

**THE MULINATIONAL JOINT TASK FOCE AND COUNTER-  
TERRORISM; AM IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF BOKO HARAM**

**BY**

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this project was carried out by ELIJAH EMEM SUNDAY with the matriculation number 13/015597/ASS and was supervised by Dr. Femi Olufunmilade of Igbinedion University Okada, in partial fulfilment for the award for Bachelor Degree (BS.c) in International Relations and Strategic Studies.

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DECLARATION

I, ELIJAH, EMEM SUNDAY hereby declare that:

This research work titled THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM; AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF BOKO HARAM was an original research carried out by me.

That this project has not previously been submitted for the award of any degree, diploma or certificate anywhere.

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## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to God Almighty who has seen me through till the completion. And also this work is dedicated to my adorable parents HON MR&MRS SUNDAY ELIJAH for their endless support and prayer. Finally to my supervisor Dr Femi Olufunmilade.

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## ABSTRACT

*Boko haram insurgency is one issue that cannot be totally evicted or in other words inevitable since their operations from 2010 till date, this terrorist group has caused alot of attack on all target (soft and hard) the former been civilians and innocent casualties. Terrorism has been a main concern all over the world and has caused the international system to seek for a lasting solution through the Multinational Joint Task Force. The MNJTF which is made up of 5 countries and it was established in 1988 to fight against boko haram. And for the purpose of this study, MNJTF has been the body used in countering boko haram insurgency in all the affected regions. The theory Collective Security is been used to gain a better understanding of combating this boko haram movement internationally. Collective Security in line with the MNJTF has formed a coalition among states to attack any country that threatens to attack, being that an attack against one is an attack on all as the theory states. The methodology used here is qualitative as information was gotten from an already existing source (secondary materials e.g library, articles). Contained in this study is the assessment of terrorism in different forms and views, counter terrorism and they different approaches used to counter their activities. The Multinational Joint Task Force, challenges they have encountered so far in the process of solving this menace, successes, mandate and how they have operated. Boko haram as a terrorist organisation, funding, the nature of their war and the campaign of violence. Conclusively this study has showed that for a long time the MNJTF has been more effective in monitoring the activities of this insurgent group, despite the limitation they have faced. The should be a broad mandate and welled equipped intelligence and surveillance tools. African union should also help in contributing military troops to fight in those countries that is been attacked. It is therefore recommended that the MNJTF should engage in a persistence work even in the face of threat and the African Union should aid in contributing troops to maintain peaceful union. Therefore it is very imperative that the military are welled trained and equipped for proper handling of the insurgent group.*

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY**

Before colonization and subsequent annexation into the British Empire in 1900 as Colonial Nigeria, the Bornu Empire ruled the territory where boko Haram is currently active. It was a sovereign sultanate run according to the principles of the constitution of Medina, with a majority Kanuri Muslim population. In 1903, both the Borno Emirate and Sokoto Caliphate came under the control of the British, Christians missionaries at this time spread the Christian message in the region and had many converts. British occupation ended with Nigerian independence in 1960. Except for a brief period of civilian rule between 1979 and 1983, Nigeria was governed by a series of military dictatorships from 1966 until the advent of democracy in 1999. Ethnic militancy is thought to have been one of the causes of the 1967-1970 civil war; religious violence reached a new height in 1980 in Kano, the largest city in the North of the country, where the Muslim fundamentalist sect Yan Tatsine ('followers of Maitatsine) instigated riots that resulted in four or five thousand deaths. In the ensuing crackdown, Maitastine was killed, fueling a backlash of increased violence that spread across other northern cities over the next twenty years. Social inequality and poverty contributed both to the Maitastine and boko Haram uprisings. In the decades since the end of British occupation, politicians and academics from the mainly Islamic North have expressed their fundamental opposition Western education. Political ethno-religious interest groups, whose membership includes influential political, military and religious leaders, have thrived in Nigeria, though they were largely suppressed under military rule. Their paramilitary wings, formed since the country's return to civilian rule, have been implicated in

much of the sectarian violence in the following years. The Arewa People's Congress, the militia's wing of the Arewa Consultative Forum, the main political group representing the interests of northern Nigeria, is a well-funded group with military and intelligence expertise, and is considered capable of engaging in military action, including covert bombing.

Boko Haram is an Islamic religious sect that has been in existence way before the beginning of their brutal politically motivated attacks in Nigeria. The group's official name is WilayatGharbAfriqiya, to designate as a branch of "province" of the Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Prior to AbubakarShekau's pledge of allegiance to ISIL, the official name was Jama'atuAhlis-Sunnah Lid-Da'watiwal-Jihad meaning "people committed to the prophets teachings for propagation and jihad". It has its headquarter in Sambisa forest, Borno state and their area of operation are Northeast Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Boko Haram is organized in a hierarchical structure with one overall leader, the group also operates as a clandestine cell system using a network structure, with unit having between 300 and 500 fighters each. Estimates of total number of fighters range between 500 and 9,000. The name "BokoHaram" is usually translated as "Western education is forbidden". Haram is from the Arabic "forbidden" and the Hausa word boko meaning "fake", and westernization is sacrilege". Mohammed Yusuf founded the sect that became known as Boko Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north eastern state of Borno. He established a established a religious complex and school that attracted poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighboring countries. The center had the political goal of creating an Islamic state, and became a recruiting ground for jihadis. By denouncing the police and state corruption, Yusuf attracted followers from unemployed youths. It has been speculated that the reason Yusuf founded Boko Haram appears to be that he saw an opportunity to exploit public outrage at government corruption by linking it

to western influence in governance. He is reported to have used the existing infrastructure in Borno of Izala society, a popular conservative Islamic sect, to recruit members, before breaking away to form his own fraction. The Izala were originally welcomed into government, along with people sympathetic to Yusuf. Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of existence, withdrawing from society into remote north-eastern areas. The government repeated warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organization. The council of Ulama advised the government and Nigerian television authority not to broadcast Yusuf's preaching, but their warnings were ignored. Yusuf's arrest elevated him to hero status. Borno's deputy Governor Alhaji Dibal has reportedly claimed that Al-Qaeda had ties with Boko Haram, but broke them when they decided that Yusuf was an unreliable Person. Stephen Davis, a former Anglican clergyman who has negotiated with Boko Haram many times blames local Nigerian politician who support local bandits like Boko Haram in order for them to make life difficult for their political opponents. In particular Davis has blamed the former governor of Borno state Ali Modu Sheriff who initially supported Boko Harm but no longer needed them after the 2007 elections and stopped funding them but they were then out of control. Sherriff denies the accusations. They vast majority and Boko Haram main targets and victims are the civilians and they have caused more than 1million people to flee from their homes (Agba E, 2015). They have claimed more than 17,000 lives although the true figure is almost certainly higher. Religion appears to be one of the drivers of the conflict, a number of other factors contribute to the ongoing instability in the region. These include the shrinking political influence of the north and the dissatisfaction of the northern elites with the current balance of power, poor governance, corruption, marginalization and poverty.

## 1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

“Boko Haram” which comes from the Hausa word boko meaning “Animist, western or otherwise non-Islamic education” and the Arabic word Haram figuratively meaning “sin” (literally, “forbidden”). Since the inception of this group in 2002 till date, it has engaged itself with a lot of attacks by killing people, kidnapping bombing etc. Before the Multinational Joint Task Force was been establish with the purpose of dealing with this cross-border security issues and to checkmate banditry activities. The problem that this study aim to solve is to assess the impact or the extent to which the Multinational Joint Task Force has been able to tackle boko Haram, since it swung into action in 2016 and what approaches have they use to combat the spread of their activities. In finding an acceptable solution to these problems the following questions has been raised:

- To what extent has the multinational joint task force been effective or operational, in combating boko Haram since it came into existence?
- The challenges the multinational joint task force has faced in combating boko Haram?
- The roles that the multinational joint task force has played in countering the activities of the boko Haram?
- What measures has the multinational joint task force kept in place to prevent the activities of the boko Haram?

## 1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of this study include the following;

- Assessing the effectiveness of multinational joint task force in combating Boko Harm.
- To outline the challenges multinational joint task force has faced.

- Ascertaining the roles it has played in countering their activities.
- Identifying the measures that the multinational joint task force will use to tackle the attacks caused by boko Haram.

#### 1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of this study will enlighten us more about the relevance of the multinational joint task force, how it has been able to combat or counter insurgency activities on boko Haram since it was created. This study will provide new knowledge and different approaches that will help the multinational joint task force to be more operational in countering their activities.

#### 1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Geographically the scope of this study spans, 5 countries which came together was to combat boko Haram namely; Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin Republic. In terms of time, it spans 2009 till 2016. The year 2009 is very important because a violent uprising in July of the year led to the execution of the leader boko Haram

#### 1.6 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The methodology used for this study is qualitative data and information collated to form the bulk of this work is gotten from (secondary source). Example of the secondary data includes; document from the institute for research studies, press release, Africa Watch, books, academic journals, internet sources newspaper and Magazines.

## 1.7 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The limitation of this study is restricted to the multinational joint task force and its Counter insurgency activities to combat Boko Haram. And the challenges the multinational joint task force has faced, if these problems are solved, these organizations will go a long way to tackle Boko Haram.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.1 CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE ON TERRORISM

There is no universal agreement on the definition of terrorism. Various legal system and government agencies use different definitions. Moreover, governments have been reluctant to formulate an agreed upon and legally binding definition. These difficulties arise from the fact that the term is politically and emotionally charged. To avoid this kind of confusion the most common definition of terrorism is used, which includes the following:

- It is the use of violence or threat of violence in order to purport a political, religious, or ideological change.
- It can only be committed by non-state actors or undercover personnel serving on the behalf of their respective governments.
- It reaches more than the immediate target victims and is also directed at targets consisting of a larger spectrum of society.
- It is both mala prohibita (i.e. crime that is made illegally by legislation) and mala in se (i.e. crime that is inherited immoral or wrong).

The following criteria of violence or threats of violence fall outside of the definition of terrorism.

- Wartime (including a declared war) or peacetime acts of violence committed by a nation state against another nation state regardless of legality or illegality that are carried out by properly uniformed forces or legal combatants of such nation states.

- Reasonable acts of self-defense, such as the use of force to kill, apprehend or punish criminals who pose a threat to the lives of humans or property.
- Legitimate targets in war, such as enemy combatants and strategic infrastructure that are an integral part of the enemy's war effort.
- Collateral damage, including the infliction of incidental damage to non-combatant targets during an attack on or attempting to attack legitimate targets in war.

There are many reasons to why there is no universal consensus regarding the definition of terrorism. Angus Martyn in a briefing paper for Australian parliament has stated that "the international community has never succeeded in developing an accepted comprehensive definition of terrorism. During the 1970s and 1980s, the United Nations attempts to define the term foundered mainly due to differences of opinion between various members about the use of violence in the context of conflicts over national liberation and self-determination. These divergences have made it possible to conclude a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that incorporates a single, all-encompassing, legally binding, criminal law definition of terrorism. A 2003 study by Jeffrey Record for the United States Army quoted a source (Schimid and Jongman 1988) that counted 109 definitions of terrorism that covered a total of 22 different definitional elements. Record continued "Terrorism expert Walter Laquer also has counted over 100 definitions and concludes that only general characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence. Yet terrorism is hardly the only enterprise involving violence and the threat of violence. So does war, coercive diplomacy, and bar room brawls.

Numerous scholars have proposed working definition of terrorism;

According to L. Ali Khan (1987), "He states that terrorism sprouts from the existence of aggrieved groups. These aggrieved groups share two essential characteristics: they have specific political objectives, and they believe that violence is an inevitable means to achieve their political ends. The political dimension of terrorist violence is the key factor that distinguishes it from other crimes. Terrorism is an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, groups or states actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violent based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s), turning it into a target terror, a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought Schmid and Jongman (1988).

Jack Gibbs (1989) Terrorism is an illegal violence or threatened violence directed against human or nonhuman objects, provided that it: (1) was undertaken or ordered with a view to altering or maintaining at least one putative norm in at least one particular territorial unit or population: (2) had secretive, furtive, and/or clandestine features that were expected by the participants to conceal their personal identity or their future location; (3) was not undertaken or ordered to further the permanent defense of some areas; (4) was not conventional warfare and because of their concealed personal identity, concealment of their future location, their threats, and their spatial mobility, the participant perceived themselves as less vulnerable to conventional military action; and (5) was perceived by their participants as contributing to the normative goal previously described (supra) by inculcating fear of violence in persons (perhaps an indefinite

category of them) other than the immediate target of the actual or threatened violence and by publicizing some cause. Alex P. Schmid (1992) according to him short legal definition proposed to the United Office on Drugs and Crime: ‘‘Act of Terrorism= Peacetime Equivalent of War Crime’’.

Judge at the international Court of Justice, ‘‘Terrorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities whether of states or individuals widely disapproved of and in which wither the methods used are unlawful, or the targets protected or both’’ Rosalyn Higgins (1997). ‘‘Terrorism according to Walter Lacquer (2002) constitutes the illegal use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted’’. Louise Richardson (1999) ‘‘Without attempting a lengthy rationalization for the definition i employ, he simply asserts that terrorism is politically motivated violence directed against non-combatants or symbiotic targets which is designed to communicate a message to a broader audience. The critical feature of terrorism is the deliberate targeting of innocents in an effort to convey a message to another party’’. ‘‘Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, and threatening of innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage usually to influence an audience’’ James M. Poland (2002).

According to M. Cherif Bassiouni (2004) ‘‘Terrorism has never been defined’’ by distinguishing terrorists from other types of criminals and terrorism from other forms of crime, we have come to appreciate that terrorism is:

- Ineluctably political in aims and motives.
- Violent or equally important, threatens violence.

- Designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target.
- Conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure whose members wear no uniform of identifying insignia and perpetrated by a sub national group or non-states entity.

David Rodin (2004) ‘‘The deliberate, negligent, or reckless use of force against noncombatants, by state or non-state actors for ideological ends and in the absence of a substantively just legal process is terrorism’’. ‘‘Terrorism consists of acts of indiscriminate violence directed at civilians or non-hostile personnel, in order to terrorize them, or their governments, into carrying out or submitting to the demands of the terrorists, Peter Simpson (2004)’’. Boaz Ganor (2005) defines terrorism as the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians in order to achieve political ends. Daniel D. Novotny (2007) ‘‘An act is terrorist if and only if (1) It is committed by an individual or group of individuals privately, i.e without the legitimate authority of a recognized state; (2) It is directed indiscriminately against non-combatants; (3) The goal of it is to achieve something politically relevant; (4) This goal is pursued by means of fear provoking violence’’. Carsten Bocksette (2008) ‘‘Thus in his view of says that, terrorism is defined as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols), such acts are meant to send an illicit clandestine organization. The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience in order to reach short and midterm political goals and or desired long term end states’’. Lutz, James M. and Lutz Brenda J. (2008), they both defined terrorism as ‘‘that which involves political aims and motives.

It is designed to generate fear in a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The violence is conducted by an identifiable organization. The violence involves a non-state actor or actors as either the perpetrator, the victim of the violence, or both. Finally, the acts of violence are designed to create power in a situation in which power previously had been lacking”. Tamar Meisels (2008) advocates a consistent and strict definition of terrorism, which she defines as “the intentional random murder of defenseless non-combatant, with the intent of instilling fear of mortal danger amidst a civilian population as a strategy designed to advance political ends”.

In conclusion having looked at the different views of terrorism by different scholars, I would say that there cannot be an end to defining terrorism and almost all definitions are in one way or the other similar to each other because their intended aim is either to maim, kill or injure the actual target.

## 2.2 COUNTER TERRORISM

Counterterrorism is a difficult concept to define, especially for western democracies. Paul Wilkinson writes that: “There is no universal applicable counter-terrorism policy for democracies. Every conflict involving terrorism has its own unique characteristics” (Wilkinson, 2016). Both Paul Wilkinson and Louise Richardson argue, and they are not alone, that Western democracies must make respect for civil liberties and the rule of law a staple in their counterterrorism strategies (Paul, 2006). While this advice to liberal democracies is admirable and complies with championed democratic principles, it does not amount to a counterterrorism (Rinehart, 2010).

Counterterrorism is defined in the U.S Army Field Manual as “Operations that includes the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism”’. (US Army, 2006) This definition is more concrete but it has its strengths and weakness. First, it correctly states that counterterrorism is an all-inclusive doctrine including prevention, deterrence, preemption, and responses, which would require bringing to bear all aspects of a nation’s power both domestically and internationally. Second, this definition includes everything but essentially but essentially differentiates nothing, which is a problem. If effective counterterrorism doctrine means ‘whatever we need, it’, then this could create problems with developing effective counter strategies, allocating resources, and determining accountability (Rinehart 2010).

Over time the nature of international terrorism changed and so too did counterterrorism (Bruce, 1999). The evolution of counterterrorism over the past years was a slow process that involved adapting to the nature international terrorism, as well as taking advantage of new advancements in military technology (Jason, 2010).

The changes in the nature of counterterrorism raise a larger question of the nature of power in modern counterterrorism operations. If counterterrorism is indeed an all-encompassing approach requiring all aspects of a nation’s power, then it is important to understand both the hard and soft power options of counterterrorism (Rinehart,2010).

Counterterrorism also refers to corresponds to actions to ameliorate the threat and consequences of terrorism. These actions can be taken by governments, military alliance, international organization (e.g INTERPOL), private corporations, or private citizens. Counter terrorism comes in two basic varieties: Defensive and Proactive Measures.

## 2.3 DEFENSIVE MEASURES AND PROACTIVE MEASURES

Defensive counter measures protect potential targets by making attacks more costly for terrorists or reducing their likelihood of success. When, however, successful terrorist attack ensues, defensive actions also serve to limit the resulting losses to target. Defensive measures have generally been reactive, instituted after some successful or innovative attack. In USA, airline passengers are now required to remove their shoes when being screened, following the innovative, but fortunately unsuccessful, attempt by Richard Reid to bring down American Airline flight en route from Paris to Miami on 22 December 2001 with explosives hidden in his shoes. Before the installation of metal detectors to screen passengers at US airport on 5 January 1973, there were on average over 25 skyjackings each year in the USA (Enders et., 1990) After the installation, attempted US skyjackings dropped to fewer than four a year. The success of this metal led to the installation worldwide over the six months. Other instances of defensive measures include target hardening, such as defensive perimeters around government buildings or embassies, or guard at points of a country's infrastructure

By contrast, Proactive Measures are offensive as a targeted government directly confronts the terrorist group or its supporters. Proactive measures may destroy terrorist's resources (e.g training camps), curb their finances, eliminate their safe havens, or kill and capture their members. In recent years, the Obama administration has relied on drone attacks to assassinate terrorist leaders and operatives. Proactive operations may assume myriad other forms, including a retaliatory raid against a state sponsor that provides resources, training, sanctuary, logistical support, or intelligence to a terrorist group. On 15 April 1986, the USA launched a retaliatory bombing raid on targets in Libya for its alleged support in the terrorist bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin on 4 April 1986, where 3 died and 231 were wounded, including 62 Americans

(Mickolus et al., 1989 vol.2, pp. 365-7). Another proactive measure takes the form of a preemptive attack against a terrorist group or a harboring country, such as the US-led invasion of Afghanistan four weeks after 9/11. A preemptive strike differs from a retaliatory raid because the former is more sustained and meant to severely compromise the capabilities of the terrorists to conduct future missions.

Other Proactive Measures include infiltrating terrorist groups, engaging in military action, conducting propaganda campaigns against the terrorists, and gathering intelligence to foil terror plots (Kaplan 2015). According to Carter (2015) ‘Military action’ generally refer to operations by the host government against a resident terrorist group. Choi (2015) states that actions that improve the economy, which in turn reduces grievances, can also be proactive. Younas (2015) demonstrates empirically that increased globalization of a country’s economy may also be proactive by limiting harmful and therefore grievance causing effects of terrorism on economic growth. Only carter (2015) considers both defensive and proactive counterterrorism response to.

## 2.4 HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE IN TERRORISM

Existing research on counterterrorism tends to structure debates around two approaches: the war (or military) model and the criminal justice model (Wilkinson, 2006). The war model tends to frame the struggle against terrorism in military terms of an enemy-centric war where the armed forces of a state are primarily in charge of developing counterterrorism strategy. On the other hand the criminal justice model champions the rule of law and democratic values which prevail in Western democracies. Doing so puts restrictions on the government thereby risks reducing the effectiveness of Counterterrorism measures. However, as Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstrop have argued, both models rarely function according to academic theory during an actual

Counterterrorism campaign. While democracies tend to champion democratic ideals and preservation of civil liberties, their attempts to combat terrorism forcefully have continually tested the boundaries of the criminal justice model (Pedahzur and Magnus, 2001).

There is a need to view Counterterrorism from other angles. It is becoming increasingly clear that framework is needed in order to develop and measure successful counterterrorism strategies (Schmid and Rashmi, 2009). Considering the evolution of counterterrorism, it could be more successful to view counterterrorism in terms of ‘‘hard’’ and ‘‘soft’’ power.

#### Hard Power Approach (Direct Approach)

The direct approach would be an enemy-centric doctrine consisting of primarily offensive, hard power tactics such as Predator and Reaper drone strikes, special forces operations, increased policing and intelligence operations. These are useful tools if the goal is to isolate and destroy groups like Boko Haram.

#### Soft Power Approach (Indirect Approach)

The indirect soft power approach would consist of population-centric methods, and would contain features such as capacity building, economic development, and counter-radicalization focusing on the underlying causes that allow terrorism to thrive.

The direct approach to counterterrorism is straightforward but it raises serious questions regarding the ethical and legal use of force- on top of the issue of collection of intelligence and the protection of civil liberties within a democratic society. On the other hand, it remains to be seen if soft power alternatives such as democracy promotion, economic development, and counter-radicalization effectively address the ill-defined ‘‘root causes’’ of terrorism Robert

Jervis argues that even if political oppression, weak states, poverty and economic inequality were the real causes, “there is little reason to think that we could deal with them effectively”. He concludes that “we cannot point to solid evidence that doing so would make much difference” (Robert 2005).

Another way of viewing Counter terrorism includes two basic varieties mentioned above: defensive and proactive measures.

## 2.5 THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK: COLLECTIVE SECURITY

This study is based on the theory of Collective Security. Collective Security can be understood as a security arrangement, political, regional or global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all and therefore commits to a collective response to threats to, and breaches to peace. Collective Security is one of the most promising approaches for peace and a valuable device for power management on an international scale. Collective Security can also be defined as one type of coalition building strategy in which a group of nations agree not to attack each other and to defend each other against an attack from one of the other, if such attack is made. The principal behind this theory is that “an attack against one, is an attack against all. An example of Collective Security organization is United Nation. Proponents of Collective Security say it is much more effective approach to security than individual countries trying to act alone, as weaker countries cannot possibly defend themselves, and countries that try often become involved in never ending arm race which eventually detract from rather than enhance their security over the long term.

Collective Security can be achieved by setting an international cooperative organization, under the auspices of international law and this gives rise to a form of international collective governance, although limited in scope and effectiveness. The concept of Collective Security was forwarded by men such as Michael Joseph Savage, Martin Wight, Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson. Organski (1960) listed 5 basic assumptions underlying the theory of Collective Security and Morgenthau (1948) states 3 prerequisites that must be met for Collective Security to successfully prevent war.

#### BASIC ASSUMPTION

- In an armed conflict, member nation states will be able to agree on which nation is the aggressor.
- All member nation states are equally committed to contain and constrain the aggression, irrespective of its source or origin.
- All member nation states have identical freedom of action and ability to join in proceeding against the aggressor.
- The cumulative power of cooperating members of the alliance for Collective Security will be adequate and sufficient to overpower the might of the aggressor.
- In the light of the threat posed by the Collective might of nations of a Collective Security coalition, the aggressor nation will modify its policies or if unwilling to do so will be defeated.

## PEREQUISITUES

- The Collective Security system must be able to assemble military force in strength greatly in excess to that assembled by the aggressors thereby deterring the aggressors from attempting to change the world order defended by the Collective Security.
- Those nations, whose combined strength would be used for deterrence as mentioned in the first prerequisite, should have identical beliefs about the security of the world order that the collective is defending.
- Nations must be willing to subordinate their conflicting interests to common good defined in terms of all member states.

The use of Collective Security theory to explain the Multinational Joint Task Force and its Counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is best suitable for this work. Multinational Joint Task Force which spans 5 countries was set up to deal with cross border banditry and also fight against boko Haram work closely with member nation to achieve their goal. Collective Security comes in here because its principal factor states thus 'the attack on one nation, is an attack on all. When one a nation or country is been threaten or attacked by another country, a coalition is been formed to achieve its aim and this is done collectively. And the Multinational Joint Task Force as a body which was established for this purpose has been able to work closely with these nations which form part of this task force and has been able to counter the activities of boko Haram to a large extent since it swung into action in 2016.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE**

#### **3.1 THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE**

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a combined multinational formation, comprising units, mostly military, from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. It is headquartered in N'Djamena and is mandated to bring an end to Boko Haram insurgency. The task force was first organized as a solely Nigerian force in 1994, during the administration of Sani Abacha to 'checkmate banditry activities and to facilitate free movement' along its northern borders (1). (2) In 1988 it was expanded to include units from neighboring Chad and Niger with the purpose of dealing with common cross-border security issues in Lake Chad region, with its headquarters in the town of Baga, Borno state. The African Union (AU) approved the repurposing of the MNJTF as a counter-Boko Haram force in January 2015, with an operational headquarter in N'djamena boasting roughly 100 military and civilian personnel. The task force's counter-terrorism force, intended to engage in military operations against the insurgency, was to comprise 8,700 troops from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin, united under the command of Major General Buratai. The operational budget for this endeavor, originally authorized for a year was pegged at \$700million some \$250million of which was pledged by Niger and France. In addition, the United States offered intelligence support and training of the force. The force was supposed to act as a way to coordinate regional efforts and lead the offensive against Boko Haram. Its charter gives the force the responsibility to engage in everything from psychological operations against insurgents to organizing humanitarian aid and

convoys to preventing arms trafficking in addition to ‘’conducting military operations to prevent the expansion of Boko Haram and other terrorist group activities and eliminate their presence.

One important issue limiting the efficacy of the MNJTF is funding. The AU has struggled to collect contributions for the force and the disbursement of pledged funds has been slow. Reuters quoted an anonymous senior officer with the MNJTF who claimed that the force’s budget had been able to buy only ‘’11 vehicles and some radio equipment’s. The officer also noted that the remaining costs were borne by the individual countries militaries creating a financial strain on already tight budgets. Other shortages like the jet fuel scarcity in the North East have made it difficult for Nigerian Air force to conduct air operations according to chief of Defense Staff, General Gabriel Olonisakin. The fragmented financial responsibility mirrors the current operational characteristics of the force’s military operations against Boko Haram. For example, credit has been given to the force for successfully dislodging Boko Haram from much of the territory it overran last year, but since then, the territory has not been adequately secured by the Nigerian military or police. Moreover, many of this operation that dislodged Boko Haram were conducted largely by national forces rather than the regional force. Vincent Foucher, a West Africa researcher with the International Crises Group reported that ‘’each force is based in its country of origin’’, and observed that there is not yet a truly integrated force. At best, the MNJTF has been a complement to national efforts in the region, at worst it has delayed military action and obfuscated which military forces are responsible for responding to developments.

The Islamist insurgency in northern Nigeria intensified in the latter part of the 2000s, and security forces across the region were increasingly directly challenged by jihadist militant groups. Boko Haram and Ansaru were the most active and well known. In April 2012, the MNJTF’s mandate was expanded to encompass counter-terrorism operations. Brig. Gen

Enitan Ransome-Kuti, son of Beko Ransome-Kuti and nephew of the musician Fela Kuti was a previous commander of the force. In January 2015 the MNJTF headquarters in Baga, Nigeria, was overrun by militants of Boko Haram, who then proceeded to massacre local residents and destroy the towns, displacing many citizens. At the time, only Nigerian citizens were present in the headquarter. There were reports that fled the attackers. It was an ignominious movement for the MNJTF and indeed the contributing nations. The political process of expanding the MNJTF was reinvigorated and led to swifter progress, including the expansion of troop numbers and mandate, and relocation to the HQ to N'Djamena, Chad.

The most significant structural changes for the MNJTF that emerged from meetings in 2015 were a rise in numbers, the creation of a new concept of operations under the supervision of Lake Chad Basin Commission, and the move to HQ to N'Djamena. It was agreed that a Nigerian officer would be commander of the duration of the mission against Boko Haram, with a Cameroonian deputy and Chadian Chief of Staff. Major General T.Y Buratai (Nigerian) was appointed commander MNJTF in May 2015. His command was however short lived, as in July 2015 he was appointed Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff. Major general Lliya Abbah, a Nigerian succeeded him as commander of MNJTF on July 30, 2015.

### 3.2 MANDATES OF THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE

According to the Communiqué of the 484<sup>th</sup> meeting of the PSC mandate is to:

- Create a safe and secured environment in the area affected by the activities of Boko harm and other terrorist groups, in order to significantly reduce violence against civilians and other abuses, including sexual and gender based violence, in full compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN HRDDP.
- Facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes by the LCBC Member States and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of states authority and return of IDPs and refugees.
- Facilitate, within the limit of its capabilities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of assistance to the affected population.
- Conducting military operations to prevent the expansion of the group's activities
- Conducting patrols
- Preventing all transfer of weapons or logistic to the group
- Actively searching for and freeing all abductees, including the girls kidnapped from Chibok in April 2014.
- Carrying out psychological actions to encourage defection within boko Haram ranks.
- The MNJTF has also been tasked to undertake specific actions in the area of intelligence, human rights, information and the media.

(Multinational Joint Task Force( MNJTJ)-GlobalSecurity.org)

### 3.3 FUNCTIONS OF THE MULTINATIONATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE

1. Conducting military operations to prevent the expansion of Boko Haram and other terrorist activities and eliminate their presence.
2. Facilitating operational coordination amongst the affected countries in the fight against Boko Haram and other terrorist group, including on the basis of the intelligence collected by the LCBC Member State and Benin and availed by external partners.
3. Encouraging and facilitate the conduct of joint simultaneous coordinated patrols and other types of operations at the borders of affected countries.
4. Preventing all transfer of arms and ammunition and other type of support to boko Haram and other terrorist groups.
5. Ensuring within its capabilities, the protection of civilians under immediate threat, IDP and refugee camps, humanitarian workers and other civilian personnel.
6. Actively searching for, and freeing all abductees, including the young girls abducted in Chibok 2014.
7. Undertaking effective psychological operations to encourage defections from Boko Haram and other terrorist groups.
8. Supporting as maybe appropriate, the initial implementation phase of strategies for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of disengaged fighters into their communities.

(Can a regional force defeat boko haram?) ISS-Institute for security studies

### 3.4 CHANLLENGES OF THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE

The establishment of the MNJTF came with various challenges and constraints that have resulted in the delay set up. The challenges that the MNJTF has faced so far includes the following: Technical, political, financial and logistical challenges.

#### TECHNICAL CHALLENGE

The latest summit was a major milestone in the establishment of MNJTF as it was here a compromise was reached about the force command structure. Without minimizing the importance of the countries concerned make their contingents available and other technical aspects. The establishment of the command headquarters which was the essential pillar of the structure, was the key element in the effective set up of the force. Nigeria was given the force for the entire duration of its mission. This decision was not contested by any other countries reflected Nigeria's commitment to eliminate boko Haram and its determination to reasserts it leadership. From an operational perspective it undoubtedly acknowledge the fact the fight against boko Haram was mainly likely to occur on Nigeria territory, making it judicious to Nigeria to assume this office. The force deputy director was assigned to Cameroon and the decision to establish the command headquarters in N'djamena adopted at its minister of foreign affairs and Defence in Niamey on 20 may 2015 was endorsed. A 30 July 2015 deadline was set for the deployment of various contingents. Like the previous deadline, this was not met. Those missed opportunities not only reflected the scope of the technical work that had to be done but also showed the need to lay the groundwork for and determine the feature of this multinational apparatus.

## FINANCIAL CHALLENGE

Financial constraints have delayed the operationalization of the MNJTF. Before it was able to occupy its current premises, the LCBC Secretariat in N'djamena hosted its command. Similar difficulties were encountered in setting up the various MNJTF sectors of operations in the field. This weigh even more heavily on the troops contributing countries because they were already burden by the considerable financial cost of human and material resource pitted against Boko Haram. This difficulties continued to act as a constraint, although the MNJTF COMMANDER, Major General LamidiAdeosun, his determined to carry out his mission with the means at MNJTF's disposal, he regularly recalled the lack of tangible effect given to the pledges of financial support required to meet security summit in Abuja on 14 May 2016, Buhari announced a total number of 8,500 personnel.

Regarding individual countries contributions, several sources mentioned 2,450 troops from Cameroon. The decision taken during the meeting of the committee of chief of army staff of the LCBC and Benin in Yaoundé on 1 April 2016 to seek the authorization the council of ministers to increase troop number in sector 1 located in Cameroon from 950-2,250 seems to support this. Chad contribution is an estimated 3,000 troops. According to newreports, Benin which had initially announced a contribution of 800 men, recently reduced it to about 200 soldiers for financial reasons. This countries whose force's supply mission is to secure MNJTF command headquarter and escort humanitarian convoys and dignitaries ended up deploying 150 soldiers in May 2016.

## LOGISTICAL CHALLENGE

The financial support the MNJTF is meant to receive is not directly to the procurement of weaponry or military equipment but instead meant to meet its logistical and material needs and cover part of its human resource cost. This mainly cover land, air, transport equipment, secured communication, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, equipment for the command headquarters and camp in the sector was estimated at US\$90 per day, per soldier. This is what the 50million euro's promised by the European union is destined for, freeing up this contribution has taken a long time due to administrative reasons attributed primarily to difficulties following an audit of AU procedures. The AU and EU's signing on 1 August 2016 is an implementation agreement to this commitment should remove the final obstacles to the effective release of the aid.

For now only the financial contributions by Nigeria, United Kingdom and the community of Sahelo-Sharan states (CEN-SAD) have materialized, while Nigeria is said to have contributed at least US\$30 million to the force command headquarters. The US is said to have disbursed an estimated US\$3.5 million at the level of the AU, CEN-SAD, for its parts announced in April 2015 that it had contributed US\$1.5million to Chad, Niger and Benin to prepare their respective contingents. The MNJTF has been able to obtain utility vehicle and communications and IT equipment, and to install operational infrastructure.

Other problems faced includes; No available resource, size of the force is not adequate for the size of the terrain, force is limited to LCBC, which have no prior experience in combating terrorism and in cooperating on security issues and no criminal justice mechanism to buttress military response.

### 3.5 OPERATIONALISATION OF THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE

The African union and the lakechad basin commission sign an agreement for the operationalization of the Multinational Joint Task Force to counter boko haram terrorist group.

For a long time the MNJTF appeared to be an empty shell. During the second Regional Security Summit on 14 May 2016 in Abuja, Nigeria, Idriss Deby Itno, the president of Chad stressed that it was urgent for the force to become operational before the rainy season sets in. After 3 June attack on Bosso he once again deployed the status of affairs. One of the difficulties in assessing the MNJTF's actions lies in the fact that for a very long time there was a very little information on its existence. In addition by not always stating their troops are operating under the MNJTF flag the troop contributing countries are preventing the structure from getting due credits. The presence of both MNTJF troops and soldiers of various national armies in the same theatre of operations also complicates the assessment of each player's contribution.

Events show that even if the first patrol by elements of sector 1-located on Cameroon soil took place in November 2015, the force only fully swung into action at the beginning of 2016. It was from February 2016 onwards that the first large scale operations were carried out by MNJTF troops or with their participation. They have also been at least four large scale by the MNJTF alongside the national units of the relevant countries from: 11-14 February 2016 in the Nigerian town of Ngoshe (as part of Operation Arrow); on 24 February 2016 in the town of Kumshe in Nigeria near the Cameroonian border, considered to be a support base for Boko Haram; on 16 March 2016 in the Cameroonian and Nigerian localities of Djibrilli and Zamga (within the framework of operation Tentacule); and on 10-16 May 2016 in Madawya forest in Nigeria, in a joint action conducted by troops from the MNJTF's Sector 1 and soldiers from Cameroonian Operation Emergence 4, supported by the Nigerian army. This report confirms that the MNJTF's sector 1 is operational. More recently in June Operation Gama Aiki was initiated by the MNJTF,

involving coalition countries, its purpose was to destroy the group's last stronghold. Action was multi-pronged, along the Nigerian and Niger borders and around Lake Chad. The arrival of soldiers from Niger into Nigeria territory at the end of July made it possible to liberate the border town from where Boko Haram was launching attacks, particularly Damasak.

According to official report in the first five months of 2016, its intervention have led to the neutralization of at least 657 presumed Boko Haram members, the arrest of 566 others and the dismantling of nearly 32 training camps and alleged factories for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices and mines. It also claimed that nearly 4690 of the group's hostage have been freed. However in the absence of a precise assessment of the Boko Haram's capacities (human and material), it is difficult to measure the impact of regional effort.

The MNJTF's troop strength is currently estimated at 10,000 military personnel, a number that is difficult to verify. Officially all the national contingents were deployed to different operational sectors. Regarding the MNJTF's area of operations, each of the country contingents is deployed within its own country's national boundaries and operates as a number of priority within this space. As a result four sectors were defined:

Sector 1, with the command located in Mora (Cameroon)

Sector 2, located in town of Baga-Sola (Chad)

Sector 3, based in Baga (Nigeria)

Sector 4, based in town of Diffa (Southeast Niger)

Although each sector of operations in which the MNJTF elements are required to operate has been presented as though it is already operational. Several events have brought reliability of this information into question. One of such was the attack on 3 June 2016 on the town of Bosso.

Although this part of Niger is within the operational sphere of the MNTJF which has a base in the city of Diffa and the country had pledge to provide nearly 1000 soldiers, the attack was so violent that it seemed doubtful that there had been any deployment. It also raised questions about the effectiveness of Niger's security apparatus. The attack took place within the context of deteriorating security situation in the south of Niger. Since the beginning of 2016 this part of the country has seen over 40 attacks. This sector was initially meant to be a sub-sector of sector 3, based in Baga, Nigeria, but had experienced delays in becoming operational.

The recent decision to transform it into a full sector, coupled with the operations conducted by the Niger army since June, has undoubtedly contributed to speeding up its actual establishment.

The operationalization of MNJTF Sector 3-located in the Nigerian city of Baga illustrates the Nigerian approach in the fight against Boko Haram. Its efforts which are essentially national in nature are underpinned by regional cooperation, particularly within the MNJTF framework. The 3000 military personnel who make up Nigeria's contribution to the MNJTF do not seem to be operating under the authority of the force, but under national command instead. However, on several occasions Nigeria's a troop have worked together with those of neighboring countries, including units operating under the MNJTF's mandate. Since Chad does not have a land border with Nigeria, this may have given the impression that Sector 2, based in Baga-Sola, was not affected. Although the Chadian territory attributed to Boko Haram elements have decreased over the first six months of 2016, the attack in the previous months around KaigaNgouboua in the region of Lake reveal the persistent nature of the threat. The deteriorating security situation along the border between Nigeria and Niger has made Chadian authorities all the more away of this

reality. As a result the country has send troops to the MNJTF and operationalized the Baga-Sola base.

Finally Sector 1 located in Cameroon territory, seems operational. Proof of this is the numerous operations undertaken by the military in this sector, of the 2,450 troops pledged by Cameroon, an initial 950 appear to have been provided within the MNJTF framework. Plans are underway to raise the troop numbers to 2,250.

(Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against boko haram). West Africa Report.

### 3.6 SUCESSSESS OF THE MNJTF

In the fight against boko haram, the Multinational Joint Task Force has helped in the release of hostages, liberation of certain areas previously occupied by boko haram and the losses and defections from within the rank of boko haram. In early November, an offensive by MNJTF Sector 2 headquartered in Baga-Sola in western Chad resulted in surrender of at least 240 boko haram combatants.

Between February and May 2016, the operations of MNJTF Sector 2 headquartered in Mora in Cameroon neutralized numerous boko haram combatants. The force secured the release of hostages, seized guns and thousands of round ammunition, and destroyed some of the groups training camp.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **BOKO HARAM AS A TERRORIST ORGANISATION**

#### **4.1 ORIGIN OF BOKO HARAM**

Boko Haram or AhlisSunnaLidda'awatiwal-jihad (people committed to the prophet's teachings and jihad), is an Islamist terrorist organization based in north eastern Nigeria. It is driven by an ideology of violent rejection of all western values, as suggested by the name Boko Haram, which means "western education is forbidden" in the local Hausa language. The organization has become known for its horrendous killing of civilians and massive abductions, many involving children. The most notorious such case involved nearly 300 schoolgirls from the town of chibok who were kidnapped in April 2014 and are still mostly in captivity. Since 2011, Boko Haram is estimated to have murdered over 10,000 people in 2014 alone it was responsible for around a third of all civilians killed in conflict in Africa. This reflects a significant intensification of its terrorist campaign.

Since the summer of 2104, boko Haram has undergone a major transformation, aiming at extend its ideological scope and territorial basis. Unlike in the past, it has recently sought to conquer territory and has gained control of a significant number of municipalities in north east Nigeria. It is possibly aiming to establish a caliphate, as declarations by its leaders, inspired by ISH/Daesh (the self proclaimed Islamic state) in Iraq and Syria have vaguely suggested. The threat emanating from the organization has taken on a cross-border dimension. Boko Haram has made incursion into Cameroon, Chad and Niger, attacking villages and military bases, and killing and abducting people. As its move quickly across borders, boko Haram has become increasingly difficult for national security forces, lacking coordination, to deal with. The entire region is at

risk of destabilization through the massive flow of refugees it has triggered. Some 120,000 people have fled across borders mainly from, but into Nigeria, posing a major problem for an already fragile region.

Although Nigeria has traditionally been an important regional actor in securing peace and stability in West Africa, its army has had obvious difficulties in coping efficiently with the threats posed by boko Haram. The Nigerian government opposition fears that the government is trying to instrumentalise the threat for political purposes in the context of the presidential and national assembly elections which had initially been planned for 14 February but were postponed for six weeks. The presidential race is expected to be tight and the three federal states in which Boko Haram operates favour the opposition's candidate.

Meanwhile, international diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the crisis have multiplied and military operations took on cross-border dimension in January 2015. Chad, whose capital only in N'Djamena is located on the border with Cameroon close to the area where operates, has obtained exploit authorization from Cameroon's government to act in its territory and deploy military forces along the Nigerian border. The armies of Niger and Cameroon have also officially joined the fight and other countries such as Benin may follow suit. Chad's army has undertaken some successful incursions into Nigeria, but the Nigerian authorities have been reluctant to let it operates on their territory. Overall, coordinated military operations have pushed boko Haram back onto the defensive operations took on a cross-border dimension in January 2015.

## 4.2 ORGANISATION OF THE BOKO HARAM (LEADERS, STRUCTURE AND MEMBERS)

Boko Haram is organized in a hierarchical structure with one overall leader; the group also operates as a clandestine cell system using a network structure, with units having 300 and 500 fighters each. Estimates of total number of fighters range between 500 and 9,000.

Between 2002 and 2009, Boko Haram was led by the organization founder, Mohammed Yusuf. In 2009, after Yusuf was killed, leadership was passed to AbubakarShekau, who was Yusuf's second-in command. AbubakarShekau was born in Yobe, Nigeria between 1965 and 1975. He speaks Arabic, Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri. On 21 June 2012 the U.S. Department of State designated AbubakarShekau a specially designated global terrorist. On August 2, 2016, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, who was previously spokesman for Boko Haram was named new leader of the group by the Islamic state, to which it is afflicted.

## 4.3 FUNDING OF BOKO HARAM

### KIDNAPPINGS, ROBBERY AND EXTORTION

Boko Haram gets funding from bank robberies and kidnapping ransoms. An example, in early 2013, gunmen from boko Haram kidnapped a family of seven French tourists on vacation in Cameroon. Two months later, the kidnappers released the hostages along with 16 other in exchange for a ransom of \$3.15 million.

Any funding they may have received in the past from al-Qaeda affiliates is insignificant compared to the estimated \$1 million ransom for each wealthy Nigerian or foreigners kidnapped. Cash is moved around by couriers, making it possible to track, and communication is conducted

face-to-face. Their mode of operation, which is thought to include paying local youths to track army movements, is such that little funding is required to carry out attacks. Equipment captured from fleeing soldiers keeps the group constantly well-supplied. The group also extorts local governments. A spokesman of boko harm claimed that Kano state governor Ibrahim Shekarau and Bauchi state governor Isa Yuguda had paid them monthly.

#### DONATIONS FROM ISLAMIST SYMPATHIERS AND OTHERS

After boko Haram was founded, it was suspected of receiving funds from corrupt local politicians to discredit their opponents and from local donors who supported its goal of imposing Islamic law while ridding Nigeria of Western influences. In more recent times, boko Haram has broadened its funding by drawing on foreign donors, and other ventures such as fake charity organizations. In February 2012, recently arrested officials revealed that while the organization initially relied on donations from members, its links with AL-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb opened it up to funding from groups in Saudi Arabia and the UK.

Boko Haram cloaks its sources of finance through the use of a highly decentralized distribution network. The group employs an Islamic model of money transfer called Hawala, which is based on an honor system and a global network of agents that makes the financing difficult to track. In the past Nigerian officials have been criticized for being able to trace much of the funding that boko Haram has received.

#### DRUG TRAFFICKING

Boko Haram has occasional been connected in media report with cocaine trafficking. James Cockayne, formerly Co-Director of the center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and Senior Fellow at the International Peace Institute wrote in 2012.

Given their appreciation of the contested nature of much African governance, it comes as something of a surprise that carrier and Klantschnig {Review of Africa and the War on Drugs, 2012} fiercely downplay the impact that cocaine trafficking is having on West Africa governance. On the basis of just three case studies (Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho and Nigeria) the authors conclude that state complicity in the African drug trade is rare and the dominant paradigm is repression. As a result, they radically understate the close involvement of political and military actors in drugs trafficking particularly in West African cocaine trafficking and overlook the growing power of drug money in African electoral politics, local and traditional governance, and security.

#### 4.4 CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE BY THE BOKO HARAM

In 2009, police began an investigation into the group code-names 'Operation Flush'. On July 26, security forces arrested nine boko Haram members and confiscated weapons and bomb-making equipment. Either this or a clash with police during a funeral procession led to revenge attacks on police and wide spread rioting. A joint task force operation was launched in response, and by 30 July more than 700 people had been killed, mostly boko Haram members, and police stations, prisons, government offices, schools and churches had been destroyed. Yusuf was arrested and died in custody while trying to escape. In the wake of the 1980 Kano riots, the killing of the leader of an extremist group would have unintended consequences. He was succeeded by AbubakarShekau, formerly his second-in-command. A classified cable apparently sent from the U.S. Embassy in Abuja in November 2009, has been published on Wiki Leaks.

Borno political and religious leaders] asserted that the state and federal government responded appropriately and apart from the opposition party, overwhelmingly supported Yusuf's death without misgivings over the extrajudicial killing. Security remained a concern in Borno with residents expressing concern about importation of arms and exchanges of Religious messages across porous international borders.

According to the leaked document, there were reports that Yusuf's death had survived, and audio taps were believed to be in circulation in which boko Haram threatened future attacks. Nevertheless, many observers did not anticipate imminent bloodshed. Security in Borno was downgraded. Borno government official Alhaji Boguma believed that the state deserved praise from the international community for ending the conflict in a short time, and that the wave of fundamentalism had been crushed.

2010

In September 2010, having regrouped under their new leader, boko Haram broke 105 of its members out of prison in Bauchi along with over 600 other prisoners and went on to launch attacks in several areas of northern Nigeria.

2011

Under Shekau's leadership, the group continuously improved operational capabilities. After launching a string of IED attacks against soft targets, and its first vehicle-borne IED attack in June 2011, killing 6 at the Abuja police headquarters, in August boko Haram bombed the UN headquarters in Abuja, the first time they had struck a Western target. A spokesman claiming responsibility attack on US and Nigerian government interests. Speaking soon after the US embassy's announcement of the arrival in the country of the FBI, he went on to announce boko Haram's terms for negotiation the release of all imprisoned members. The increased

sophistication of the group led observers to speculate that boko harm was affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which was active in Niger.

Boko Haram maintained steady attacks since 2011, striking a wide range of targets, multiple times per week. They have attacked politicians, religious leaders, security forces and civilian targets. The tactics of suicide bombing, used in the two attacks in capital on the police and UN headquarters was new to Nigeria. In Africa as a whole, it had only been used by al-Shabaab in Somalia and, to a lesser extent, AQIM.

2012

#### STATE OF EMERGENCY

Boko Haram carried out 115 attacks in 2011, killing 550. The state of emergency would usher in an intensification of violence. The opening three weeks of 2012 accounted for more than half of the death total of the preceding year. Two day after the state of emergency was declared, boko Haram released an ultimatum to southern Nigerians living in the north, giving them three days to leave. Three days later they began a series of mostly small-scale attacks on Christians and members of the Igbo ethnic group, causing hundreds to flee. In Kano, on 20 January, they carried out by far their most deadly action yet, an assault on police buildings, killing 190. One of the victims was a TV reporter. The attacks included a combined use of car bombs, suicide bombers and IEDs, supported by uniformed gunmen.

Amnesty International and human rights watch published reports in 2012 that were quoted by government agencies and the media based on research conducted over the course of the conflict in the worst affected area of the country. The NGOs were critical of both security forces and boko Haram. HRW stated “Boko Haram should immediately cease all attacks, and threats of

attacks, that cause loss of life, injury, and destruction of property. The Nigerian government should take urgent measures to address the human rights abuses that have helped fuel the violent militancy”.

2013

Nigeria’s Borno State, where boko Haram is based, adjoins Lake Chad as do Niger, Cameroon and the country of Chad. The conflict and refugees spilled over the national borders to involve all four countries. In 2013 boko Haram increased operations in northern Cameroon, and were involved in skirmishes along the borders of Chad and Niger. They were linked to a number of kidnappings, often reportedly in association with the splinter group Ansaru, drawing towards them a higher level of international attention.

The U.S. Bureau of counterterrorism provides the following summary of boko Haram’s 2013 foreign operation:

In February 2013, boko Haram was responsible for kidnapping seven French tourists in the far north of Cameroon. In November 2013, boko Haram kidnapped a French priest in Cameroon. In December 2013, boko Haram gunmen reportedly attacked civilians in several areas of northern Cameroon. Security forces from Chad and Niger also reportedly partook in skirmishes against suspected boko haram members along Nigeria’s borders. In 2013, the group also kidnapped eight French citizens in northern Cameroon and obtained ransom payments for their release.

Boko Haram has also often evade the Nigerian army by retreating into the hills around the border with Cameroon, whose army is apparently unwilling to confront them. Nigeria, Chad and Niger formed a Multinational Joint Task Force in 1998. In February 2012, Cameroon signed an agreement with Nigeria to establish a Joint Trans-Border Security Committee, which was

inaugurated in November 2013, when Cameroon announced plans to conduct coordinated but separate border patrol in 2014. It convened again in July 2014 to further improve cooperation between the two countries.

In the late 2013, Amnesty International received credible information that over 950 inmates had died in custody, mostly in detention centers' in Maiduguri and Damaturu, within the first half of the year. Official state corruption was also documented in December 2013 by the UK Home Office.

2014

#### CHIBOK KIDNAPPING

In April 2014 boko Haram kidnapped over 276 school girls from chibok. Shekau announced his intention of selling them into slavery. More than 50 escaped. The incident brought boko Haram extended global media attention, much of it focused on the pronouncements of the US First Lady Michelle Obama. Faced with condemnation for his perceived incompetence, as well as allegations from Amnesty International of state collusion, President Jonathan responded by hiring a Washington PR firm.

Parents of the missing girls and those who had escaped were kept waiting until July to meet with the president, which caused them concern. In October, the government announced the girls imminent release, but the information provided unreliable. The announcement of the media of a peace agreement and the imminent release of all the missing girls was followed days later by a video message in which Shekau stated that no such meeting had taken place and that no girl has

been married off. The announcement of the media, unaccompanied by any evidence of the reality of the agreement, was thought by analysts to have been a political ploy by the president to raise his popularity before his confirmation of his candidacy in the 2015 general election. Earlier in the year the girls' plight had featured on "#BringBackOurGirls" political campaign posters in the streets of the capital, which the president denied knowledge of and soon took down after news of criticism surfaced. These posters, which were interpreted to the dismay of campaigners for the girls' capture, as being designed to benefit from the frame of the kidnapping had also been part of Jonathan's presidential campaign. In September, "#BringBackGoodluck2015" campaign posters again drew criticism. The official announcement of the president's candidacy was made before cheering crowds in Abuja on November 11.

In February 2016, the organizations International Alert and UNICEF published a study revealing that girls and women released from Boko Haram captivity often face rejection upon returning to their communities and families, in part due to a culture of stigma around sexual violence.

## NORTHERN CAMEROON

In 2014, Boko Haram continued to increase its presence in northern Cameroon. On May 16, ten Chinese workers were abducted in a raid on a construction company camp in Waza, near the Nigerian border. Vehicles and explosives were also taken in the raid, and one Cameroon soldier was killed. Cameroon's antiterrorist rapid intervention battalion attempted to intervene but was vastly outnumbered. In July, the deputy prime minister's home village was attacked by around 200 militants; his wife was kidnapped, along with the sultan of Kolofata and his family. At least 15 people, including soldiers and police, were killed in the raid. The deputy prime minister's wife was subsequently released in October, along with 26 others including the ten Chinese

construction workers who had been captured in May; authorities had no comment about ransom, which the Cameroon government had previously claimed it never pays. In a separate attack, nine bus passengers and soldiers were shot dead and the son of a local chief was kidnapped. Hundreds of local youths are suspected to have been recruited. In August, the remote Nigerian border town of Gwoza was overrun and held by the group. In response to the increased militant activity, the Cameroonian president sacked two senior military officers and sent his army chief 1000 reinforcements to the northern border region.

### BAGA MASSACRE

On 3 January 2015 boko Haram attacked Baga, seizing it and the multinational joint task force military base. As the militants advanced the army fled. Some residents managed to escape to Chad. Although the death toll of the massacre was earlier estimated by western media to be upwards of 2000, the Defence Ministry dismissed these claims as “speculation and conjecture”, estimating the figure to be closer to 150. On 25 January the militants advanced to Monguno, capturing the town and the nearby military base. Their advance on Maiduguri and Konduga, 40km to the southeast, was repelled. After retaking Monguno, the army expelled the militants from Baga on 21 February.

The massacre attack was one of the Nigerian army’s biggest defeats in terms of loss of equipment and civilian casualties. Several officers were court-martialed. In October 2015 general Enitan Ransom-Kuti was dismissed from the army and sentenced to six months imprisonment. It was determined that he had failed in his duty to launch a counter-attack after retreating from the town.

### WEST AFRICAN OFFENSIVE

Starting in late January 2015, a coalition of military forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger began a campaign against boko Haram. On 4 February, the Chad army killed over 200 boko Haram militants. Soon afterwards boko Haram launched an attack on the Cameroonian town of Fotokol, killing 81 civilians, 13 Chadian soldiers and 6 Cameroonian soldiers.

On 7 March 2015, boko Haram's leaders AbubakarShekau pledged allegiance to ISIL via an audio message posted on the organization's twitter account. Nigerian army spokesperson Sami UsmanKukasheka said the pledge was a sign of weakness and that Shekau was like a drowning man. On 12 March 2015, ISIL's spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani released an audio tape in which he welcomed the pledge of allegiance, and described it as an expansion of the group's caliphate to West Africa.

On 24 March 2015, residents of Damasak, Nigeria said that boko Haram had taken more than 400 women and children from the town as they fled from coalition forces. On March 27, the Nigerian army captured Gwoza, which was believed to be the location of boko Haram headquarters. On Election Day 28 March 2015, boko Haram extremists killed 41 people, including a legislator, to discourage hundreds from voting.

In that same year, boko Haram lost control of the northern Nigerian towns of Bama and Gwoza to the Nigerian army. The Nigerian authority said that they had taken back 11 of the 14 districts previously controlled by boko Haram. In April, four boko Haram camps in the Sambisa forest were overrun by Nigerian military who freed nearly 300 females. Boko Haram forces were believed to have retreated to the Mandara mountains, along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. They were other attack that followed like the attack on the attrition of catholic diocese of Maiduguri,

July mosques massacres, suicide bombings in Chad, Federal Capital Territory/Nasarawa, Adamawa, Yobe, Kano, Cameroon, Niger and Chad.

(Boko Haram). <https://en.wikipedia.org> Boko Haram)

#### 4.5 GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO BOKO HARAM

At the initial stage of the conflict between the security forces of Nigeria and boko Haram, the state made use of police force in an effort to check the activities of the group. Before 2010 boko Haram's activities consisted mainly of civil, social and religious acts of disobedience to established local norms. The Nigeria police force (NPF) made extensive use of roadblocks and mass arrests to curb and contain boko Haram activities. NPF's inability to check the militant sect forced the government to form a Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2003. By this period, the group had begun to actively target and burn down police stations in Yobe. In 2007, the JTF launched 'Operation Flush' to arrest and contain the activities of boko Haram in the northeast. By 2009, the JTF succeeded in killing the founder of the group, Yusuf. His death generated serious controversy both in local and international media. Yusuf was captured alive and held in police custody before he mysteriously died. It has been argued that it was unlawful killing of Yusuf that pushed boko Haram to embrace a more combative approach. With the death of Yusuf, AbubakarShekau took over the leadership of boko Haram.

With the ascension of this new leader the conflict, then entered a more virulent phase. After a year of preparations, boko Haram began to employ new tactics and methods including suicide bombings. This forced the Nigerian government to establish the Special Military Joint Task Force (SMJTF) in 2011. It consist of personnel from Nigeria Police Force(NPF), the Department

of State Security(DSS), the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). Moreover, the new level that Shekau took the conflict to, brought about two important changes.

- The first was that it pushed Nigeria fully to mobilize its armed forces (totaling 10,000 soldiers) to confront the security challenge.
- Secondly, it forced the government to adapt its counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies.

In May 2013, Nigeria declared a state of emergency in the three north eastern states of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno. The three states have not only become the main CZ of the war but also boko Haram stronghold in Nigeria. During this period Nigeria also established a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) to complement the efforts of the military in degrading boko Haram. The CJTF is composed mainly of the vigilante groups, hunters, framers, and youths in the areas most affected by the activities of the boko Haram. In addition, Nigeria created a new military formation, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, in Maiduguri with the mission to contain and rout boko Haram. To give legal backing and effective coordination to these measures, Nigeria fast-track the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2013. The Acts stipulates, among other provisions, death penalty sentences for terrorist and insurgents and the destruction of suspected terrorist enclaves. At the same time, the Nigerian state also made an offer to engage in a strategic dialogue with boko Haram. Boko Haram steadfastly rebuffed this offer.

In December 2015, the new president of Nigeria, Muhammad Buhari, declared that boko Haram has been technically defeated. In January 2016, the president announced that boko Haram was now on 'fall-back'. By..... As a result of this, it has now become impossible for boko Haram

to launch conventional attacks against federal troops in the CZs. It has fallen back onto its strongholds, the Sambisa forest in Maiduguri, a mountains border region difficult to penetrate. Nigeria was able to turn the tide mainly because of the engagement of troops from neighboring countries and what is less known, with the help of white South African mercenaries known as STTEP (Specialized Task Training Equipment and Protection).

In summer of 2013, the Nigerian military shut down mobile phone coverage in the three north-eastern state to disrupt the group's communication and ability to donate IED's. Accounts from military insiders and data of boko Haram incidences before, during and after the mobile phone blackout suggest that the blackout was successful from a military tactical point of view. However it angered citizens in the region(owing to negative social and economic consequences of the mobile shut down) and engendered negative opinions towards the state and emergency policies. While citizens and organizations developed various coping and circumventing strategies, boko Haram evolved from an open network model of insurgency to a closed centralized system, shifting the center of its operations to the Sambisa forest. This fundamentally changed the dynamics of the conflict. In July 2014, Nigeria was estimated to have had the highest number of terrorist killings in the world over the past year, 3477, killed in 146 attacks. The governor of Borno, KashimShettima, of the opposition ANPP, said in February 2014.

“Boko Haram are better armed and are better motivated than our own troops. Given the present state of affairs, it is absolutely impossible for us to defeat boko Haram”.

In March 2015, it was reported that Nigerian had employed hundred of mercenaries from South Africa and the former Soviet Union to assist in making gains against boko Haram before the March 28 election. In October 2015, General David M. Rodriguez, head of U.S Africa command

reported that boko Haram has lost territory directly contradicting statements made by boko Haram. U.S. efforts to train and share intelligence with regional military forces is credited with helping to push back against boko Haram, but officials warn that the group remains a grave threat.

## INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

### United States responses

In 2012, the U.S. Department of States had an internal debate on whether to place boko Haram on its lists foreign terrorist organization. The Bureau of Counterterrorism leaned towards designation while the Bureau of Affairs urged caution. Officials from the departments, the FBI, the CIA, and a number of members of congress urged the state department to designate boko Haram as an FTO. The Nigerian government voiced its opposition to an FTO designation, citing concerns that it would raise boko Haram's stature and have implications for humanitarian aid region where boko Haram operated. Twenty academic experts on Nigeria signed a letter to the State Department urging it not to designate boko Haram as an FTO, saying that it would hinder NGO efforts in the region and might legitimize the Nigerian Army's human rights abuses in its effort to fight boko Haram.

The U.S. State Department designated boko Haram as its offshoot Ansaru as terrorist organizations in November 2013, citing boko Haram links with AQIM and its responsibility for "thousands of deaths in northeast and central Nigeria over the last several years including targeted killings of civilians". The state Department also cited Ansaru's 2013 kidnapping and execution of seven international construction workers. In the statement it was noted, however,

“These designations are an important and appropriate step, but only one tool in what must be a comprehensive approach by the Nigerian government to counter these group through a combination of law enforcement, political, and developmental efforts.” The state department had resisted earlier calls to designate boko Haram as a terrorist group after the 2011 Abuja United Nations bombing. The U.S. government does not believe boko Haram is currently (2014) affiliated with al Qaeda central, despite regular periodic pledges of support and solidarity from its leadership for al-Qaeda, but its particularly concerned about ties between boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) including likely sharing of funds, training and explosives materials.

Efforts to cooperate in freeing the chibok schoolgirls had faltered, largely due to mutual distrust, the infiltration of the military by boko Haram meant that U.S. officials were wary of sharing raw intelligence data, and the Nigerian military had failed to supply information that might have aided U.S. drone flights in locating the kidnapped girls. The Nigerian government claims that boko Haram is the “West Africa branch of the world-wide Al-Qaeda movement with connections” to al-Shabaab in Somalia and AQIM in Mali. The Nigerian governments denied having committed human rights abuses in the conflict and therefore oppose U.S. restrictions on arm sales, which they see as been based on the U.S. mis-application on the Leahy Law due to concerns over human rights in Nigeria. The U.S had supplied the Nigerian army with trucks and equipment’s but had blocked the sale of cobra helicopters’. In November 2014, the U.S. departments again refused to supply Cobras, citing concerns over the Nigerian military’s ability to maintain and use them without endangering civilians.

On 1 December 2014 the U.S. embassy in Abuja announced that the U.S. had discontinued training a Nigerian battalion at the request of the Nigerian government. A spokesman for the U.S

state department said, “We regret premature termination of this training, as it was to be the first in a larger planned project that would have trained additional units with the goal of helping the Nigerian army build capacity to counter boko Haram. The U.S. government will continue other aspects of the extensive bilateral security relationship, as well as all other assistance programs, with Nigeria. The U.S. government is committed to the long tradition of partnership with Nigeria and will continue to engage future requests for cooperation and training.

On 24 September 2015 the White House announced a military aid package for African allies fighting boko Haram. The package included up to \$45 million for training and other support for Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. On 14 October the white house released a statement, in accordance with the war powers resolution, announcing the deployment of 300 troops to Cameroon to conduct airborne ISR.”These forces are equipped with weapons for the purpose of providing their own force protection and security, and they will remain in Cameroon until their support is no longer needed.

#### AFRICAN COALITION FORCE

After a series of meetings over many months, Cameron’s foreign minister announced on 30 November 2014 that a coalition force to fight terrorism, including boko Haram, would soon be operational. The force would include 3,500 soldiers from Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria. Discussions between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) about a broader based military force have been scheduled.

## FRENCH AND BRITISH ASSISTANCE

France and the UK, in coordination with the United States, have sent trainers and material assistance to Nigeria to assist in the fight against boko Haram. France planned to use 3,000 troops in the region for counter-terrorism operations. Israel and Canada also pledged support.

## CHINESE ASSISTANCE

In May 2014, china offered Nigeria assistance that included satellite data, and possibly military equipment.

## COLOMBIAN ASSISTANCE

In October 2015, Colombia sent a delegation of security experts to assist the Nigeria authorities and share expertise on security and counter terrorism. In January 2016, a delegation led by Lieutenant General Tukur Yusuf Buratai also invited Colombia to exchange information in regards to the war against boko Haram.

#### 4.6 TACTICS AND STRATEGY USED BY THE BOKO HARAM

Before 2010, boko haram had no apparent strategy on how to achieve its objectives in northern Nigeria. It used occasionally guerilla tactics of hit-and-run to harass and oppress Nigerians in its area of operations. Its weapons were rudimentary: clubs, machetes, Molotov cocktails, knives, swords and locally made guns. Boko haram militants sometimes shot sporadically from 'okada' (local slang for motorcycle) at their targets- both civilians and police officers before speeding away. This however, began to change after 2010 as the group started using bombs and improvised explosives devices (IEDs) on strategic locations. Boko haram tactics also include suicide bombing, on august 26, 2011 a suicide car-bombing in Nigeria's capital directed against the UN building killed 21 persons and injured 71 others. Boko haram arsenal now includes AK-47 rifles, surface-to-air-missiles, vehicle mounted machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, T-55 tanks, Panchard ERC-90 'Sagaie' and explosives such as Semtex. Tactics have become more sophisticated both in response to increased security operations by the military in an effort to stir sectarian conflict. The first attack in 2010 was predominately shootings, but IEDs began to be used by December, especially in the run-up to the 2011 elections.

After those elections, the movement turned to a vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIED). These cars were typically packed with several propane cylinders or explosives-filled oil drums. Furthermore, in order to disseminate its ideology and to reach a wider audience, boko haram began to make an effective use of internets. You tube has been particularly effective in showcasing boko haram's exploits and confrontations with the Nigerian army.

#### 4.7 THE NATURE OF THE NIGERIA'S BOKO HARAM WAR 2010-2015

The conflict with boko haram has gone through three different iterations. In the beginning the Nigerian government perceived to be a form of civil unrest when it reared its head between 1995 and 2002. Subsequently, it can be seen as a religious uprising between 2002 and 2009. Between 2010 and 2015, the war took its final form. It began a war on terror on the one side and an insurgency on the other. It is on the final form that the true nature of the war can be gleaned. It is the contention of this article that the war is not a mere terror campaign but amount to hybrid war. This assumption is based on other things, the tactics and strategies, aims and objectives and the choice of weapons used in prosecuting the war by the adversaries.

A war has some basic definable features. Although its contemporary definition now encompasses asymmetric warfare, it still has some generally accepted characteristics. One of these is the observance of established rules of engagement. Normally, the combatants take especial care during engagements to shield non-combatants from the violence of war. Proportionality is also an established norm. Terrorism does not have such rule of engagement. Boko haram only graduated from occasional attacks to irregular warfare in 2010. Why 2010? It is an established fact that the conflicts between Nigeria and the group went as far back as early 2000. It is worth recalling that the founder of the group, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed in 2009 along with 900 of his followers by Nigerian security forces. The group subsequently dispersed to re-organize. By 2010 the new leader AbubakarShekau escalated the conflict and took it to a more dangerous and unrestricted phase. In addition to seeking revenge, a major factor responsible for this escalation was the desire for boko haram to Islamize Nigeria as a long term objectives. Since 2010 there has been a noticeable difference in boko haram tactics in its confrontations with the Nigerian states. For the first time, the group carried a series of carefully coordinated and deadly bombing campaigns in

Nigeria, directed against both religious and secular targets. The bombing campaigns took four major formats: suicide bombings, VBIEDs, roadside IEDs, and vehicle-borne suicide bombing (VBSBs). By this period, the CZs of the war were clearly defined. The major CZs are Adamawa, Yobe, Borno, Gombe and Bauchi states. Other targeted zones in the HN include Abuja, plateau and Kano states.

From 2010 onward, boko haram started launching a series of attacks on security structure and military installations in north western part of the country. For example on September 7 2010, boko haram overrun a prison in Bauchi state, freeing over 700 inmates in the process. Between 2010 and 2015, boko haram attack became more daring and brazen. Never in the history of political violence in Nigeria had any group deliberately targeted not just military structures but military formations and barracks in the CZs. The attack launched on the Giwa barrack and Baga military base in Bornu in 2014 and 2015 are cases in point. In the two encounters, over 500 hundreds lives were lost. What became noticeable in the course of the confrontation was that the adversaries simultaneously employed asymmetric and conventional tactics and strategies in waging war. This is why Nigeria boko-haram conflict can be described as a form of hybrid warfare.

The Nigerian boko haram has gone through the different phases earlier numerated above. Elements of unrestricted warfare could be seen in the use of girls (as young as 10 years old) as suicide bombers. This apart is from the fact that the group uses men and women in incessant and ubiquitous attack on civilians and military structures in Nigeria. The aim was to demonstrate to Nigerian citizens that the government did not have the capacity to protect them. This was probably the main reason why the group did not carry out the brazen kidnapping of more than 200 chibok girls from their schools in Borno in 2014. The repeated attacks against military

infrastructure targets (such as barracks and munition depots) were designed to show the citizens that the Nigerian military even lacked the capacity to protect itself. The internet played a crucial role in the propaganda efforts of the group. Since the government could not effectively censor what was posted on the line. Boko haram used YouTube to disseminate its threats against the Nigerian states. The exploits of the group against Nigeria in the CZs as well as its administration of the localities under its control were posted online. All these efforts were geared towards the delegitimizing of the authority of the state in what amounts to acts of psychological warfare.

During compound warfare phase, the opposing forces deployed asymmetric and conventional tactics and strategies simultaneously in the CZs. In some cases, there even instances of role reversal with the military taking up the guise of the insurgents and the insurgents doing vice-versa. Nigeria established a special counter terrorism squad the aim was which was to go into boko haram territory in the CZs and complement the efforts of the military forces. Militants from boko haram in turn sometimes posed as regular Nigerian forces in order to make it easier for them to launch surprise attacks on the villages in CZs. This was what happened when the boko haram attacked Gwoza local government in Borno state in 2014. Moreover boko haram adopted a conventional military mode to confront Nigerian forces during this phase. A prime example was the attack on Baga military barrack in January 2015. A video released by boko haram confrontation shows how it attacked the military barrack frontally, using vehicle mounted machine guns and a lot of AK-47 wielding infantry foot soldiers. This is not unlike how a regular army would attack its opponent base in a conventional war. On the Nigerian government's side, the CJFT played crucial roles during this phase of war. It acted as the unofficial intelligence gathering unit of the SMJTF and in many insurgents. In March 2014, the SMJTF was able to foil a bomb attack on an internally displaced persons camp in Maiduguri due to the timely

intelligence provided by the CJTF. On several occasions the involvement of the CJTF in actual combat operations was decisive to defeating boko haram attacks in the CZs. Thus the simultaneous and synchronous use of conventional (JFT) and unconventional (CJTF) forces and the use of conventional and unconventional tactics qualify the situation as being one of compound warfare.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

#### 5.1 SUMMARY

This research work trails down from defining boko haram, how it started their leaders, who the boko haram mainly attack and the causes of their attack on the people. Moving away from this had a conceptual discourse on terrorism and counter terrorism by different scholars what they have said about these concepts. Also the different measures and hardware these terrorist have used in fighting which are; Defensive and proactive measures, hardware (direct approach) and software (indirect approach) approach. Looking at my theoretical frame work made use of the collective security theory which effectively explained why the MNJTF work as one team to counter boko haram and also the basic assumptions and perquisites of the theory.

For a better understanding of the Multinational Joint Task Force which was set up in 1998 to combat boko haram, there is a need to know the history and development of the MNJTF, mandates, functions, successes, challenges (technical, financial, logistical) of the force and not forgetting how it operates since it became active in 2016 till date. Expatiated more on boko haram as a terrorist group or organization the transformation it has undergone, organization of the group (leaders, structures and members). How they get their funding's from different sources through kidnapping, robbery, extortion, donations from Isla mist sympathers and drug trafficking. The threats they have posed so far by their campaign of violence starting from 2010 till date, different government responses to boko haram how they have been able to tackle it to a large extent. Finally the nature of their war from 2010-2015 and also if the MNJTF work closely with each other their mandates will be achieved.

## 5.2 CONCLUSION

Owing to the persistent threat posed by boko haram makes the Multinational Joint Task Force more relevant as one of its reasons for establishment was to combat the boko haram in the states where there are large in number. However this force alone has no panacea. A lot still remains to be done to secure and stabilize those regions affected by the insurgency. These are the precondition for the return of millions of refugees who are living in an extreme vulnerable condition, and for the necessary rebuilding efforts. Total victory over this insurgent group does not seem imminent, however instead advances will be measured against progress in terms of security and humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and the socioeconomic development of the affected, ravaged region. The psychosocial reintegration of certain population groups-former fighters, relatives, supporters and victims of boko haram also represent an area that should not be ignored in countering boko haram.

The Multinational Joint Task Force as a regional force has not lived up to its expectations. There should be increase in its focus on improving the effectiveness of the coalition's military effort. It may be necessary to rethink the broad mandate of the MNJTF, narrowing its scope of activities to more achievable goals e.g. focusing on cross-border surveillance and intelligence sharing rather than more ambitious military objectives that could complement the activities of the national forces of the participating countries.

### 5.3 RECOMMENDATION

Owing to the ongoing war against boko haram the recommended initiatives should be considered since the MNJTF has proved as the most reliable means to counter the insurgency caused by the boko haram the Nigerian government is recommended to;

- Countries who engage in the fight against boko haram should stay mobilized given the persistence of the threat and the group's capacity to adapt, as well as resilience.
- The MNJTF must become fully operational and play its role, despite its challenges. To do this, the troop-contributing countries should take full ownership and participate in making it functional.
- The MNJTF's partners should give concrete effect to their pledges of material, financial and technical assistance in order to strengthen operational capacities in their different sectors (mobility, communications intelligence) that would enable it to operate effectively
- The MNJTF should step up its efforts in the field of external communication and civil military relations to better inform the public opinion about its actions and to benefit from support of local populations located in its areas of operations.
- The nature of boko haram and its environment in which it operates pose operational challenges to the armies combating it. These realities make it more necessary for the MNJTF to ensure that its actions comply with international humanitarian law and, more broadly respect for human rights and the rule of law.
- The African union should play an instrumental role and the components for the force should be well trained and equipped.

- Nigeria should establish a national reconciliation process to deal with the conflict between Muslims and Christians.
- The concept of operation of the MNTF should be elaborated by counter-terrorism and peace support operation expert.

With the aid of Multinational Joint Task Force, comprising of Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon, the country's military hence should monitor at close the porosity of the borders in order to restrict the inflow of ammunitions of the insurgent group into the country.

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