deplorable barrack accommodation, indifference, corruption, police brutality and lack of public support. Added to this, the image of the Nigerian police has been seriously damaged with the public knowledge that high ranking police officers are involved in abating and aiding crimes in Nigeria, thus the issues of crime should not be left to the police alone such factor like motivation, good working conditions inadequate crime fighting facilities, good salaries and logistics are positively related to reducing insecurity in Nigeria.

Accordingly Gbenga and Augoye (2019), perceive the cause of insecurity to be as a result of the malignant environment dominated by man's insensitivity to man, thus many people in authority take advantage of their positions to force down policies that impoverish 'the many' in so much as it benefits them and a few others. Furthermore, the inability of the managers of Nigeria's security apparatus to address the country's security challenges raises yet another critical question on the preparedness of Nigeria to attain desired political, social and economic heights in the year 2020. It further poses serious threats to the unity and corporate existence of Nigeria as a sovereign state. Therefore, addressing the security challenges in Nigeria ultimately requires not only the causes of threats but also a critical evaluation of the performance of security agencies in handling the security situation in Nigeria and effectiveness of the security agencies in Nigeria to perform their statutory responsibilities.

## **Conclusion**

This study illustrated the complex and intersecting kinds of information needed to understand the phenomenon of modern religiously-inspired domestic Boko Haram terrorism, so it should hopefully be useful to the general counter Boko Haram terrorism practitioner as well. Clearly, no terrorist group has ever emerged in a vacuum; there are dynamic contexts - political, social, economic, temporal, spatial, even spiritual - that must be taken into account. The government has struggled to deal effectively with these grievances and sources of tension throughout the country, and there is a pervasive belief particularly among northern Nigerians that the government continually fails to address critical needs of those who aspire for a better future. While resources are surely constrained, it is the inequitable distribution of those resources, and the widely acknowledged levels of corruption among elites, that detract from the government's effectiveness. In turn, patronage and corruption fuel a general perception that government officials - to include law enforcement - cannot be trusted, and this further undermines the government's ability to influence the behavior of local community members in positive directions, away from the lure of radical extremist ideologies like that of Boko Haram.

An overwhelming majority of problems identified in this study can be tackled, but only by a capable government that is seen by its citizens as legitimate and trustworthy. There is much the government can and must do to reduce alienation and build trust and legitimacy among its citizens—particularly in the northern region - and address other enablers of Boko Haram terrorism described in this study. At the core of the problem is perceived government legitimacy, or lack thereof, and how this provides opportunities for non-state actors like Boko Haram to capture loyalties, hearts, and minds in pursuit of their radical vision of the future.

## **Recommendations**

The study recommends the following:

1. Counter Boko Haram terrorism strategy should focus on at least three areas: organizations, environmental conditions, and perceptions. It involves attacking terrorist organizations and their members, degrading their functional capabilities, encouraging “leaving” alternatives, and supporting sociopolitical entities that draw support away from them. It also involves mitigating sociopolitical conditions and other grievances which have historically been used by terrorist organizations to justify their use of violence.
2. The need to employ diplomacy, or Carrot and Stick approach as Obasanjo suggested is necessary if the menace of Boko Haram is to be overcome. This is to encourage the group to understand that they are not merely treated as outcasts, but make them understand they are still part of the Nigerian society. Here, the instruments of soft power are just as important in helping combat Boko Haram terrorism as a nation's security forces.

3. Legitimacy in effort is also critical, in that it affects the quality of intelligence needed to identify and take away from the terrorist group the things that facilitate their operations, like safe havens, weapons proliferation, weak border controls, and illicit financial networks.
4. Importance of good governance cannot be overemphasized. It is critical for the government to understand that the root of crises and arm struggles in Nigeria has always been accumulated grievances towards bad governance in the country. Conscious efforts, commitment and determination by the government to enthrone governance in Nigeria is an important step that must be followed to curtail the Boko Haram and any other insurgency in Nigeria.

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