

**THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ON COUNTER TERRORISM  
EFFORTS IN NIGERIA.**

**BY**

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IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS & STRATEGIC STUDIES.**

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**OCTOBER, 2022**

## **DECLARATION**

I, **EMUVEYAN JOCHEBED OGHENENYORE**, hereby declare that this thesis is a result of research that has been undertaken by me under the guidance of my supervisors and no part of it has been submitted previously, in whole for the award of any other academic degree elsewhere. Except from references to other works which have been duly cited, this thesis is an original work.

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## **DEDICATION**

This project is dedicated to Almighty God for His infinite mercy, care, love, guidance and provision throughout the period of my program.

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## **ABSTRACT**

Terrorism remains the major threats to the sovereignty of Nigeria amongst other transnational criminal activities. In spite of the formulation of several counter terrorism strategies such as counter terrorism legislations, specialized counter terrorism security units, regional security cooperation, and lately, military operations. Regrettably, on the one hand, these strategies have not yielded the desired result in curtailing the ferocious activities of terrorist groups. On the other, the growing animosity among security agencies further hinder the operational conduct and performance of Nigerian law enforcement agents, especially on counter terrorism. This research study examined the capability of the Nigerian intelligence agency; the level of intelligence cooperation among law enforcement agencies; citizen's support towards intelligence agency on counter terrorism and the process of intelligence gathering by intelligence agencies in Nigeria. The study adopted frustration and aggression theory as it best explains the root cause of terrorism in Nigeria as many citizens are faced with enough challenges such as low standard of living, bad infrastructures, and insecurity. However, these challenges create an avenue of frustration for the citizen making them look for better ways to survive such as banditry and terrorism. In the course of the study, secondary data were mainly collected from the Army Quarterly Report (AQR) to complement other sources of data generated. In conclusion, lack of cooperation among intelligence agencies, absence of citizen's support towards intelligence agents on counter terrorism and poor channels of intelligence gathering invariably have significantly heightened the spate of terrorist operations with gross attendant impact. However, professionally trained personnel on intelligence gathering and sharing be recruited devoid of partisan politics, and ethnic inclination into sensitive national security positions; timely utilization of actionable intelligence; provision of welfare package for security personnel and eradication of unnecessary frictions among the security agencies were recommended.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

Pogson (2013) described security as the heart of sovereign political entities. This interprets national security as socio-economic, political, cultural and military strategies that would promote a nations interest including its citizens as a core objective of the policy objectives and national interest of sovereign states. The core element of sovereign state policies is to protect and secure their territorial integrity and sovereignty. Domestic and foreign policies of states revolve around implementing new strategies for countering security threats especially through the strengthening of their military capabilities to meet up with current realities of security threats. In spite of this, global peace and security has still been interrupted by security challenges in the world.

Terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, cyber fraud, poverty, religious extremism and natural disaster are some ways in which global insecurity finds expression. However, there has been an increase in the focus on terrorism since the attack on the World Trade Center, New York and the Pentagon, Washington DC in 2001. This event has led to more cases of terrorist activities and insurgencies globally. Immediately after the 9/11 attack, many leaders began declaring war on terrorism and concluding that transnational terrorism as the next major threat to global security, (Smith & Zeigler, 2017). Amidst the declared war on terrorism, conventional methods of pursuing security such as the military and conflict control mechanism were given priority and based on the foundations of deterrence and war, (Singh & Nunes, 2016).

The repercussion of this led to counterterrorism measures becoming purely military based which is high ended and guarantees short term victory. Regardless of this forceful approach since 2001, not much of the threat of terrorism has diminished or totally eliminated as the world has

witnessed the rise of deadly and lethal terrorist sect apart from Al-Qaeda over the years. Africa being a home to dangerous terrorist groups is also not free from this form of threat. Thus the continent especially the eastern, northern and western sub-regions have experienced growing incidents of terrorism since the last decade of the 20th century (Mbagwu, 2017).

More disturbing is the case of Nigeria, a country with a record of contributing to global security by contributing troops for global and regional peace keeping missions (Dambazau, 2014). It is however contrasting for a state with such history to be in the category of countries with a very low state of peace, (Global peace index, 2018). This situation of Nigeria is majorly as a result of the increase in terrorist activities that has engulfed the country especially since the transition to civil rule. Nigeria and her ethnically diverse nature has always been susceptible to many security challenges such that few years after it gained independence, a civil war broke out which came as a result of intense ethnic consciousness and rivalry.

Since 1999, Nigeria has witnessed a high level of insecurity which has been exhibited through violent extremism, insurgency, terrorism, militancy, secessionist agitations and other conventional crimes. The present-day Nigerian society is engulfed by acts of terrorism which have seriously caused untold hardship to the Nigerian populace. The Niger Delta militant groups have subjected the country especially the Niger Delta area to several rounds of kidnappings and willful destruction of national properties as means of achieving their objectives with their consistent demand for resource control, fiscal federalism and agitation against environmental degradation caused by oil spillage, (Omitola, 2012). Their activities have a drastic impact on both the federal government and the nation's economy thereby creating tough times for the ordinary citizens.

Terrorism can be defined as a form of coercion that employs or threatens to employ violence to achieve its political or ideological aims (Agba E, 2015). According to the FBI, “violent, criminal acts” are the hallmark of both foreign and domestic terrorism. According to Title 22 Chapter 18 of the United States Code, “premeditated, politically motivated violence conducted against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine operatives” is the legal definition of terrorism in the United States (US Code, 18).

Terrorism can happen both inside a country and outside its borders. When the government is unable to come to an agreement with terrorist groups, they might turn exceedingly violent, resulting in loss of life and destruction of property and posing serious concerns to national security. Terrorism is a problem that must be eradicated at its source. This is due to the fact that they could be state-sponsored sabotage orchestrated by an adversary power.

Intelligence sharing is one of the effective tools used in countering terrorism. Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated, understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, refined and narrowed to meet those needs. Nations, in order to preserve their security, need to keep track of internal and external threats which involves intelligence about their immediate environment and that of other nations, (Lowenthal, 2000). This is necessary because, nations require certain instruments to contain these threats which is a strong military supported by an intelligence apparatus. Also, to enable nations to respond appropriately and safeguard themselves from both external and internal threats, they adopt strategies and policies such as defense and security policies, (Enahoro, 2010).

As a critical tool of statecraft, intelligence provides the necessary warning about imminent threats policy makers in order to protect a nation from being subjected to surprise military attacks. As an organization, intelligence is able to avert imminent threats to a country by

providing timely, processed information to national security decision makers. This is achieved through the acquisition of secret information by secret means on the capabilities, actions, and policies of other nations. The information acquired, is collected, analyzed and disseminated for use to support action. Thus, the role of intelligence is to support action that may be deemed necessary in the furtherance of national interests (Lowenthal, 2007).

In the context of military operations, intelligence is vital for guiding operations. With the right intelligence there is a possibility of success. The importance of this assertion was illustrated in the operations Desert shield and Desert storm in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Adequate intelligence was provided to the US military during these operations. Due to the accuracy of the in- depth intelligence on enemy vulnerabilities, capabilities and intentions the operations were successful. The US military gained access to a full and complete view of the adversary, while the military power was directed where it was needed most.

Security operations are the procedures and actions taken by security agencies to protect lives and properties in order to ensure there is no state of insecurity within a society. In Nigeria, what shapes the conduct of security operations is the peculiarity of the security environment; thus, security operation could be proactive or reactive. When the security operation is proactive, it involves essentially the use of intelligence to avert any threat to national security. These threats could take the form of sabotage, subversion, terrorism and all other destructive actions that could undermine national security. Reactive security operations involve the use of security apparatuses to contain conflicts that are already on ground. In this case, states involve security operations that are reactive in nature and the use of military force is employed in conjunction with national intelligence assets to contain threats (Jackson et al, 2004).

There has always been a rather healthy tension between the producers of intelligence and the users of intelligence. This is against the backdrop that intelligence operations are not conducted for their own sake, but rather to inform the decisions of those who must act in defense of national security/community safety. The value of intelligence is in the eyes of its users, not its producers; intelligence is at its best when it is fully integrated with its users. These simple truths led to the development of intelligence methodologies and techniques as a function of support to specific instruments of national power such as diplomacy, law enforcement, and war fighting. The nature of today's threats has blurred the lines between traditional diplomatic, military, and law enforcement concerns, requiring all instruments of national power to work as a seamless network to defeat our adversaries. The rise of joint task forces, intelligence operations centres, and fusion centres has brought together professionals from across the law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities, offering them a unique opportunity to share tools and techniques in defense of the nation (Baginski, 2007).

## **1.2 Statement of Problem**

Global terrorism has been one of the major threats to Nigeria national security since the civil rule when terrorist attack has been on the rise uprising. As a result of this, Nigeria has been formulating counter terrorism strategies to deal with this threat, these which include counter terrorism legislations, creation of specialized counter terrorism security units, regional security cooperation, and lately, military operations. These strategies were designed to eradicate the threat. However, terrorism is yet to be eradicated because terrorists are still carrying out attacks in the country. This might be as a result of misunderstandings among the security agencies, which are tasked with the elimination of this threat by implementing the counter terrorism strategies. But these strategies have had shortcomings and controversies. There is need for these

strategies to be supported by intelligence from both the local and foreign agencies, through bilateral and multilateral liaison arrangements to realize a more effective implementation. Therefore, this study seeks to investigate how Nigeria's intelligence community undertakes its role in the implementation of countering terrorism strategies.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

In examining the role of the Nigeria intelligence agencies in counter terrorism, this study focuses on the following questions:

- i. What is the capability of the Nigeria intelligence agencies in detecting, preventing and pre-empting terrorist activities?
- ii. What is the relationship between intelligence agencies, and how does this influence counter terrorism operations?
- iii. What is the impact of intelligence cooperation on counter terrorism?
- iv. How is intelligence gathered by the security agencies in Nigeria?

#### **1.5 Objectives of the Study**

The main objective of the study is to examine the role that the Nigeria intelligence agencies play in countering terrorism. The specific objectives are:

- i. To investigate the capability of the Nigeria intelligence agency in detecting, preventing, and pre-empting terrorist activities.
- ii. To study the levels of intelligence cooperation, including its support to judicial processes, and how this influences counter terrorism.
- iii. To examine how the citizens support the intelligence agency on countering terrorism.
- iv. To determine the process of intelligence gathering by intelligence agencies in Nigeria.

## **1.5 Significance of the Study**

Contemporary terrorism has become one of the major security threats in Africa, with Nigeria being one of the main targets. Non-state actors (such as terrorist groups) pose threats which are more difficult to anticipate, detect and combat unlike the traditional national security threats posed by rival nation-states. Like intelligence agencies, these terrorist groups operate more like an intelligence organization; thus, they operate in secrecy, spy and collect intelligence on their targets' vulnerabilities before attacks. The intelligence agencies play a vital role in countering their activities by gaining a thorough knowledge of their organizations, capabilities, modus operandi, structures and members.

There are several scholarly literatures on intelligence and terrorism subject areas, but due to the sensitive nature of counter terrorism operations, especially on the use of intelligence, there are few academic literatures. This study seeks to make a modest contribution to the few available sources of reference on the intelligence agencies and counter terrorism in Nigeria. It will proffer areas of future study will benefit the Nigeria intelligence agencies on how to improve their counter terrorism strategies. It add to the national policy framework on counter terrorism strategy research in the discourse of intelligence and terrorism, thus contributing to the debates on the role that the intelligence agencies play in counter terrorism. It will assist the policy makers in some strategic decisions.

## **1.6 Scope of Study**

This work seeks to reveal the importance of intelligence to counter terrorism efforts as against terrorism and how intelligence gathering can be an efficient tool in dealing with terrorism. This research will depict what terrorism is, terrorist groups and how counter terrorism efforts are influenced by intelligence gathering using Nigeria as a case study. This work will major on

Nigeria and how the military can be used to subdue terrorism in this state. This research will be centered on terrorist activities in Nigeria from 2014 till date.

### **1.7 Research Methodology**

The method adopted in this study was largely qualitative, making use of secondary data from books, journals, conference proceedings, bulletins, newspapers, internet sources, security reports, among other periodicals.

### **1.8 Research Design**

Cross-sectional research design is the design adopted for this work. The cross-sectional design enables researchers to collect data from an existing document at one time. In this research design, the Army Quarterly Report (AQR) will be highly relied upon for data generation to complement other sources of data to be generated. Triangulation which involves the interplay of data between documents such as AQR and journals, books, e.t.c will be employed to ensure consistency in data reporting.

### **1.9 Limitation to Study**

**Insecurity:** One of the best ways to tell how much or to what extent a state has been affected by terrorist groups is by going to witness for it yourself. However, the researcher was unable to do that due to the state of insecurity.

**Secrecy:** Due to the nature and sensitivity of their work, intelligence agencies maintain secrecy on their operations and collection methods. The information and documents kept by the intelligence agencies are mostly classified and are not available to any person who does not have the right security clearance, because of “the need to know” philosophy. This may limit the availability and validity of data collected from intelligence agencies.

### 1.10 Definition of Concepts

i. **Intelligence:** Intelligence is conceived as information that has been collected, processed, analyzed and disseminated for use against security threats, such as terrorism. It is also considered as covert operations undertaken by the Nigeria intelligence agencies.

ii. **Intelligence agencies:** Intelligence agencies refer to all government departments and security agencies that work separately and together in full cooperation to fulfill a number of security and intelligence functions, in this case, counter terrorism. They include the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), *State Security Service (SSS)*, *The Nigeria Police Force (NPF)*, *Federal Investigation and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB)*, and *Provisional Ruling Council (PRC)*. It should be noted that there is no formal intelligence agency in Nigeria, nor an official head, but the NIA Director General is the De-Facto head of the Nigeria intelligence agency.

iii. **Terrorism:** Terrorism is conceived as violence or threat of violence carried out by organized non-state actors aimed at civilians, security agents, private properties or governments institutions; resulting into fatalities, injuries, and loss and destruction of properties. It is often aimed at achieving political, religious, or ideological objectives.

iv. **Counter terrorism:** For this study, counter terrorism is considered as strategies and measures undertaken by the Nigeria intelligence community, security agencies, and the government, through its policies, to prevent, pre-empt, mitigate and respond to terrorist acts.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.1 Literature Review

##### 2.1.1 Terrorism

There is no agreed-upon definition of terrorism. Scholars, legislators, regional and international agencies, media professionals, civil society groups, etc., all interpret "terrorism" differently based on their own experiences and perspectives (Agba, 2015). Terrorism is defined by Resolution 1556 of the United Nations Security Council, which as states, "Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population, or compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act" (United Nations, 2004).

Terrorism is "the calculated use of unlawful violence, or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological," according to the U.S. Department of Defense (Omale, 2013).

"The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any portion thereof, in support of political or social objectives" is how the FBI describes terrorism (Omale, 2013). This concept incorporates the trinity of violence, horror, and intimidation in service of its stated goal: to instill fear in its target audience.

Terrorism is defined as "the use or threat of use of violence or brutality by sub-national groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through the intimidation of an audience,

usually not directly involved in the policy making that terrorists seek to influence." (Enders and Sandler, 2008)

According to Paul Pillar terrorism is characterized by the following four features: (1) it is always political in nature, thus excluding violence for financial gain; (2) the target choice is not random, thus necessitating a phase of planning and preparation; (3) terrorism strikes the civil population intentionally, affecting non-combatants; and (4) the terrorist network itself is composed of non-state actors (Sandler, 2013). Terrorism, in other words, has evolved into "a challenge to be handled, not resolved," as Pillar puts it (as cited in Odeleye, 2013).

Academic definitions of terrorism have been found to differ from their official counterparts, but Merari, Schmid, and Jongman found that official definitions shared three key characteristics: the employment of violent means, the pursuit of political ends, and the instillation of fear in a specific population (Shaeffer, 2010).

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) also established three key requirements for an act to be considered terroristic. These criteria are as follows: (i) the act must have some sort of political, economic, religious, or social motivation. To qualify as (ii), there must be proof that the offender intended to influence people beyond the immediate victims. (iii) It cannot be part of legal military operations; rather, it must fall outside the bounds established by international humanitarian law (in particular, the prohibition on aiming attacks at civilians or non-civilians) (Liolio, 2013).

Odeleye (2013) argued that the instilling of dread, terror, and mental, psychological, or bodily harm is universal to all terrorist acts. For the purposes of this research, "terrorism" refers to any criminal act or politically motivated violence committed by individuals or sub national groups with the specific intent to cause dread, terror, and mental, psychological, or bodily injury to

civilian populations or non-combatants. This definition of terrorism incorporates previous official and academic descriptions of the phenomenon.

### **2.1.2 Counter-terrorism**

The term counter-terrorism describes efforts to reduce the impact of terrorism on society. Governments, military coalitions, international organizations (like INTERPOL), commercial enterprises, and even individual citizens can all adopt such measures (Agba E and Olufunmilade F, 2020). There are two primary types of anti-terrorist strategies: defensive and offensive, (Sandler, 2014),

Also, according to the definition provided by O'Neil, counter-terrorism is an instrument of state policy that actively strives to degrade and manage risk of terrorist attacks against national interests, notably (but not primarily) against national territory. By eliminating or reducing the motivations of terrorist groups and discouraging would-be terrorists, Ganor saw counter-terrorism in a new light (Messa, 2015).

Counter terrorism is political or military actions or measures intended to combat, prevent, or deter terrorism, according to the Oxford English Dictionary. The term's early usage implied that counter terrorists' tactics were similar to those of the terrorists themselves (Ahmed, 2014).

Counter-terrorism is the application of practice, tactics, procedures, and strategies by governments, militaries, Police Forces, and Intelligence Services (or private citizens) to stop or prevent terrorist attacks (Udoh, 2016).

### **2.1.3 Counter Terrorism Measures for Nigeria**

Given the complexity of the security situation in Nigeria, blended with the economic, political and social strife, projects and programmes designed to counter terrorism should be built around community resilience against terrorism, enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies and strengthening judicial institutions. Hence strategy and the importance of collective efforts to counter terrorism in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected Nigeria have become imperative.

Piombo (2007) highlight some measures that could be used to counter terrorism in Nigeria which he calls the four “Ds” of fighting terrorism: ‘defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit, and defend citizens and interests at home and abroad’.

Another way to consider the effectiveness of these programmes is that they should attempt to fight the supply of terrorists, the demand for terrorist networks, and the ability of terrorist to operate and maneuver. The counter terrorism measures proposed in this paper include the following:

#### **2.1.3.1 The Meghalaya Model**

The Meghalaya model is a multi-sector approach involving government, law enforcement, judiciary and civil society organizations that creates a comprehensive framework for combating trafficking in North East Asia in 1999 under the five “Ps” prevention, protection, policing, press and prosecution (Kharbhih, 2010). This model was designed to track and rescue trafficked children in North East Asia; to facilitate rehabilitation, and making sure that survivors do not get re-trafficked. This model also provides families with livelihood alternatives; provides evidence to prosecute offenders; and raises awareness through the media. The process of Meghalaya Model is the five “Rs” reporting, rescue, rehabilitation, and repatriation and re- education. These

activities are pillars of the Meghalaya model to counter human trafficking are relevant to counter terrorism as they could fight the supply of terrorists, supply of mercenaries for terrorism, and the demand for terrorist networks. This is imperative because, despite international agreements and a plethora of national laws on counter terrorism, the issue remains one of the fastest growing criminal violence in the world. Its proliferation is due to its cross-border nature and thus requires cooperation and collaboration between states, if it is to be tackled effectively. However, throughout the world often counter terrorism initiatives have failed to incorporate all relevant stakeholders. Hence, the Meghalaya Model though originally designed to track and rescue trafficked children could be adopted or adapted to counter terrorism in Nigeria; as there are insinuations of mercenaries and conscripted fighters for Boko Haram terrorists. And with the porous nature of Nigerian borders and the rate of human trafficking in the country, these mercenaries and conscripted fighters could be trafficked victims from neighboring countries.

This model is relevant to counter terrorism in Nigeria because through a collaborative and far-reaching security network of stakeholders in counter terrorism and human trafficking (Security and Intelligence Agencies, NAPITIP, the media, Civil Society and NGOs), terrorists, mercenaries and terror suspects are more likely to be arrested, and face prosecution.

### **2.1.3.2 Countering Terrorism through Public Private Partnerships (CTPPP)**

Closely related to the Meghalaya model is the CTPPP model. While combating terrorism is a primary responsibility of nation States, developing partnerships with the private sector can be beneficial especially in areas where State resources and expertise are limited. The public-private partnerships (PPPs) concept is gaining attention in the business world, but at a much slower pace in the security domain. For instance Jonathan Lucas, Director of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) argues that progress to build partnerships on

security matters has been hampered by lack of legislation to facilitate information exchange between the public and private sectors, as well as the absence of incentives because ‘too often no incentives are provided to encourage the private sector to invest in the protection of vulnerable targets as the private sector usually considers funding of PPP initiatives in security sectors as a cost rather than an investment’ (2012, p.8). However, the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy explicitly encourages such partnerships in capacity-building and information exchange. Hence the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) working group on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes argues how it benefited from private sector expertise in ‘the technical and legal aspects on how the Internet could be used to counter terrorist narratives’ (2012, p.8). Russia for example, has been engaging with Moscow State University and People’s Friendship University of Russia to exchange new ideas and expertise in countering terrorism. Because in their view, ‘private-public cooperation should not be limited to the business community alone but should also include non-governmental organizations, media, tourism and hotels, youth associations, academic community and religious leaders’ involvement in security sector’ (Yudintsev, 2012).

### **2.1.3.3 Empowering Youth as Peace-Entrepreneurs and Peace-Seeds**

There is growing evidence from the social science literature on the links between youth unemployment and armed conflict, and donors have increasingly used youth job creation programmes as a tool with which to address armed violence, (Collier, 2003). Many donors now identify addressing youth unemployment as an urgent priority, both in the field of peace building and in efforts to foster economic development (World Bank, 2008; ILO, 2010; UN, 2009). Similarly, the link between job creation and peace building has been affirmed by the UN Secretary General’s approval of the ‘UN Policy For Post- Conflict Employment Creation,

Income Generation and Reintegration' in 2008 and more recently by the ILO's 2010 Guidelines on Local Economic Recovery in Post- Conflict (UN, 2009; ILO, 2010).

However, a study conducted by Walton (2010) finds that both the theoretical and the empirical cases for using youth employment programmes as a 'stand- alone' tool for reducing violent conflict are extremely weak, because donor interventions have been poorly evaluated and evidence of success is usually limited to demonstrating increases in employment levels, with little effort made to assess the impact on conflict. Hence, this work argues that the evidence on using job creation as part of an integrated or comprehensive armed conflict or Anti-Violence Response (AVR) strategy is stronger: some government-led initiatives in countries that experience high levels of armed violence (such as Brazil and South Africa) are good examples. So, emphasis on youth Anti Violence Response (AVR) strategy should be based on 'holistic', 'comprehensive' and 'integrated' approaches that go beyond simply addressing a lack of economic opportunities, but seek to address the more complex array of factors (like belief system, religious, political and ethnic fundamentalism) that make youth entrepreneurs of violence rather than peace-seeds. This is imperative because Omale (2012) argues that, if youth involvement in terrorism is becoming a real threat, then the primary step is to try to understand the phenomena of increase, and the causes of such criminal deviance because in the word of Socrates 'Fundamentum Omnius Cultusanimae' (i.e., the soul of all improvement is the improvement of the soul). For instance, the goal of most national educational curriculum in modern times is to produce scientists, lawyers, doctors, engineers, among other professionals for the society. How much of our school curriculum inculcate active citizenship education, youth leadership skills, civil courtesies and speaking for relationship buildings? The earlier we begin to

instill the skills of ‘Learning to Live Together’ (Oshita, 2005), respect for humanity and society through active citizenship education the better for our society.

#### **2.1.3.4 Women-Gender Intelligence (WGI)**

The innovation of “Women-Gender Intelligence” (WGI) particularly in the events of volatile conflict and endemic suicide bombings in Nigeria has become imperative. For instance, with the continued violent conflict in Jos, and the emerging suicide bombings in the country, the “Women for Change and Development Initiative” of the Office of the First Lady of Nigeria orchestrated media campaigns and jingles of “Women: See Something; Say Something!”; “The One that give life must Protect Life!”

The impact of these jingles and campaigns; motivated a rural woman in a village called Haya Biu, Niger State to assist the State Security Service in Nigeria to unravel the hideout of some Boko Haram extremists on 6th September, 2011 whom until then have been hiding there and making IEDs. By this revelation, it could be argued that women can be strong agents of change and development if adequately incorporated. In terms of security and counter terrorism in Nigeria, if women voluntarily and unanimously agree to stop insecurity, they can; because, there is no terrorist or criminal that does not have a mother, a spouse, or a girlfriend. The Women Gender Intelligence (WGI) is even more relevant in the Nigerian context since it is insinuated that some Boko Haram perpetrators are youth who cannot afford to pay bride price for a wife; and are so brain- washed and recruited to kill so as to be rewarded with seven virgins in Aljena. In this case therefore, if women are granted protection as whistle blowers, they can be good source of intelligence on counter terrorism in Nigeria.

#### **2.1.3.5 Counter Extremism and De-radicalization Programmes (CEDP)**

Religion and cultural differences are among the most important causes of conflicts and violence in Nigeria. A very worrisome dimension of the role of religion in conflicts is the tendency and frequency at which some politicians and leaders exploit it for selfish reasons, as sometimes public statements on issues of religion tend to ignite or exacerbate conflicts, justifying the need for conflict sensitivity. Our world-as an American sociologist Peter Berger notes-is ‘fiercely religious’ and Nigeria has witnessed rising essentialism within all the major religions. For instance, a Muslim cleric was once criticized by the media for publicly preaching to his followers in a mosque in Kano (northern Nigeria) that “Unkakama Mary koChinyerekachisu” (meaning “if you catch a girl with a name Mary or Chinyere rape her”). This is a hate-based preaching that encourages young Muslims boys to rape girls bearing Christian or South Eastern names in Nigeria.

In the same vein, some Neo-Pentecostal and evangelical Christians in Nigeria see themselves (the “born again” brethren) as holier than the ‘Other’. Similarly, crusades that dwell much more on the Biblical verse of Mathew 11: 12 which states: “And from the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom of heaven suffered violence, and the violent takes it by force” are becoming common citations among youth in Nigeria. Whereas, this Biblical injunction does not encourage violence, perverse interpretations of these religious injunctions however have crept into the minds of some people. This radical mindset has created many of the world’s violent outbreaks, both present and past. Lammy (2013) argues in an article written after the May 22nd killing of a Woolwich soldier by a terrorist suspect (Michael Adebolajo) that ‘radical Islamism suffocates conventional Islamic beliefs with a diet of anger, hate and intolerance among young men, who perhaps are already convinced of being outcasts, and are intoxicated by teachings that not only entrench this difference further but demands that they despise the society they leave

behind'. Hence, it is not uncommon for fringe groups of all ideological persuasions to systematically target these men by manipulating their sense of hopelessness and lack of belonging (Lammy, 2013).

However, if religion could be used to cause conflict it could be used to resolve conflict. Because even in this climate of global religious turbulence, religions offer the potential for generosity, wisdom and an ethical sense of transcendence capable of creating a strong link between people, beyond their differences. People might have different beliefs and dogmas and adhere to different schools of philosophical and metaphysical thought, but this paper strongly believe that it is possible to share a pragmatic universal system of ethics that would allow us all to live together. So Counter Extremism and De-radicalization Programmes (CEDP) can work, and could be an effective way of countering the spread of radical-violent ideology and activism, provided that the right conditions for success exist. These include, among others, political will, a vibrant civil society, a robust developmental and political capacity within the Nigeria State.

#### **2.1.3.6 Security Inter-Operability (SIO)**

In every human society there are those that could not be safely contained in the community. Security inter-operability that encourages security networking and intelligence sharing could root out the bad eggs in the society. For instance, if the Police, SSS, EFCC and NIA work collaboratively they could unravel both local and international sponsors and financiers of Boko Haram. Similarly, if the Customs, Immigration and the NDLEA work collaboratively they could unravel the criminal importation of foreign mercenaries, drugs, arms and ammunitions that are

sustaining the Boko Haram insurgencies. In the same vein, the SSS and police working collaboratively with the Prisons Service could plant pseudo inmates who are fluent in Arabic, Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri in strategic prison cells for intelligence gatherings from detained Boko Haram suspects. The Military Joint Task Forces (JMTF) could as well invest in telemetric security and cable detection technology; and use less of road blocks. Where these security strategies are done well, the use of the Military Joint Task Forces (MJTF) fire operations would only be the last resort. But if terror attacks do occur, a coordinated and well equipped MJTF that comprises the Military forces, NEMA, Fire Service and the Red Cross should be on a standby for effective evacuation and other needed humanitarian and relief services. However, in a system like Nigeria where security and law enforcement agencies struggle for supremacy and lay claim for arrests and security breakthroughs (as was the case in Kabiru Sokoto's arrest), interoperability becomes difficult to achieve. Nigeria does not lack the institutions to counter terrorism but what Nigerian security and law enforcement agencies need to understand is that "success for one is success for all".

#### **2.1.4 Intelligence Sharing**

Intelligence is hard to pin down since different academics place such a high value on different aspects of the concept. Stephen Marrin agreed, arguing that a single definition of intelligence would be impossible to pin down because it implies different things to different people. But there were still those academics who thought an effort should be made to pin down what exactly constitutes intelligence.

Intelligence, according to Warner (2002) applying the Hoover Commission of 1995, is concerned with "all that could be known prior to commencing a course of action." According to Carl and Bancroft (1990), intelligence is the end result of gathering and analyzing data on actual or possible conflicts between the United States and other countries or between the United States and an area under enemy control.

Another definition with a military flavor can be found in 2007's Joint Intelligence (JP 2-0): "the product result from collecting, processing, integrating, evaluating, and interpreting available in information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potential hostile forces of element or areas of actual or potential operation" (Joint Chief of staff, 2009). Detection, collection, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information for decision making in diplomatic, military, and other actions constitutes intelligence, (Alex and Schmid, 2000).

Intelligence sharing is the process through which entities from different levels of government, as well as from the private sector, are able to share intelligence data and expertise with one another. Expert intelligence is to be shared among government security agencies. Terrorism, human trafficking, insurrection, war, poverty, and unemployment are just some of the many threats to national security that are discussed during intelligence exchanges.

The formal requirements of intelligence sharing within the Nigerian security outfit are as follows: the ability to focus intelligence in a specific direction without missing the target; the ability to identify and prioritize the central problems and elements within those problems; and the ability to share and focus on the central problems and elements. Therefore, the key vehicle that propels security is intelligence exchange.

The Nigerian government's security services should collaborate and share information gleaned from the public's actions, so intelligence collecting should not be confined to a single domain.

For Olusegun Obasanjo, a former president of Nigeria, national security is about protecting people, communities, ethnic groups, and states (Abolurin, 2011).

This suggests that the issue of intelligence sharing is not a purely government-level one, but rather calls for the participation of all Nigerians, regardless of their ethnic background, by providing information that can be used by the country's security agencies. Prunckun (2012) defines intelligence sharing as "a means of preventing an adversary into a nation's confidential information or protecting against inadvertent leakage of one's confidential information, and to make secure its installation and material against espionage, subversion, sabotage, and other forms of politically motivated violence, and the transfer of key technologies Prunckun (2012).

## **2.2 Theoretical Framework**

In social science, the subject of security can be theorized within international relations, psychology, sociology and criminology frameworks among others. This also applies to terrorism and intelligence, which are aspects of security. Brannan et al (2014, 56) argue that most terrorism literature lack theoretical frameworks necessary to support and produce accurate analysis. Thus, this study will rely on International Relations theories to present a theoretical understanding of intelligence and how it can be applied in counter terrorism approaches. Nevertheless, there are still scholarly debates among terrorism scholars on the appropriate methodology to be used contemporary terrorism research, but there is glaring insufficiency of counter terrorism theories. The application of the established international relations theories to research on security studies was occasioned by the security crisis that emerged following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. World security was threatened by the new wave of terrorism, and as such, security concerns became a primary focus of international relations, which cannot be addressed without collaborating the two. Furthermore, security is a vital objective of all states in contemporary world affairs. To

maintain security, all states collect intelligence and recognize its significance. Thus, intelligence is a normal function of the state. In intelligence practice, theories are crucial in creating applications that address the intelligence agencies' core mandate, namely, the protection of national security. Walt (1998; 38) based the international relations theories on four basic paradigms, namely; liberalism, realism, critical theory and social constructivism. As such, security is theorized in its multidimensional approach of contemporary and traditional security. While the traditional conceptualization of security followed along the realms of realist security theory, the contemporary conceptualization of security follows along the realms of liberalist security theory. Transformation of security from traditional to contemporary has also changed intelligence dimensions. Morgenthau (1985; 4-15), notes that the central concern of a state is to realize its national interests through power. Because the desire for more power is entrenched in the flawed human nature, for realists, states engage in the power struggle to increase their capabilities (Elman, 2008).

Realists theorize that the state is the principal actor in the international system, while security is primarily in their hands based on their authority over others. Thus, states utilize their means and power to realize their basic aim, specifically, survival. Applied to intelligence, realists focus more on state survival in the international environment. Their conception of the world system is that it is composed of states. Therefore, intelligence focuses on threats to the international survival of the state, which emanate from other states. Morgenthau (1985) advocates for building alliances in an anarchic world. In this case, intelligence focuses in identifying friends with whom states can enter into alliances for survival. According to Nicollo Machiavelli's doctrine of 'the end justifies the means, where the end is security, realists would go to any extent to gather

intelligence that would ensure state security. Thus, realists in their view of intelligence collection are ‘amoral’.

### **Realists**

Neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, emphasize on the structure of the international system (structural realism). They argue that intelligence policies and methods are meant to counter threats emanating from within the structure of the international system, which is linked to power distribution, namely, polarity. Intelligence is affected by a change in polarity, and as such, intelligence cooperation between states will identify and tend to require the support of the superpower. The superpower determines and defines the threats and the enemy. A major weakness of realist theory is its disregard of the domestic security variables within the state. Thus, intelligence is directed against other states and ignores political, economic and, environmental threats, and threats originating from within the society.

### **Liberals**

These threats can be addressed by liberalists. Liberalists also address the issue of morality and ethics in intelligence processes and operations. The liberal security theory dates as far back as Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1991), who emphasized the importance of ‘republican’ constitutions in sustaining peace. Liberalism is based on the assumption that the state, which is one of the actors in the international system, functions in a peaceful environment, endeavors for cooperation and peaceful disputes’ handling (Navari, 2008). Collective security is the basis of the liberal theory. Thus, cooperation among states led by the international community results in reduction of danger and averts occurrence of war and conflicts. Liberalists expanded the concept of security to include political, economic, social, and environmental security. The liberalists’ referent point is security for the human person, and as such, intelligence gathering and policies

are aimed at securing the human person to bring out their virtues. This is because human beings are good natured, but it is their environment that may cause them to engage in threats to security. Thus, liberalists see radicalization and terrorism as encouraged by man's environment. Because of the shared values, liberalists advise collective (and not national) security to secure the world. They see the world as cooperation between the various actors in it. Thus, intelligence agencies should share intelligence and information because their main aim is to secure the world, not individual states since security is indivisible. Intelligence sharing through liaison ensures that if one state is secure, then the whole world is secure. The reverse also applies. Liberalists believe in ethical relations between states. Ethical and moral processes and methods of intelligence collection ensures safeguarding and promotion of human rights and their dignity. Thus, democratic and human rights-oriented intelligence operations and policies can eliminate threats and activities that threaten security in the world, such as terrorism. Thus, intelligence operations and methods of collection that violate human rights, to liberalists, can be counterproductive. Liberalists' weakness emanates from their underestimation of the role of state in international and security affairs. Apparatus to collect and act on intelligence belongs to the state, making it a critical factor in security and intelligence. The best way is to empower the state on its role in security and make it democratic. As such, the intelligence community would undertake responsible intelligence collection and operations, which can then play a vital role in counter terrorism by preventing terrorist acts through intelligence cooperation and addressing its root causes, and support judicial processes in prosecuting terror suspects. Realists do not recognize non-state actors, such as terrorists; therefore, intelligence should not be focused on terrorists because 'they do not pose security threats to states. This wrong perception was one of the likely intelligence failures that led to the 9/11 attacks. This was because intelligence (the CIA) focused

on threats from external states and not local non-state actors. Liberalists recognize non-state actors; thus, intelligence can be focused in countering terrorist activities. Also, because of globalization, intelligence cooperation by the intelligence community, formed on mutual security agenda, such as counter terrorism, is vital in fighting transnational terrorist activities. Finally, intelligence processes and operations in countering terrorism should be for the public good, and not benefiting only the policymakers. In light of the above theoretical arguments, the researcher noted the different roles that intelligence and the intelligence community play in counter terrorism can better be examined by using both realist and liberalist theories. As such, the researcher used realist and liberalist theories to examine the role of the Nigeria intelligence community in counter terrorism.

### **2.2.1 'Greed' or Opportunity Perspective**

This theoretical assumption typically sees armed violence (including terrorism) as the outcome of rational individual choices to maximize economic, social or political benefits. Rebellion is only feasible when the opportunity and potential gain from joining an armed group outweigh the benefits of not fighting and pursuing alternative income-generation opportunities (Urdal, 2007). From this perspective, the costs of organizing rebellion are lower where there is a large youth population (which is relatively cheap to recruit), where there are high levels of poverty and illiteracy or where there is an abundance of easily lootable resources (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Suffice to say that these identified variables abound in Nigeria and could perhaps explain why some Nigerian youths are more inclined to armed violence in contemporary times.

### **2.2.2 Grievance 'perspective**

Stewart (2008) argues that there is a link between horizontal inequalities and armed violence. Walton (2010) also sees armed violence (including terrorism) as a response to relative

deprivation or exclusion. This theory supports the findings of Omale (2012) which argues that many people in Nigeria call for the restorative justice paradigm because they are ‘aggrieved and hurt’ socially, politically and economically; and could not explain why ‘a people who stand in plenty of water should wash their hands with spittle’. Similarly, the grievance theory appears to support the assumption of some people in Nigeria, that the violent dimension of Boko Haram is a reaction to job creation opportunities granted to the Niger Delta militants in the Amnesty Programme. For this reason, the unemployed youth in the north are aggrieved and want to benefit from same. This paper however argues that where the Boko Haram members missed their mark is from their name ‘Boko Haram’ (western education is evil). How do they intend to benefit from international and local trainings like the Niger Delta militants when their supposed ideology already defines western education as evil?

Another “grievance hypothesis” is that the modern Nigerian youths are becoming politically conscious and aware of their political rights which have been constitutionally disfranchised. Unlike Uganda where a 19 years old girl won election into the National Parliament in 2012, section 65 ss (a) and (b) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states otherwise that ‘a person shall be qualified for election to the National Assembly if he has attained the ages of thirty-five years (for the Senate) and thirty years (for the House of Representative). These constitutional provisions automatically disqualified potential youths electable into the National Assembly. By implication therefore, Nigerian youths are only good to be used as thugs and dumped by politicians but not as electable politicians themselves. Such political attitude can fuel a militarized sense of “we will do it ourselves” when provoked by the failure of government to provide for them in the mist of plenty.

This theoretical discourse is relevant to Nigeria where people already feel that our democracy is anorexic (people do not feel the dividends of democracy) or as the Governor of Imo State-Chief Rochas Okorocha put-it: Nigeria's democracy is suffering from "democratic kwashiorkism" (a situation where power is concentrated at the top and the head feeds fat while the lower extremities are extremely malnourished).

### **2.2.3 Psychological Propensity Perspective**

Walton (2010, p.3) emphasizes particular psychological reasons why young people are more prone to engaging in violence. He argues that adolescents may be more susceptible to recruitment by rebel groups or to engage in violence for a number of psychological reasons (emotional development or identity construction, for example). Understanding this perspective is relevant in the Nigerian context where youths mirror their personality in the likeness of military rulers that dominated the political system of Nigeria until 1999. Hence it is not uncommon to hear or see idle Nigerian youth talk and behave violently in certain cases as if violence pays. Walton (2010) therefore argues that job creation schemes can provide restless youth with a means of channeling their energies and thereby resisting a natural propensity to violence in its various forms. This perspective however does not intend to overstate the threat posed by youth and neglecting the positive peace building roles that youth could play if given the opportunity.

### **2.2.4 Social and Political Exclusionism Perspective**

This perspective sees youths violence as a product of the social and political marginalization of young people. As Hilker and Fraser (2009, p.18) have argued, there is a growing sense in the literature that 'the social and economic statuses required for adulthood are increasingly unattainable for young people'. Walton (2010) argues that a number of ethnographic studies of young people in a number of different conflict-affected countries have identified various social,

economic and political barriers that block young peoples' transition to adulthood, and highlighted the central role these barriers can play in driving violent conflict. For instance, Sommers' (2006a) work on 'youth men' in Rwanda and on blocked youth transitions in West Africa (Sommers, 2007), research on 'waithood' in the Middle East (Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon 2008), and studies of youth violence in Sri Lanka (Amarasuriya et al, 2009) all emphasize a blocked transition to adulthood emerging as a result of a complex combination of demographic, economic, social and political factors. A related theme, which has been noted in a range of contexts, is corruption or hypocrisy of the political elite (Sommers, 2009; Amarasuriya et al, 2009, Yousuf, 2003). Hence Yousuf (2003, p.19) has argued that, the fact that resources are controlled by entrenched elites rather than poverty and inequality per se is what drive youth grievance in recent times. So, taking up arms against the state or the political elite in these contexts can provide a means by which they can integrate into society (by fire, by force), or gain the sense of purpose and recognition denied them by the society (Sommers, 2007, p.9). From this perspective, youth job creation will not address violence unless it also deals with the social and political exclusionism that underpins youth grievance. This is why there is no escaping the fact that terrorist attacks have almost exclusively been led and executed by young men. Males isolated from the rest of society.

### **2.2.5 Frustration-Aggression Theory**

The frustration-aggression hypothesis as proposed by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939) describes aggression as a result of frustration. In the view of Dollard and colleagues frustration - as an emotional experience - is created when an external trigger interferes with goal directed behavior. Frustration subsequently activates the desire to act aggressively, leading to reactive aggressive behavior against the source of frustration (Vitaro & Brendgen, 2005).

Research has indeed demonstrated a relationship between frustration and aggression, with frustration leading to more reactive aggressive behavior (Berkowitz & LePage, 1967). However, this theory is quite stringent stating that “aggression always presupposes the existence of frustration” and “contrawise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression” (Dollard *et al.*, 1939). Not surprisingly, in 1994, the founders of the frustration-aggression hypothesis - driven by Miller -, nuance the original statement in two ways; firstly, they state that frustration can initiate aggression, but not automatically results in aggressive behavior. For instance, aggressive behavior can be inhibited by the notion of punishment. Secondly, they modified the statement that frustration always causes aggression, now claiming that frustration can cause a number of different reactions in which aggression is one, but not the only (Miller, Sears, Mowrer, Doob, & Dollard, 1941).

This theory is the principal theory of this work because it best explains the root cause of terrorism in the nation. This also theory explains that terrorist groups emerge as a response to an already made decision. In Nigeria, citizens are faced with enough challenges such as low standard of living, bad infrastructures, insecurity etc. these challenges create an avenue of frustration for the citizen making them look for better ways to survive which could lead to armed robberies, theft and terrorism. Terrorism comes as a response to the people having an aggressive response to the decisions of the government.

**CHAPTER THREE**  
**HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM, COUNTER TERRORISM AND**  
**INTELLIGENCE IN NIGERIA**

**3.1 History of Terrorism in Nigeria**

There is a wide variety of targeting strategies and subsidiary activities to be found across the spectrum of terrorist organizations operating in the world today. In Nigeria, the Niger Delta terrorist groups (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People - MOSOP), the Egbesu Boys and Niger Delta Vigilante, have a long history dating back to the Adaka Boro Movement in the 1960s, through to Ken SaroWiwa's struggles. In the East, the Bakassi Boys, Bakassi Movement for self-determination, Igbo People Congress, Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), and MOSOP are terrorist groups fighting for one goal or the other.

The Odua People's Congress (OPC) is the militant wing and mouthpiece of Egbe Omo Oduduwa, and is also used by dominant parties in the West to advance their courses and achieve sanity in the society. The Arewa People's Congress (APC) in the North and the congregation of the People of the Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad better known as by its Hausa name Boko Haram ("Western education is forbidden"), a Jihadist militant organization are based in Maiduguri in the northern part of Nigeria and thus, appear to be protecting the interests of the northerners (Okemi, 2013), and put together, it is essentially a militant agitation against environmental degradation, unemployment, poverty, deprivation and marginalization.

From the foregoing, domestic terrorism, i.e., acts that are: dangerous to human life that violate federal or state laws; intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; designed to influence government policy by intimidation or coercion; affect the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of Nigeria (in this case) has risen in Nigeria because of the emergence of militant groups that have taken

advantage of government inefficient actions and inactions in dealing with the fundamental elements of nationhood, internal insecurity, corruption, youth unemployment, marginalization and so on (Obioma, 2012).

These terrorist groups frequently participate in more obviously criminal activities such as extortion, theft, robbery, pipeline vandalization, as well as hostage taking. Thus, the terrorists use violence to achieve political change, and while motivations vary considerably across the plethora of groups we call terrorists, their principal methods remain remarkably similar. Considering the above, the remaining part of this discussion will examine representative cases of the activities of a few of the above groups and associations in the 21st century. Beginning with the Odua People's Congress (OPC), on 20 February 2001, two police officers and three members of the group were killed in clashes between the police and OPC members in Ikotun Egbe in Lagos, Nigeria after the police tried to disperse a gathering of the OPC that was considered illegal (Attoh, 2012).. And by 2001, newspaper reports were replete with stories of the inhuman treatment, extrajudicial killings and human rights violations perpetrated by the Bakassi Boys in Abia state (Attoh, 2012).

However, irrespective of the claims of controlling crime and criminality, the activities of the Bakassi Boys (Abia) included arson, kidnapping, extra-judicial killings, looting, unlawful detention and disappearances. Hence, the police, and sometimes the communities, are in no doubt that these groups are more of a menace than a partner in curbing crime and criminality, or fighting for ethnic goals. Organizations such as Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and many other groups in the Niger-Delta are famous for hostage taking, kidnapping for ransom, pipeline vandalization, oil-theft, arson and ambush.

To date, hundreds of oil workers, politicians, actors, children, and other important personalities have either been kidnapped, or taken hostage. And initially, the groups and associations argued that kidnapping and hostage taking were introduced to force experts involved in crude oil exploration in the Niger-Delta areas to pressurize Nigerian government to take decisive steps towards ameliorating the environmental, social and political problems bedeviling the area, but more recently, the trends and patterns of hostage taking and kidnapping differ markedly from those using as proxies to attract government's attentions, as the groups focus more on the ransom paid to ensure the release of the oil industry workers. And therefore, foreign nationals irrespective of whether they work in the oil industry or anywhere near the oil-producing areas or not constitute part of their targets, based on the primary intention that when such people are captured or kidnapped, their relatives and embassies would pay whatever amount to ensure their release. In January 2007, four foreign oil workers were abducted at a Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) location in Bayelsa State (Ebun-Amun, 2010). In the early hours of Saturday February 18, Ijaw youth launched a series of coordinated and devastating commando-like attacks on specifically selected and strategically located oil facilities and installations in western Niger Delta (Ebun-Amun, 2010). In March of the same year, Ijaw youth took hostage nine expatriate oil workers, while by April, thirteen expatriates were abducted in Port Harcourt, and altogether, more than five thousand foreigners, most of whom are from America, Britain, Thailand, Egypt, and the Philippines had been kidnapped and taken hostage by Niger-Delta groups which signaled a new dimension in what is happening in the Niger-Delta as youth were ready to tell the world that the Nigerian government had lost control over what is happening within its borders, especially in the oil rich Niger Delta. Before 2008, no group or organization ever dared to engage the Nigerian army in any form of confrontation. For instance,

in December 1999, when 12 policemen were brutally murdered by suspected Ijaw youth at Odi in Bayelsa State, the Nigerian military sacked the entire town of Odi (Attoh, 2012). Similar actions have occurred in Jesse and Jos

But now, the youths are confronting the federal government and striking where it matters most: oil, the economic nerve center of Nigeria. As leader of MEND and most wanted militant in the Niger Delta, Ekpemupolo, aka Tompolo, said that these coordinated attacks are because they are ready to “take their future in their own hands,” (Okemi, 2013) actions, which have since forced the Nigerian government to set in motion processes for negotiation that ultimately resulted in the on-going amnesty programme. Since the beginning of 2008, kidnapping and hostage taking have ascended new heights, and many Nigerian politicians, university lecturers, kings and their chiefs, musicians and movie industry workers have been featured among the kidnapped (Ebun-Amun, 2010), to show that anyone can be kidnapped. And more often than not, kidnappers and hostage takers hardly kill their victims, although a number of deaths have been recorded. Thus, whenever a person is kidnapped, the family, company or embassy of the country of the victim is notified, and a price is placed on his or her head and quoted based on the worth of the victim. And if a renowned personality with clout in government or oil magnate or, better still, children of any of these is kidnapped, the price is usually high. The geography of kidnapping for ransom has also changed from Niger-Delta to Lagos, Ibadan to Kadunna, and Adamawa to Ekiti with different people male and female, old and young beening kidnapped in addition to a high spate of violence, killings and bombing recently in the northern part of Nigeria. And notwithstanding, Ebun-Amun (2010) argues that the new trend of bombing portend danger, even though it was foreseeable and avoidable.

### **3.1.1 Intelligence Agencies in Nigeria**

## **1. Ministry of defense**

The Ministry of Defense was established on 1st October, 1958 with the statutory responsibility of overseeing the Defense profile of the country from the perspective of the Armed Forces. It, therefore, supervises the Defense Headquarters, the Services namely, Army, Navy and Air Force as well as Tri-Services Institutions/Parastatals.

### **Main Mandates**

- i. Maintain men of the Nigerian Armed Forces in a state of combat readiness on land, sea and air;
- ii. Maintain a proper balance in arms and men to meet needs of internal and external security;
- iii. Make provisions for the welfare of the men of the Armed Forces in terms of training, accommodation, health care and other benefits aimed at boosting their morale;
- iv. Enhance the capabilities and sophistication of the country's defense industries, in order to reduce the country's dependence on foreign sources of supply;
- v. Enhance security in the African continent by promoting a collective defense system through bilateral, sub-regional and continental co-operation;
- vi. Contribute towards peace and stability in the world through the United Nations Organization (UNO) the African Union; (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and
- vii. Responsible for the formulation and execution of the National Defense Policy.

## **2. Armed Forces**

The primary purpose of the Nigerian military is to defend the nation from external attack and deter of attack of would-be enemies. The realization of this function primarily entails the preservation of the territory, people, culture and the national security of the Federal Government of Nigeria. Nigerian Military has the primary responsibility for combating terrorism in the North East. Governing Structure: The Nigerian Army is governed by the Nigerian Army Council (NAC). The Nigerian Army is functionally organized into combat arms, which are infantry and armored; the combat support arms, which are artillery, engineers, and signals; the combat support services comprise medical, supply and transport, ordinance and finance. Others include the military police, intelligence, physical training, chaplains, public relations and band Rules and Mechanism Governing the Function of the Armed Forces of Nigeria in Countering Violent Extremism. The Armed Forces Act; Code of Conduct (COC), Rules of Engagement (ROE); National Policy on the Protection of Civilians and Civilian Harm Mitigation; and Code of Conduct (COC) for Civilian Joint Task Force are the rules and mechanism governing the operation of the Armed Forces of Nigeria in countering violent extremism in the country (Karl *et al.*, 2007).

### **3. National Human Right Commission**

The National Human Commission deals with promotion and protection of human rights and incorporate International Law norms and standard in its work by observing the provisions of UDHR, ICCPR, CERDAW, ICESCR, CRC, ACHPR and other International and Regional Instruments on human rights which Nigeria is a party.

### **4. Nigeria Police Force**

The Nigeria Police incorporate International Human Rights norms and standards and Humanitarian Law in carrying out its activities by making resort to the UDHR, ICCPR,

CERDAW, ICESCR, CRC, ACHPR, and other International and Regional Instruments on human rights to which Nigeria is a party. Furthermore, there is the Nigeria Police Reform Bill 2019 which is awaiting the assent of the President before being operationalized.

### **Duties of the Nigeria Police Force**

Section 4 of the Police Acts and Regulations lists the duties of the police force to include:

1. The prevention and detection of crime.
2. The apprehension of offenders.
3. The preservation of law and order.
4. The protection of life and property.
5. The due enforcement of laws and regulations with which they are directly charged.
6. The performance of such military duties within and outside Nigeria as may be required of them by or under the authority of the police act or any other act.

### **5. The National Intelligence Agency (NIA)**

The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) is a Nigerian government division tasked with overseeing foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

Fulfilling one of the promises made in his first national address as president, in June 1986 Ibrahim Babangida issued Decree Number 19, dissolving the National Security Organization (NSO) and restructuring Nigeria's security services into three separate entities under the Office of the Coordinator of National Security.

- i. State Security Service (SSS) – Responsible for domestic intelligence
- ii. National Intelligence Agency (NIA) – Responsible for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations
- iii. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) – Responsible for military intelligence

Protecting the Naval forces from violent extremist organizations and individuals is one of NCIS' highest priorities. As the primary law enforcement and counterintelligence component for the Navy services, NCIS is focused on countering threats to the physical security of Sailors, Marines, and Department of the Navy civilian personnel and on preventing terrorist attacks against installations, ships, and expeditionary forces.

NCIS is responsible for detecting, deterring, and disrupting terrorism worldwide through a wide array of investigative and operational capabilities. Within the Department of the Navy, NCIS has exclusive investigative jurisdiction into the actual, potential or suspected acts of terrorism. NCIS accomplishes this through key partnerships resulting in enhanced information-sharing of threats to DON for forces and assets. Offensive operations aim at identifying and interdicting terrorist activities. In defensive operations, NCIS supports key DON leaders with protective services and performs physical security assessments of military installations and related facilities including ports, airfields, and exercise areas to which naval expeditionary forces deploy (National Intelligence Agency, 2012).

**6. The State Security Service (SSS)**, self-styled as the Department of State Services (DSS), is a security agency of Nigeria and one of three successor organizations to the National Security Organization (NSO). The agency is under the Presidency of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. And it reports its activities to the office of the NSA. Its main responsibilities are within the country and include counter-intelligence, internal security, counter-terrorism, and surveillance as well as investigating some other types of serious crimes against the state. It is also charged with the protection of senior government officials, particularly the President and Vice President with their respective families, and state governors. It is headquartered in Abuja. According to the

1999 Presidential Proclamation, the SSS operates as a department within the Ministry of Defense and its under the control of the National Security Adviser (Osagie, 2011).

## **7. The DIA**

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), is the primary military intelligence agency of Nigeria. The DIA was established in 1986 to provide an efficient system of obtaining military intelligence for the Nigerian Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence. The DIA promotes Nigeria's Defence Policy, enhances military cooperation with other countries, protects the lives of Nigerian citizens, and maintains the territorial integrity of Nigeria. The DIA is headed by the Chief of Defense Intelligence (CDI) who is appointed by the President of Nigeria.

## **8. Defense Intelligence College**

The Defense Intelligence College (DIC) was established by Decree 19 of 1986 as a training arm of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Since then, it has grown to become a Regional Centre of Excellence; especially within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

### **3.2 Some Root Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria**

No person is born a terrorist, and becoming one is a process with several steps and a historical background with diverse origins. Terrorism is also a choice, among other options, that try to influence political strategies. Therefore, without understanding the root causes, no realistic solution will come out. According to the root cause approach to counter terrorism, knowing why people resort to terrorism is a critical precondition for determining how to respond (Cinar, 2009). Thus, understanding it is the first step towards formulating a functioning counter terrorism strategy.

Preventing terrorism involves not only enhanced security, but also better efforts to deal with the fundamental conditions leading to violent extremism and radicalization. Thus, the conditions that

cause and/or promote terrorism should be addressed by respective counter terrorism policies. The role of the intelligence community in pro-active and preventive counter terrorism approach is to ensure the identification and destruction of these conditions. However, there is no theoretical analysis of the causes of terrorism despite inspiring a voluminous literature in recent years (Crenshaw 1981). This is because some scholars approach terrorism literature from historical viewpoints, which Crenshaw, citing Laqueur's work, dismisses explanations considering many cases as "exceedingly vague or altogether wrong" (Crenshaw, 1981; 379). According to Cinar (2009), terrorism can be studied under historical and political roots, socio-economical roots, and ideological and religious roots.

### **3.2.1 Economic and Social Root Causes**

Poverty and unemployment have been identified by some studies as common causes of terrorism. However, several studies have found no link between poverty, unemployment and terrorism. The general belief of the security and intelligence community is that people who are economically deprived are more likely to resort to violence as a way to express their grievances. That is poverty and unemployment create terrorism. The theory of relative deprivation explains that when people feel deprived of something they are expect to have, they become discontent, hence could use violence to express their grievances. Although, it is argued that poor economic conditions such as lack of employment opportunities and poverty create the condition for people to join terrorist organizations.

Low income and economic inequality are found to be possible causes of terrorism. In the paper "does terrorism have economic roots?", Derin-Gure found evidence that the greater the income inequality there is in a country, the greater the incidence of domestic terrorist attacks. Krieger and Meierrieks sampled 114 countries between 1985 and 2012 and found that income inequality

is correlated with terrorism. In addition, Enders et al. found a robust nonlinear income-terrorism relationship, which suggests that terrorist attacks are more concentrated in middle-income countries. But, other empirical studies have found no support to suggest that the income distribution of a country is related to terrorism.

In northern Nigeria, there is the common perception that violent extremism is entrenched in the socio-economic problems of the country. For example, Ayegba argued that poverty and unemployment are the driving forces behind the insurgency in Nigeria. Further in the study, Ayegba claimed that the high rate of youth unemployment has resulted in poverty and insecurity in the country. David et al. argued, “socio-economic indices such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, economic underdevelopment, low education, inter alia, underlie the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram terrorism.” These assertions suggest that the pervasive poverty and unemployment in northern Nigeria create the condition for especially young people to be manipulated and recruited by Boko Haram. Although, some studies have found no link between poverty and terrorism, however, the vicious cycle of poverty and unemployment make it easy for people to become prey for Boko Haram recruitment. A study by Botha and Abdile confirmed that, due to adverse economic conditions and unemployment in Somalia, some people viewed Al – Shabaab as a potential employer. A recent public opinion study on Boko Haram by Botha et al. revealed that some of the respondents interviewed perceive that people are motivated to join Boko Haram because “they are unemployed and see Boko Haram as a job.”

### **3.2.2 Religious and Ethnic Causes of Terrorism**

It is common belief that religious tension and religious fundamentalism cause terrorism. There is empirical evidence to support this argument. With respect to Boko Haram, religion plays a vital role in their discourse. The group holds extreme religious ideology, which they use as the basis

to commit their heinous crimes. Akinola argued that the rise of Boko Haram is embedded in Islamic fundamentalism, which they use to justify their actions. For example, the group aims to promote Sharia law and create an Islamic state in Northern Nigeria. As a result, it has waged war on any group or western idea, which they believe is against Islam. This has created the notion that terrorism is linked to religion fundamentalism. In the study, why do people join Boko Haram? Onuoha found that, “ignorance of religious teaching is the leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme religious views, especially among youth” in all the northern states surveyed.

### **3.2.3 Political Causes of Terrorism**

With respect to the political root causes of terrorism, several studies have indicated that the lack of civil liberties, corruption, weak political institutions, political instability, weak government, high level of repression, civil wars can foment the incidence of terrorism. In addition, a study by Piazza shows that societies with large complex multiparty systems are more prone to terrorist incidence than those with few homogeneous systems. Also, democratic countries, which are assumed to be in a better position to stop terrorist attacks, are more prone to terrorist attacks than autocratic countries. Krieger and Meierrieks argued that democratic countries are prone to terrorist attacks due to the promotion of democratic ideals like respect for civil liberties and free press, which open doors for terrorists to operate and also hinder counter-terrorism measures.

On domestic terrorism in North East Nigeria, some studies blamed the emergence of Boko Haram on the country’s elite politics. Botha et al. argued that “Boko Haram is a political construct, sponsored by politicians.” According to Mbah et al., Boko Haram emerged from the struggle among northern and southern political elites to gain control of state political power, especially after the death of President Yar’Adua. The reelection of Jonathan Goodluck in 2011

then led to the use of Boko Haram as an instrument of destruction by northern political elites. However, these claims cannot fully explain the emergence of Boko Haram, since other political and social phenomenon could contribute to the rise of the group. For instance, some scholars have argued that emergence of the group could be linked to bad governance, corruption and economic deprivation in northern Nigeria, which has fostered the rise radical extremist groups

### **3.3 Nigeria Counter Terrorism Strategies: The Intelligence Agencies**

Intelligence agencies provide the most sensitive protective security for the very survival of a country. When Nigeria embarked on its fight against the new era of terrorism, the intelligence agencies have played a crucial role in both defensive and offensive counter terrorism operations to defend the country. With the arduous task of collecting, processing, packaging, prioritizing, and disseminating terror related information and data; the intelligence agencies have become very important to the Nigeria's internal security. While intelligence alone may not stop the next terror attack, it liaises with, and supports the other security organs to undertake this mandate. Therefore, it plays a crucial first step in detecting and possibly thwarting a terror attack. Investigation, conversely, is a process taking place after an event and is mostly directed at arresting the culprits and their associates. Therefore, intelligence and investigations are mutually supportive. Effective counter terrorism should involve the support of good intelligence, mostly from the intelligence agencies. Counter terrorism intelligence is divided into three categories, namely; psychological, strategic and tactical intelligence (Raman, 2002; 256).

- i. Tactical intelligence relates to specific terrorist action plans, also known as preventive or indicators and warning intelligence, which enables the state to pre-empt, prevent, and frustrate terrorist attack plans.

- ii. Strategic counter terrorism intelligence is information on a terrorist group's organizational structure, leadership, facilitators/financers, aims, modus operandi and weapons.
- iii. Psychological intelligence covers details of a terrorist group's propaganda war and terrorist related data, such as discontent against the leadership, which can enable the state to mount a psychological warfare against them. The latter two counter terrorism intelligence can easily be covered by the intelligence agencies through open sources, peripheral secret informants and agents, and analysis of captured documents and media, tactical intelligence can only be obtained from moles in a terror group's leadership, interrogation of captured suspects, and technical intelligence (TECHINT) collection (Schreier, 2005; 143). Tactical counter terrorism intelligence is premised on detecting pre-incident indicators, or initial clues of terrorist plots. As such, tactical counter terrorism intelligence, which is a critical counter terrorism preventive weapon, relies on both TECHINT and human intelligence (HUMINT).

HUMINT is the use of human agents, informants and moles to acquire information and perform covert actions against terrorist groups and membership. However, HUMINT collection is the most difficult and the most dangerous for counter terrorism practitioners because its mistakes can be fatal, embarrassing and likely to undermine its goals. As such, tactical counter terrorism intelligence requires an in-depth knowledge, customs and culture of the terrorist group to be penetrated. This can be a risky and difficult task, particularly in the case of religion (such as the Al-Shabaab) and ethnicity based groups, which need meticulous planning and direction by an intelligence officer. To achieve this, Raman (2002, 258) advises that the intelligence officer (IO) from the same ethnic and/or religious group as the targeted terrorist belong, should win-over

members who have already been accepted and initiated into the terrorist group. In undertaking HUMINT, Raman also recommends TECHINT penetration as another way of collecting precise tactical intelligence for preventive purposes. For the intelligence agencies, this has been made considerably easier due to technological advancements and globalization.

### **3.4 The Intelligence Cycle**

The intelligence cycle is the process through which intelligence is obtained, produced, and made available to users. In depicting this cycle, the United States Intelligence Community uses a five-step process. Other nations may describe this cycle differently; however, the process is largely the same. The steps in the intelligence cycle are depicted in the following illustration:

**1. Planning and Direction:** The first step in the cycle, planning and direction, involves the management of the entire intelligence effort, from the identification of a need for data to the final delivery of the intelligence product to the consumer. The process consists of identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence requirements, translating requirements into observables, preparing collection plans, issuing requests for information collection, production, and dissemination, and continuously monitoring the availability of collected data. In this step specific collection capabilities are tasked, based on the type of information required, the susceptibility of the targeted activity to various types of collection activity, and the availability of collection assets.

**2. Collection:** includes both acquiring information and provisioning that information to processing and production elements. The collection process encompasses the management of various activities, including developing collection guidelines that ensure optimal use of available intelligence resources. Intelligence collection requirements are developed to meet the needs of potential consumers. Based upon identified intelligence, requirements collection activities are

given specific tasking to collect information. These tasking are generally redundant and may use a number of different intelligence disciplines for collection activities. Tasking redundancy compensates for the potential loss or failure of a collection asset. It ensures that the failure of a collection asset is compensated for by duplicate or different assets capable of answering the collection need. The use of different types of collection systems contributes to redundancy. It also allows the collection of different types of information that can be used to confirm or disprove potential assessments. Collection operations depend on secure, rapid, redundant, and reliable communications to allow for data exchange and to provide opportunities for cross-cueing of assets and tip-off exchanges between assets. Once collected, information is correlated and forwarded for processing and production.

**3. Processing:** The third step, processing, is the conversion of collected information into a form suitable for the production of intelligence. In this process, incoming information is converted into formats that can be readily used by intelligence analysts in producing intelligence. Processing may include such activities as translation and reduction of intercepted messages into written format to permit detailed analysis and comparison with other information. Other types of processing include video production, photographic processing, and correlation of information collected by technical intelligence platforms.

**4. Production:** The fourth step, production, is the process of analyzing, evaluating, interpreting, and integrating raw data and information into finished intelligence products for known or anticipated purposes and applications. The product may be developed from a single source or from all-source collection and databases. To be effective, intelligence production must focus on the consumer's needs. It should be objective, timely, and most importantly accurate. As part of the production process, the analyst must eliminate information that is redundant, erroneous, or

inapplicable to the intelligence requirement. As a result of the analytical effort, the analyst may determine that additional collection operations are required to fill in gaps left by previous collection or existing intelligence databases. The final intelligence product must provide the consumer with an understanding of the subject area, and draw analytical conclusions supported by available data.

**5. Dissemination:** The final step of the intelligence cycle is dissemination. Dissemination is the conveyance of intelligence to the consumer in a usable form. Intelligence can be provided to the consumer in a wide range of formats including verbal reports, written reports, imagery products, and intelligence databases. Dissemination can be accomplished through physical exchanges of data and through interconnected data and communications networks.

Knowledge of an adversary's collection methods and patterns allows the program manager to develop effective countermeasures that hide or distort indicators.

According to one estimate, over 100 countries currently conduct intelligence operations against the United States. Adversary intelligence organizations place a high priority on the acquisition of scientific and technical information and target the United States because of its pre-eminence in many high-technology areas. The United States Government, American corporations, and U.S. universities have been targeted by intelligence organizations seeking scientific and technical intelligence. The United States hosts more science and technology (S&T) officials, defense attaches, and identified intelligence officers than any other industrialized nation in the world.

The 1992 Open Skies Treaty also poses an imagery collection threat. The treaty establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its signatories. The treaty was negotiated between the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact as a means to promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities. Observation flights can be

performed from aircraft provided by the observing nation, the observed nation, or a third participating party. Aircraft can be equipped with panoramic and framing cameras capable of a ground resolution of no better than 30 centimeters, video cameras with a ground resolution of no better than 30 centimeters, infrared line scanning devices with ground resolution of no better than 50 centimeters, and synthetic aperture radar systems with impulse response rate resolutions no better than 3 meters. Ground resolutions of 50 centimeters or less provide significant detailed information for an imagery analyst. Using the imagery derived from Open Skies flights analysts will be able to identify particular types of equipment by type and capability, and perform detailed analyses of rail, port, industrial, and military facilities.

### **3.5 The Role of Intelligence Community in Preventing Terrorism**

Nigeria's vital national interest is the preservation and protection of her sovereignty and territorial integrity. This core national interest embodies the primary purpose of all tiers of government which is to guaranty the security and welfare of the Nigerian people. Historically, the constitutional responsibility of protecting Nigerian people and territory has been carried out by the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) and the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). However, contemporary and emergent security challenges have compelled urgent re-calibration of the institutional responses to national threats. Based on the dominant themes in our national security threat analysis, the National Security Strategy (NSS) is focused broadly on all categories of security threats. These include terrorism and violent extremism; armed banditry, kidnapping and militancy; cybercrimes; transnational organised crime; insecurity in other domains; potential threats from Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) agents; and national disasters. The national responses to these threats must be comprehensive and coordinated.

### **3.5.1 Promote Crisis Response and Resilience**

The primary responsibility for crisis response and management lies with various tiers of government until such responsibility is transferred to a higher authority or a Presidential declaration is made in accordance with Section 305 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999 (as amended). In the event of a national emergency, the Federal Government will discharge its responsibilities for crisis response through statutory organs such as the National Security Council (NSC), National Defense Council (NDC) and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) for security and defense emergencies as well as national disasters.

The NSC oversees the management of national crisis situations through the instrumentality of security and intelligence agencies statutorily empowered to carry out designated functions. The overall national crisis and emergency response and management system is aided by inputs from designated agencies in the form of early warning, intelligence gathering and analysis, strategic decision-making, early and effective responses as well as effective leadership and coordination. In the particular instance of a national defense crisis, the President exercises command and control of the AFN in accordance with extant provisions of the Constitution. However, in the event of national disasters, NEMA is empowered to provide both strategic and operational leadership, guidance and coordination in all national disaster relief efforts.

The national crisis response and management system is guided by certain fundamental crisis management principles such as early warning and early response, effective communication, establishment of focused objectives and unified command and control. Others are interdisciplinary, multi-tasking and flexibility of remedial options and overarching imperative to deliver impactful remedies and reliefs on time.

The objectives of the national crisis response and management system are to coordinate Ministries, Departments and Agencies in all tiers of government as well as domestic and international State and Non-State actors. The objectives seek to prevent crises; establish an effective management structure to respond to a threatened or actual crisis; apply a multi-sectoral approach to crisis management; and lastly, build national resilience. These objectives will continue to be promoted through certain thematic approaches. In recognition of our political structure, we will continue to apply a crisis management philosophy of collective but differentiated responsibility that recognizes the tenets of our federalism as well as coordinate jurisdiction. This will undergird full scale crisis management responsibilities for containment, response, stability and recovery. We will promote continuous, integrated technology-enabled environmental scanning, monitoring, early detection and analysis, and initiate public advisories, alerts, warnings and engagements as necessary.

In the event of crisis, we will institutionalize the establishment of case-specific strategic level crisis management teams in addition to time-bound objective-driven multi-disciplinary and inter-agency crisis intervention outfits with unified command, control, intelligence, communication and coordination structure. To build institutional capacities and public resilience, we will promote continuous education, orientation, mobilization as well as emergency preparedness and drills. Importantly, we will leverage public-private partnerships for national emergency response and management. Lastly, we will continue to improve on the legal and regulatory frameworks and platforms for both international assistance and domestic civic responsibility in crisis response, management and resourcing.

### **3.5.2 National Defence**

The defense of the people and territory of Nigeria from both external aggression and internal insurrection is a statutory function of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN). Over the years, the AFN has patriotically discharged this onerous responsibility to underscore the imperative of a strong military as the bedrock of national defense. However, due to the increasing frequency of asymmetric threats to national defense, security is no longer the exclusive preserve of the military. It is therefore instructive, that going forward, all national defense efforts accommodate mandatory mobilization and application of all instruments of national power, in a comprehensive and coordinated whole-of-nation approach.

Our shift in approach to national defense requires concomitant consolidation of the attitudes, capacities, concepts of operation as well as conduct and application of the AFN to national defense in diverse ways. Our strategic response rests on three layers of defense crisis management namely constructive engagement, application of soft power and combat engagements. In other words, the first option in the resolution of fledgling national defense threats will be to adopt non-kinetic measures. As a rule, we will explore the opportunities of defense diplomacy, as expedient, to leverage the comparative resource endowments of friendly nations, allies and international partners. When military engagements become inevitable, we will apply domestic and international legal frameworks to promote national defense. We will also mobilize domestic political, economic and social institutions through statutory Civil-Military Relations structures.

The military will be deployed in accordance with its defined roles and responsibilities in the Constitution. In cases of humanitarian and internal security operations, the AFN will provide Military Aid to Civil Authority (MACA) and Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP), while

deferring to the supremacy of civil authority and the primacy of the statutory agencies such as the Nigeria Police Force in such operations.

All military efforts will be geared to detect, deter, degrade or decisively defeat threats to national defense and provide stability within the shortest possible time. The AFN may also be used for power projection abroad in the national interest, if and when such situations arise. In all cases, the envisioned Military Strategy, Rules of Engagement (RoE) and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) will, without any exception, conform with the established principles of combined, inter-agency, joint, special and domain specific operations as required and applicable.

To effectively mobilise intelligence for operations, we will pursue the aspirations for consolidated technology-aided fusion systems. Also, intelligence sharing capacities will be expanded through bilateral and multilateral partnerships and engagements. In all operations, we will promote niche information operations targeted at significant audiences as well as winning the hearts and minds of the people. In the long term, we will develop a comprehensive National Information Security System to effectively protect electronic and non-electronic information.

The AFN is being transformed and modernized to improve its capabilities as a credible defense force. The improvements in its defense capabilities will deliberately exploit the full range of a nation-wide Military Industrial Complex (MIC), national productive capacities and allied capacities of friendly nations. In view of insecurity along our international borders and outlying ungoverned spaces, the AFN will deploy to ensure deterrence and protection along the nation's borders and in other identified ungoverned spaces in collaboration with other statutory agencies.

We will promote the development of the MIC as a deliberate national economic security option.

To promote self-reliance and credible national defense capability, funding of the AFN and its transformation will be treated as national capital investments. In terms of performance

assessment and national resource accountability, the AFN will be subjected to a two-yearly defense review and Presidential inspections of its overall capabilities.

### **3.5.3 Internal Security**

The goal of Internal Security is to create a safe and secure environment for the pursuit of peace, personal well-being, prosperity and development. Internal security is a complex multi-sector national endeavor which calls for concerted, proportionate, open, flexible and effective application of political, economic, social, informational, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and military responses where they become inevitable. In specific terms, internal security will be promoted by an enabling political environment hinged on good governance, rule of law, human rights and both credible and peaceful political transitions. Others are enabling social security environment; security consciousness; credible alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; viable technology enabled intelligence infrastructure; law enforcement, effective criminal justice system as well as a viable and sustainable system of funding and resourcing. To improve our overall resilience for Internal Security, we will strengthen security in specific environmental domains such as territorial, border, maritime, aviation, and National Critical Infrastructure security (Mahmud, 2012)

Internal Security is the responsibility of all Nigerians, but it is the statutory duty of a large number of security and intelligence agencies in Nigeria. However, the Joint Intelligence Board (JIB) and Intelligence Community Committee (ICC) working in concert with the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) will continue to coordinate intelligence and information analysis required for strategic decision making by the National Security Council.

The roles of law enforcement and the criminal justice system are paramount in Internal Security. These roles are carried out by all security agencies but principally by three critical institutions

namely, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the judiciary and non-correctional centres. Additionally, without prejudice to the work of the JIB and ICC, the State Security Services (SSS) is the foremost intelligence agency in Internal Security matters.

Recognizing the statutory roles of the NPF, the judiciary and the NPS in Internal Security, there is the need to promote capacity building in these institutions. The NPF in particular, is responsible for crime detection, prevention and general constabulary functions. Statutorily, it has collaborative leadership role in Internal Security operations and will continue to do so. However, it will transfer authority and effect transitions to other agencies as and when necessary. To meet the challenges posed by serious crimes to Internal Security, we will improve the intelligence-gathering, logistical, technological, forensic and rapid response capabilities of the NPF. In specific terms, the NPF will be upscale in five key areas namely recruitment, training, platform and equipment modernization, data collection, management and retrieval as well as technology-driven command, control, communication and intelligence networks to meet modern standards (Hillary, 2020).

Criminal intelligence will be based on cooperation between the public and the Police to balance enforcement with preventive and proactive measures as a departure from reactive responses to insecurity. We will also enhance the capacity of the Central Criminal Registry (CCR) for large scale identity capture to promote data-driven approaches to preventing and investigating crimes. To promote this intelligence-driven approach, the NPF will deepen its commitment to community policing by implementing operational and organizational strategies that foster new ways of cooperation between residents of communities and the Police. Already, the Police at all levels are mandated to engage in active partnerships with the armed forces, security agencies, citizens, non-governmental organizations, government agencies, traditional institutions, faith-

based organizations, educational institutions and businesses to collaboratively solve problems of crime, reduce the fear of crime, maintain public safety and apply proactive measures that address anti- social behavioral patterns before they evolve into more serious forms of criminality. We will continue to strengthen these partnerships (Hillary, 2020).

Additionally, we will promote comprehensive and systematic capacity building of the Judiciary to fast-track the trial processes in line with the aspirations of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA). Furthermore, we will promote ongoing reforms in the NPS to enable it effectively discharge its important roles in the criminal justice system. In particular, we will promote: infrastructure expansion; facility improvement; provision of equipment such as customized vehicles; establishment of a unified command, control, communications and intelligence network linked to a viable prison data-base- management system; as well as the training and retraining of personnel. These aspirations are pursuant to the goals of decongesting and modernizing the Nigerian prisons and reaffirming its reformatory function in the criminal justice system to reduce recidivism.

On the whole, the state of internal security in Nigeria will be measured by improved public perception of security, public confidence and trust in the security agencies particularly the Nigeria Police Force, drastic reduction in the incidence of crime and all forms of insecurity.

#### **3.5.4 Combating Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism**

Since 2009, terrorism has constituted a major national security challenge in Nigeria. In responding to the threat posed by terrorism, Nigeria enacted the Terrorism Prevention Act 2013, developed the National Counter Terrorism Strategy 2016 (NACTEST) and established the Counter Terrorism Centre to coordinate our national counter terrorism efforts. In furtherance of our national security objectives, we will sustain a Whole-of- Government approach through

strong inter-agency platforms and mechanisms at strategic and operational levels to ensure the realization of counter terrorism mandates. Under these special platforms, we will conduct timely threat analyses and share information at home and with our partners. We will also promote international cooperation and collaboration in the fight against terrorism. This is in view of the international affiliations of terrorist groups in Nigeria to global terrorist networks (Hillary, 2020). In more specific terms, we will strengthen national finance systems in collaboration with international finance systems to prevent and disrupt terrorist financing. We will also deploy strategic communication in aid of our security operatives to counter terrorism efforts and narratives. We will partner with domestic and international information technology companies to counter violent extremism narratives online. In recognition of the critical role of criminal justice in counter terrorism, we will strengthen our criminal justice system including investigation, evidence collection and prosecution to bring terrorists to justice. We will upgrade border, maritime, aviation and cyber security measures.

In view of the nexus between violent extremism and terrorism, Nigeria adopted a Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in 2017. The Framework emphasizes human security and people-centred approaches in dealing with insecurity. We will therefore, strengthen our capacity to implement the Framework against violent extremism. Intergovernmental, inter-agency and government- civil society platforms will be mobilized to implement ‘Whole-of-Society’ approaches in dealing with violent extremism. A key tool will be to strengthen knowledge through research on violent extremist phenomena and determine how best to address it. We will build the capacity of Ministries, Departments and Agencies to execute their mandates.

In recent years, a number of notable initiatives have been employed in the fight against terrorism with positive results (Agba E and Olufunmilade F, 2020). We have, for instance, initiated programmes to encourage defections from terrorist groups as well as promoted the rehabilitation and reintegration of repentant terrorists. We will continue to strengthen these initiatives in addition to reinvigorating strategic communication to prevent and counter violent extremism through the media. In partnership with civil society, we will curb subversive religious activities as well as hate speech and ethno-religious extremism in the mainstream media, social media and cyberspace. Finally, we will continue to produce Annual Reports on Combating Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism for Nigeria in furtherance of national and international accountability in counter terrorism.

### **3.5.5 Preventing and Combating Kidnapping, Armed Banditry and Militia Activities**

Kidnapping, armed banditry and militia activities have become very serious threats to Nigeria's national security. Collectively, they constitute about 40 per cent of incidences of national insecurity in Nigeria. To prevent the incidence of kidnapping, armed banditry and militia activities, we will proactively activate systems for early warning and early responses established in the national crisis response mechanisms. We will address disputes and conflicts through regular dialogues by exploiting traditional, faith-based and state structures of peace building and alternate dispute resolution before they trigger crisis and violence. Communal assets for human intelligence gathering and proactive conflict interventions have been largely underutilized. These will be integrated into the crime response infrastructure. In addition to these critical measures,

we will sustain special inter-agency security outfits to conduct special operations in conjunction with state and local authorities.

The outfits will be enabled by the provision of technology driven intelligence and communication assets. To improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of intervention measures, we will develop doctrines for inter-agency coordination and collaboration. These measures will be taken in addition to the up-scaling of the NPF through the innovative transformation of its policing methodologies and equipment and the expeditious dispensation of criminal justice.

### **3.5.6 Promote Cyber Security Development**

Nigeria developed the National Cyber-security Policy and Strategy (NCPS) 2015 in response to increasing cyber-security threats. The document outlines how we will ensure our preparedness for threats in cyberspace. It also addresses the willingness to build comprehensive capability to protect Critical National Information Infrastructure (CNII) and mitigate cyber risks. The NCPS gained traction with the subsequent promulgation of the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act (CPPA) in the same year. The Act provides the comprehensive legal framework for cyber-security as well as the prohibition and punishment for cybercrimes in Nigeria. To meet the requirements for cyber-security, Section 41 (b) of the Act provides for the formulation and effective implementation of the NCPS.

Protecting CNII and cyberspace from cybercriminals, including terrorists, is a shared responsibility that requires active collaboration between government and all stakeholders. In furtherance of this Strategy, the national objectives will be to monitor and enforce the implementation of the legislative frameworks regulating cyber-security in Nigeria in line with international standards and best practices. Government will also continue to promote security

and build trust for the use of the Internet, e-government and e-commerce services to enhance service delivery and facilitate economic development through ICT innovations and advancement.

In order to enhance national defense through cyber-security, government will develop a national strategic framework dedicated to cyber defense that recognizes various threat levels. Furthermore, we will develop a national framework for cyber-security manpower development anchored on public-private partnership towards building local capacity to fill the gap in manpower requirements for cyber-security in Nigeria. This will include comprehensive capacity building programmes for military and law enforcement personnel, prosecutors and judges to investigate and prosecute cybercrimes.

Additionally, we will establish academic centre's of excellence with defined objectives to carry out coordinated research and development activities in cyber-security issues. Considering that cybercrimes can occur across international jurisdictions, government will exploit both local and global collaborative mechanisms to deter and mitigate the use of cyberspace for activities detrimental to national security. We will also create awareness and sensitization among our populace to foster a culture of cyber-security vigilance against financial scams and other related cybercrimes.

### **3.5.7 Promote Research and Development in Space Technology**

Space holds a number of exciting opportunities and many nations around the world have integrated programmes to exploit space for the advancement of military and peaceful purposes in furtherance of their national security and development. Nigeria is committed to exploiting the opportunities offered by space for peaceful purposes. In furtherance of this national objective, Nigeria established the National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA) in 2001

and launched a number of satellites into space for the purposes of disaster monitoring, information and communications as well as satellite meteorology.

In 2016, we established the Defense Space Administration (DSA) to support the AFN with relevant space products necessary for national defense. We intend to develop significant capacities to exploit the space-based potential for improvements in overall national security preparedness and responses.

Consequently, the NSS envisions the following:

- i. Generation of a critical mass of academic interest in the use of space through funding in designated Nigerian universities and other initiatives.
- ii. Development of human capital for space science, drawing on the intellectual capital of strategic partners and effective local institutional collaboration.
- iii. Promotion of collaboration between NASRDA and DSA for joint development of indigenous space technologies.
- iv. Promotion of deliberate programmes to develop advanced communications and surveillance capabilities and other scientific uses of space technology and knowhow.
- v. Development of proprietary space infrastructure.
- vi. Establishment of geo-spatial laboratories across the country for data processing and provision of data to support strategic planning.

### **3.5.8 Combating Transnational Organised Crime**

Transnational Organized Crime(TOC) include proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), smuggling, piracy and sea robbery, drug and human trafficking as well as illegal oil bunkering. Some key factors fueling TOC are armed conflicts in neighbouring countries, weak border security management systems, spread of extremist religious ideologies and weak legal

and policy frameworks for prosecution and conviction of perpetrators of TOC. Mindful of the impact and implications of TOC, Nigeria has enacted the Advanced Fee Fraud Act 2006, the Miscellaneous Offences Act 2004 and the Cybercrimes Act 2015 amongst others, to combat the phenomenon.

These laws have been complemented by the establishment of relevant agencies such as the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Surveillance Unit. Due to the international interconnectedness and complexity of TOC, a number of international organizations such as the INTERPOL, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) are now actively involved in combating the menace of TOC. We will actively promote a number of specific measures to combat TOC. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) will continue to coordinate the implementation of legislation to combat TOC and strengthen the relevant legal frameworks and judicial system. We will also develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for collaboration and cooperation with local and international agencies responsible for various forms of TOC.

In recognition of the nature and impact of TOC, we will promote shared access to domestic and external intelligence and the development of synergies among relevant agencies. This will include access to common national criminal databases as well as the development of common procedures and protocols for the disposal of the proceeds of TOC.

### **3.5.9 Critical National Assets and Infrastructure Security**

The key objectives of identifying, classifying and prioritizing Critical National Assets and Infrastructure (CNAI) are to determine appropriate levels of protection required for each CNAI

or groups of CNAI; enhance the resilience of CNAI to hazards; and minimize the effect of attacks or disasters on CNAI. The lead agency statutorily responsible for protecting all CNAI is the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC). The critical nature of these assets and infrastructure underscore the need to conduct periodic reviews, audits and risk assessments to ensure their protection and resilience. To this end, we will develop a CNAI Protection Response Plan that designates roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders such as the Nigeria Police Force, Federal Fire Service as well as other security and intelligence agencies, MDAs and the general public. This will involve the design and development of institutional capacity, systemic resilience, physical protection and contingency plans for CNAIs by all MDAs.

Allied to these measures, will be the development of a Geographical Information System (GIS)-based decision support tool that networks all stakeholders with contingencies and emergency responses to CNAI protection. It will also involve the development and activation of response protocols at the National Crisis Management Centre for national security breaches that imperil CNAI. Finally, we will conduct periodic inspection and certification of security preparedness of CNAI.

Institutional arrangements shall be put in place to coordinate the activities of the Federal Government with those of States and local governments. The NCMC, established in ONSA will coordinate CNAI protection, policy development and ensure implementation and liaison across all levels of government and industry. State and local governments are to set up corresponding structures to liaise with the NCMC at the national level to coordinate activities and request for assistance where necessary. A robust response and coordination system will be put in place between NCMC and state and local government structures.

### **3.5.10 Maritime Security**

Maritime security requires measures that are potent and supported by a strong balanced naval fleet as well as an integral shore based maritime air power. This needs to be fully supported by an effective Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Infrastructure. Consequently, the Nigerian Navy has responded to challenges in the maritime domain by strengthening its strategic and operational capabilities.

Maritime security requires strong inter-agency collaboration especially with other maritime security stakeholders such as the Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), SSS, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Nigeria Police Force. Indeed, the need for sustained collaboration between naval operations and commercial operations to attain effective naval power in Nigeria is very important. This would provide actionable intelligence critical to tracing illicit finances derived from maritime crimes. We will strengthen the legal and policy frameworks of the maritime security environment to secure prosecutions and convictions that are both punitive and deterrent in nature.

At the regional level, the Nigerian Navy has worked with allies to achieve necessary synergy to curb maritime crimes. Collaboration with the African Partnership Station (APS) under the auspices of the United States of America and Western allies has provided several maritime security engagements through sea exercises. Efforts towards securing the maritime domain have also been advanced through the GoG Commission and the Yaoundé Declaration. However, the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) will be strengthened, through stronger collaborations within the Navies in the West African Region including issues relating to intelligence sharing.

The GoG has witnessed a rapid and extensive development of its security architecture and collaboration over the last 6 years. Accordingly, ECOWAS, Economic Community of Central

African States (ECCAS) and GoG Commission have developed a robust framework that has broken the region into five maritime zones. Collaboration already exists between zones but needs to be complemented by regular combined sea patrols and exercises, while allowing the principle of hot pursuit across international maritime boundaries. There is also need for regular advocacy for the development of the other maritime security zones. Our maritime security objectives in specific terms will also be further enhanced through the following measures:

- i. Implementation of the Harmonized Standard Operating Procedures (HSOP) for the Arrest, Detention and Prosecution of Vessels and Persons in Nigeria’s Maritime Environment.
- ii. Effective administration and safety of Nigeria’s maritime environment in compliance with international conventions and protocols.
- iii. Provision of an enabling environment to overcome maritime ‘sea blindness’ and promotion of our ‘blue economy’ and projecting the nation as the regional maritime hub.
- iv. Integration of all maritime intelligence assets for maritime surveillance, domain awareness, enforcement as well as Search and Rescue.
- v. Expansion of the maritime security infrastructure as well as development of human and institutional capacities.
- vi. Implementation of the provisions of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, especially with respect to Flag and Port State control functions.

### **3.5.11 Airspace and Aviation Security**

Efforts to secure the Nigerian airspace will be led by the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) in collaboration with other relevant agencies. Considering the vulnerability of the airspace, the

NAF will emplace preventive and protective measures to guard against airspace violations through enforcement of international and national air laws. In addition, the NAF will deploy its resources to ensure the integrity of Nigerian airspace is maintained at all times. This will include conduct of aerial surveys and delineation of security zones and liaison with appropriate agencies towards the completion of the Total Radar Coverage of Nigeria (TRACON) project to ensure effective monitoring and airspace security.

An evolving phenomenon in airspace security is the preponderance of drones which constitute safety challenges such as air misses and mid-air collisions with manned aircraft and security challenges such as air space violation, penetration of prohibited airspaces, threat to VIP security, terrorism and espionage. Others are law enforcement challenges such as drug trafficking and proliferation, which are all inimical to national security. To mitigate the threat posed by drones, the NCAA, NAF and NAMA will continue to work in synergy with the Office of the National Security Adviser and other relevant agencies, to closely monitor, control and set safety and security standards to regulate Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) operations within the country's airspace and aviation industry.

The primary stakeholders principally concerned with safety and security in the aviation sector include the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA), the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) and the NAF. Others are the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Nigeria Meteorological (NIMET) Agency and the SSS.

The role of these agencies will be coordinated and enhanced in line with extant legislation and policy on Nigerian Aviation Security. They will also continue to comply with International Civil

Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards and recommended practices to guarantee the safety of our air space, its users and the security of airport facilities. To this end, government will ensure the continuous provision of modern and up-to-date equipment as well as the promotion of effective training and professionalism of various agencies handling different aspects of aviation security. Additionally, we will develop Standard Operation Procedures to streamline the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies in order to optimize their performance and enhance the cohesion of their personnel. Furthermore, we will ensure the development of common safety protocols and resilience to protect critical aviation information infrastructure against cyber-attacks to enhance aviation security.

### **3.5.12 Land Transportation Security**

Land transportation is a vital aspect of the socio-economic well-being of Nigeria. It is a major facilitator of growth and development and promotes manufacturing, food security, industrial development, tourism, education, health and socio-economic development. Based on this, the transportation sector is accorded high priority in Nigeria and its effective functioning is considered a major enabler of national security. The land transportation system covers about 204,000km of roads and accounts for over 80 per cent of the national transportation needs. On the other hand, rail transportation covers all rail lines, railway equipment and infrastructure constructed or operated by the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC) for the conveyance of passengers, animals, farm produce, freight and merchandise as well as for the rendering of services.

As road and rail transportation systems expand, there are concerns about the safety and security of commuters and merchandise. In recent times, the spate of armed robbery, kidnapping and other vices on Nigerian roads have informed the urgent need to implement measures to address

insecurity in this sector. Although rail transportation currently offers an alternative to the insecurity on the road, it is equally vulnerable to some extent. Therefore, the promotion of security measures for rail and land transportation becomes imperative. We will review and expand all extant legal and policy frameworks guiding both rail and land transportation to adequately capture safety and security of the transportation system. Government will ensure that all stakeholders involved in land and rail transportation are coordinated to enhance safety and security of the transportation systems.

### **3.5.13 Securing Ungoverned Spaces**

Ungoverned spaces especially around our international boundaries, forests and game reserves provide opportunities for criminal networks to fester and generally promote crime. They constitute a critical fragility in Nigeria's national security and are antithetical to the nation's security system. In order to dominate and protect these ungoverned spaces along our international boundaries, we will ensure effective presence of governance in such areas. In particular, we will ensure the state monopoly of force in border and frontier communities by establishing more military units to provide credible presence to support border security operations by other statutory agencies. The Nigeria Police Force will be enabled to strengthen their presence at border communities in conjunction with other statutory security agencies to consolidate law and order. We will ensure that forests and national game reserves are closely monitored by forest guards to prevent them from becoming safe havens for criminal gangs. In terms of development we will ensure and facilitate basic infrastructural penetration by both public institutions and corporate organisations. We will also influence the development of licit and viable local economies by facilitating Small and Medium-scale Enterprises (SME); and lastly, promote actions to influence favourable local demographics.

### **3.5.13 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive Security**

The proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) weapons and means of delivery, constitute threats to international peace and security. The potentials for non-state actors to carry out criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at CBRNE material or their associated facilities and activities is also an ongoing global concern. There are known incidents of the use of explosive precursors such as ammonium nitrate, by Boko Haram to make improvised explosives devices (IED) in Nigeria, as well as incidents of loss of radioactive materials by oil prospecting companies in the Niger Delta.

Accidental dispersal of materials with CBRNE components can compromise public safety and security. Large quantities of diverse CBRNE related material exist and are used in various sectors such as health, petroleum, industry, agriculture, security, energy, education and research as well as other emerging opportunities intended to improve lives and property. Ensuring the safe, secure and authorized usage, storage, transport, and other related activities involving CBRNE material is a matter of national security that require the building of strong institutions with capacity to regulate and implement best practices.

The overall objective of the strategy is to deter, detect, prevent and respond to CBRNE incidents. Mitigating the risks associated with CBRNE and related activities require a coordinated and integrated global approach.

To improve our internal resilience and preparedness for CBRNE threats and challenges, we will:

1. Build capacity for criminal-justice and law enforcement personnel to implement relevant legal frameworks.

2. Improve physical protection measures for facilities with CBRNE and related material.
3. Develop national policies and strategies on CBRNE detection and implementation.
4. Carry out national risk and threat assessment for CBRNE material and facilities.
5. Provide strong national coordination using inter-agency/inter-ministerial committees to ensure cooperation and collaboration.
6. Improve detection capacity and equipment distribution including provision of personal protection kits.
7. Ensure adequate implementation of strict measures on storage, transport, import and export of CBRNE material.
8. Improve response systems and measures for CBRNE emergencies including the establishment of early warning systems.

Nigeria is a signatory to a number of international instruments on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the peaceful uses of CBRNE material and related activities. We will pursue these obligations and commitments to ensure international peace and security. We will also cooperate and collaborate on capacity building for criminal-justice and law enforcement agencies.

#### **3.5.14 Strategic Communication**

We will integrate Strategic Communication in all priority areas in order to achieve our national security objectives. These include public relations, public diplomacy, information operations and psychological operations in advancing our national values, interests, and in dealing with social, political, economic and security threats. Therefore, we will ensure that an audit of all our communication assets is conducted and our strategic communication capabilities upgraded. Indeed, Strategic Communication as a cross-cutting function will be mainstreamed to implement

the NACTEST, Cyber security Policy and Strategy, National Defence Policy, Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, and other current or future government policies, programmes, strategies and economic plans.

Violent non-state armed groups have continued to rely on media and communication platforms to target our national values and people. We will therefore, seek to dismantle illegal communication platforms through appropriate laws and partnerships. In all our communications, we will emphasize our core national values and the promotion of the national interests in diverse ways.

In particular, the work of the Strategic Communication Inter-Agency Policy Committee (SCIPC) will be strengthened to meet our national security objectives. Furthermore, the SCIPC will continuously:

1. Identify, assess and strengthen government communication assets and ensure mobilisation of such assets in support of the national security interests.
2. Strengthen the capacity of government communication staff to effectively align their tasks to national strategic goals and objectives through training and capacity building.
3. Develop and share content across MDAs that amplify positive narrative while delegitimizing negative themes, messages and narratives.
4. Assist in utilizing the social media for positive ends while countering negative voices online.
5. Identify opportunities for government to partner with civil society, private sector, research and academic institutions, media, international entities and religious and cultural groups in the national security interest.
6. Promote security consciousness and education.

7. Promote the Annual Reporting on mainstreaming strategic communication capabilities in Ministries, Departments and Agencies

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **COUNTER TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION**

The political, economic and social systems of a country create the conditions for security and insecurity. Security remains a necessary pre-condition for the development of human beings and society. Therefore, security is the most basic need of human beings and societies (Abiodun, 2016). Recognizing the significance of security as the pre-condition for survival of the Nigerian people and nation, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provided in section 14 (1) (b) that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”. The duty conferred on the government by this provision has not been substantially and substantively discharged as the prevailing high level of human insecurity in the country demonstrates.

Security is, generally taken to mean the condition or situation of enjoying safety, protection and preservation of core values and absence of threats to such values (Pogson, 2013). It also means freedom from danger of from threats to nation’s ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interests (Imobighe, 1990). Security is very crucial to the survival of any nation-state and without adequate security of lives and property; our society will remain a Hobbesian state of nature manifesting chaos, lawlessness and total annihilation. This is the reason security is affirmed to be a changing or dynamic situation which involves the capability of a state to counter threats posed to its sustenance (Abiodun, 2016:45).

The increasing spate of insecurity in Nigeria is disheartening, with the growing rivalries and clumsy among the security agencies; hence the need for intelligence cooperation and coordinated efforts to contain terror. Cooperation among the Nigerian security operatives is a

vital means of ensuring stable national peace and security. This is due to the fact that each of the security agencies has a unique capability and operational skills that can complement the other (James, 2000). In his submission, Ahmed (2007) identified the military or armed forces, law enforcement agencies and secret intelligent agencies as the three major elements in maintain Nigeria's internal security. This focus of intelligence cooperation to solving internal security imbroglios was also envisaged by Oghi and Unumen (2014) as they argue that, Nigeria requires absolute commitment and dedication from security operatives and agencies. In the same vein, there is need for financial empowerment and mobilization as a means to strengthening all the security agencies (Ahmed, 2007). That is why Abolurin (2012) reports that; Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) must have clear objectives on how to keep the state safe. The objectives as envisaged by ONSA however, have to be strategically transmitted to the various existing agencies in the state: National Intelligence Agency (NIA), State Security Service (SSS), Nigeria Police Force (NPF), and Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and Ministry of Interior. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) should coordinate the efforts of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Directorate of Naval Intelligence Agency (DNIA), and the Directorate of Airforce Intelligence (DAI). Any and all intelligence gathered that may stand as threat to stability of the state, either from outside or within, must be shared with National Security Adviser (NSA) for passage to the proper agency authorized to expedite action on such (Ajayi, 2015)

From the above, it is quite sacrosanct that each of the component elements of security agencies in Nigeria have an array, but complementary roles to play. Ajayi (2015) explains that, the

statutory duties, functions and responsibilities of every agency has been spelt out in the act establishing it. The use of intelligence cooperation in executing strategic responsibilities by all the security agencies has not been effectively convincing and has fallen below international standards. And considering the roles of these security agencies, it would be right to state that, if these constitutional roles are well played especially in mutual cooperation with one another as expected by the society, violent conflict, terror and all forms of insecurity in the state will be minimal (Abiodun, 2017).

#### **4.1 Security Intelligence Cooperation**

Security Intelligence cooperation refers to the art and act of promoting active working relationship on intelligence gathering among multiple security agencies with a view to improving process outcomes at a reduced cost. Security intelligence, a relatively new discipline that focuses on the hidden side of government: those secret agencies that provide security-related information to policymakers and carry out other clandestine operations on their behalf. The main purpose of intelligence is to provide information to policymakers that may help illuminate their decision options in a state (Fingar, 2011). The assumption is that good that is, accurate, comprehensive, and timely information will lead to more effective choices made by government officials. Security intelligence can refer to more than an information product, though. It can mean a process as well. Although it is easy enough to state the core purpose of intelligence providing information to policymakers the challenge of actually gathering, assessing, and delivering useful insights to those who make decisions is an intricate matter (Murray and Gimsley 1994). Finally, intelligence refers to a cluster of people and organizations that carry out the missions of collection-and-analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action.

However, Frazier (2014) submits, diverging goals and operations can make policy implementation difficult and, therefore, a more formal cooperation process is required among the security agencies in a state. Intelligence cooperation becomes more inevitable when the statutory agencies such as armed forces, state security service, the police force, para-military operatives fail to unite in intelligence gathering to wage war against or containing insecurity in Nigeria (Abiodun, 2016). Therefore, agencies such as National Intelligence Agency (NIA), State Security Service (SSS), Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria Army (NA) as well National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) must endeavour to give room for intelligence cooperation in order to achieve strategic security policy implementation. This, therefore, requires a review of the existing national security policy and the very architecture of the Nigerian military-security establishment; a new security architecture that constructs all military and paramilitary agencies as equal partners in security (Nigerian Tribune, 2013). The feat of security intelligence cooperation was achieved when the personnel of Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) arrested the embattled and erstwhile Liberian President, Charles Taylor on exile in Nigeria in his bid to escape from the country, having committed all sorts of human rights abuses; he was thereafter, handed over to the Nigeria Immigrations Service (NIS) (Ngunan, 2013).

#### **4.2 Coordinated War on Terror**

The United States security agencies have been able to see to the end of Osama Bin Laden, a globally-acclaimed terrorist in Afghanistan years ago; also winning war against the ISIS activities in Syria recently as a result of coordinated war on terror embarked upon (US White House Report, 2018). War on terror is a military campaign that was launched by the United States government after the September 11 attacks against the United States to contain all

forms of terror in the global system. Coordinated war on terror has, to a great extent, suppressed terrorist tendencies and activities in some parts of the world (Trump, 2019). Coordinated war on terror is used to connote containment of conflict, terror, banditry and all forms of insecurity in a state. Coordinated efforts of all security agencies in Nigeria; National Intelligence Agency (NIA), State Security Service (SSS), Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria Army (NA) as well other para-military agencies would definitely go a long way in decimating and winning war on insecurity and terrorist activities in the state (Campbell, 2013). According to Ngunan (2013), this feat of coordinated war on terror was amply demonstrated amongst the security agencies on the arrest of Boko Haram kingpin, Yusuf Muhammed in year 2009, by the soldiers and other security agencies and was later handed over to the police in Borno State.

#### **4.4 Series of Security Challenges Currently Bedeviling Nigeria**

##### **4.4.1 Boko Haram Insurgency**

Nigeria is currently bedeviled with profound threat of terrorism, especially in the North-Eastern part of the country. In the last ten (10) years, the country has witnessed the vulnerability of terror, criminality and instability. The disheartening phenomena include, but not limited to devastation and annihilations of several towns, villages, churches, mosques, Police stations, schools and other public institutions with Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) bombs planted and small arms and light weapons (SALWs) by the Boko Haram insurgents in Niger, Bornu, Adamawa, Yobe, and Nassarawa states respectively (Abiodun, 2016:145).

##### **4.3.2 Arms Proliferation**

The proliferation of these small arms and light weapons and the new emergent trend in armed violence in Nigeria put to question the efficacy and total commitment of the Nigerian

government in combating the menace. The alarming rate of SALW spread poses a serious threat and challenge to Nigeria's internal security. However, the outbreak of Islamic extremism and domestic terrorism in the North-East, Nigeria, remains evident in the growing audacity of the Boko Haram sect, following the attacks in the Eagle Square, Abuja during the 50th Independence Day, 1 October, 2010 in which no fewer than 12 people were killed; the Nyanya Motor Park bombing on April 14, 2014 also claimed more than 75 lives and injured several dozen others, bombing of the UN Building in the FCT and abduction of about 216 girls of in Chibok, Borno State the next day leaving the country in a state of insecurity (Abiodun, 2016:146). Niger Delta Avengers and other militant groups proliferate all sorts of weapons freely and unchecked in the country. .

#### **4.3.4 Armed Robbery**

Another security threat that is plaguing the country is armed robbery using all sorts of arms and weapons. Only recently, a new trend of robbery which was quite different in outlook occurred at Ogolonto area of Ikorodu, Lagos State, when a lady reportedly led the gang to the banks and stayed outside while the two-hour operation lasted. The leader of the gang was said to have sat down in front of the bank bragging, and no police officer or any security agency was able to confront them. It was disclosed that the gang that carried out the robbery consisted about 15 youngsters, all in their early 20s. Incidences of armed robbery have become a daily routine in many parts of the country. Apart from public institutions such as banks that are their major targets, major highways across the country are not spared as commuters are routinely attacked and dispossessed of their valuables. (The Punch, 2016).

#### **4.3.4 Militancy in the Niger Delta**

Ethnic militia has been a recurring decimal in Nigeria and its fledgling democracy (Ekhomu, 2013). The restoration of democratic rule in Nigeria on May 29, 1999 signalled the emergence and continued proliferation of vigilante groups, ethnic and sectional militias as well as secessionist or separatist groups wielding all sorts of arms and weapons. Prominent among these are: the Bakassi Boys, a vigilante outfit set up by Abia and Anambra State governments to curb criminal activities in 1999; the Egbesu Boys (1998); the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) 2000; Ijaw Militia and Itsekiri Militias (1999), and the Militia arm of Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) 1992 (Analyst, 2010). A most recent development is the emergence of Niger Delta militants with the name Niger Delta Avengers'. The Niger Delta Avengers '(NDA) has continued to launch attacks on some major oil installations in the oil rich region, using the various arms, IEDs and ammunitions in their possession (The Vanguard, 2016).

#### **4.3.5 Cult Killings in Higher Institutions and the Society**

There is now proliferation of cult groups in over three hundred institutions of higher learning in Nigeria, brandishing various arms and weapons; whenever they strike on campuses. In recent times, Rivers and Akwa-Ibom States have appeared to be the epi-centre of cultist activities in the country, with no fewer than 19 people reportedly killed following cult clashes in some communities in the state. Also, the Badoo 'cult group claimed several lives in Ikorodu area of Lagos State. (Channels TV News, 2017).

#### **4.3.6 Herdsmen/Farmers' Clashes**

One of the security threats in the front burner today, remains the recurring crises between cattle herders and farmers. The most recent of such crises were those that occurred in Agatu community in Benue State and that of Nimbo community, Uzo-Uwani Local Government area of

Enugu State. In both attacks, several lives were lost while properties worth millions of Naira were also destroyed. Many proposals have been advanced to proffer solution to the recurring problem. While some have proposed grazing reserves, others insist that ranches would be the best solution out of the conundrum (Channels TV News, 2017).

#### **4.3.7 Piracy**

Almost half of the 30 deaths recorded in pirate attacks around the world between 1st January and 30th June of that year occurred in Nigerian territorial waters. In terms of the number of attacks, Nigeria was ranked third with 13 attacks, behind Indonesia (50) and the Malacca Straits (20) (Mukundan, 2004). Nigeria's growing piracy problem can be traced back to oil, the country's economic lifeblood and its large-scale theft and sale to vessels offshore. Gangs, armed with automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, cruise along in speedboats and barges, finding cover in the creeks and rivers intertwined with mangrove swamps that make up the delta where the River Niger empties into the Atlantic Ocean (Ibid).

#### **4.3.8 Kidnappings**

Another security concern spreading across Nigeria like wildfire is kidnapping. When it began in the creeks of the Niger Delta region some years ago, nobody thought it would become a nightmare (Ekhomu, 2013). Gradually, it has even become a 'lucrative business' for many of Nigeria's jobless youths in the South East, South West and other parts of the country. Initially, it was the kidnapping of expatriates that was predominant in the South but today, the situation has gotten so bad that nobody is safe. Serving government officials are not spared in the kidnapping menace, as their family members, relatives and friends have become worthy targets'. Interestingly, armed robbers and other sorts of criminals are fast abandoning their trades for the more lucrative business of kidnapping (Ojeme, 2015:15).

#### **4.3.9 Cattle Rustling and armed banditry**

Jan Birni, a community in BirninGwari Local Government area of Kaduna State, which lies on the border between Kaduna, Katsina and Zamfara States, is one of the areas that have been in the grip of cattle rustlers and armed bandits.

Little wonder the traditional ruler of the area and Emir of BirninGwari, Alhaji Zubair Maigwari, was reported to have lamented that his community had completely been taken over by rustlers and bandits who kill, maim, rape and kidnap their victims before dispossessing them of their hard-earned investments (The Punch, 2019). These rustlers also carry all sorts of small arms and light weapons in executing their evil machinations. The threats posed by the existence of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) to Nigeria's internal security are fast becoming uncontrollable

#### **4.4 Efforts Geared Towards Promoting Security Intelligence Cooperation and Coordinated War on Terror among the Security Agencies in Nigeria**

On the issue of incessant kidnappings, pipeline vandalism and illegal refining, the six states in the South-South region of Nigeria, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Edo and Delta states have set up a Joint Anti-Kidnapping Force to tackle the upsurge of kidnappings in the region. The proposed new security outfit when jointly put together by the security advisers in the region, will function well in strengthening intelligence cooperation among all the security agencies in the region (Chiluwa, 2011). In terms of weapons, the new security outfit will also be backed up by a huge budget for the procurement of helicopters, gunboats, patrol vans and coordinating digital coverage of the entire region. Also in a bid to curtail pipeline vandalism arising from the oil thieves operating in the creeks of the Niger Delta, the Federal Government

has put in place a new operational strategy in the region, code-named JTF Operation Pulo Shield. The synergy is expended expanded to include: National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Nigeria Army, Nigeria Police Force, the Nigeria Prisons Service, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, and others (The Vanguard, 2012).

Concerning the menace of transnational crimes such as terrorism, illicit drug and human trafficking, proliferation of arms, kidnapping, assassination, human trafficking, and the effects of globalization, the role of national security transcends individual agency to include the collaboration and cooperation of all other agencies. The Nigerian government also entered into synergy or cooperation with other neighbouring states of Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic, forming a Multinational Military Joint Taskforce (The Sun, 2017). Concerning the menace of herdsmen/farmers' clashes, some state governments have enacted Anti-Grazing Laws in their respective states; starting with the Ekiti State Government, during the tenure of Governor Peter Ayodele Fayose in 2016; followed by Benue State Government under the administration of Governor Samuel Ortom. Having enacted the Anti-Grazing Laws, a Joint Taskforce on Anti-Grazing was put in place to checkmate the menace, with contributions from the various security agencies in the states (Africa Independent Television News, 2018).

However, there has been viable synergy among the security agencies and other stakeholders anti-human trafficking matter has been a bit impressive. It is observed that there is close cooperation and collaboration amongst the Police, Nigeria Army, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP), which is the national focal point agency on all issues of human trafficking.

The national borders are being closely monitored and patrolled to arrest the perpetrators and thereby save the victims (Dambazau, 2014). In the area of combating terrorism in the North East, Nigeria, intelligence cooperation and coordinated war on terror efforts of the Nigeria Army, Nigeria Air Force, the State Security Service (SSS), and National Intelligence Agency (NIA) has been encouraging. The Nigerian government through Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) has stepped up intelligence cooperation amongst the security agencies; which is very strategic in combating terrorism and other criminal tendencies in the North East region of Nigeria (Dambazau, 2014).

But to summarize it all, the extent of success achieved by the security agencies on their statutory roles in fortifying the nation would have been highly meritorious but has, however, been usually hindered with unhealthy rivalries and lack of intelligence cooperation with a disconnect as regards war on terror (Abolurin, 2010).

#### **4.5 Factors Militating against Security Intelligence Cooperation and Coordinated War on Terror in Nigeria**

Despite the call for push towards security intelligence cooperation and synergy in Nigeria, there has been persistent rivalry among the security agencies. For instance, the Nigeria Police has severally clashed with the NSCDC, Department of State Security Service (DSS) and the Nigeria Army. The operations of some of these security agencies seem to veer into the activities of the other without formal agreement. Ahmed (2007) has submitted that inter-agency rivalries or clashes occur because of the following:

- i. The feeling of superiority by a security agency over and above the other usually creates a sense of envy and jealousy which explodes into violent rage at any time;
- ii. Acts of indiscipline, arising from a false sense of superiority, ignorance, poor education and training, undermines ‘\_esprit de corps’ among the security agencies;
- iii. Pecuniary interest arising from poor remuneration; when security operatives are not well paid, any opportunity to make extra income may pitch one group against the other;
- iv. Unhealthy rank comparisons amongst security agencies often result in commotion, quarrels and fights;
- v. Poor or lack of inter-service communication, which is required to ensure prompt command, control and retreat hampers the quick relay of information among the services, leading to clashes;
- vi. Ineffective command and control borne out of weak leadership which engenders indiscipline at all levels. Thus, the personnel do as they please, unchecked, because of the luxury of unbridled freedom;
- vii. Usurpation, undue interference and duplicating of functions without clear delimitation of statutory roles or operational areas of competency of other agencies result to clashes,
- viii. Uncontrolled and inordinate use of force by security operatives at the slightest provocation, is another potent cause of inter-agency rivalry and clashes;
- ix. Inability of the system to create appropriate sanctions for erring personnel after the clashes; instead prepares the grounds for further rivalry and clashes;
- x. There is problem of inadequate barracks accommodation which compels military and other security personnel to live among the civilian populace and commute in public transportation means

#### **4.6 Rivalry (A Case Study of Boko Haram)**

The fight against Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria recorded a major feat in 2014 when the Federal Government formally established a multi-layer communication structure for implementing National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). The policy was reviewed in 2016. NACTEST is a service-wide collection of counter-terrorism efforts bordering on the deployment of carrot-and-stick approach in fighting terrorism. While the strategy is coordinated by Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA), several ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) now have clear-cut roles to play in its implementation.

According to the policy, each of the MDAs would now have a NACTEST desk, based on their core mandates to forestall threats, secure territories, identify, prepare and implement policy-directives. The first edition of the counter-terrorism strategy was developed and launched in 2014, with awareness being created. ONSA is, therefore, now in full swing to implement the strategy with the participation and buy-in of the relevant stakeholders represented here by MDAs.

Irrespective of this mandate, the security agencies in the polity appear to be unperturbed as they are engrossed in supremacy rivalry between and among themselves. They include the Department of State Service (DSS), the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Vehicle Inspection Office (VIO), Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission (ICPC), Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corp (NSCDC) among others.

It is therefore disturbing to observe the prevalence of insecurity and threat to peace in the full glare of the plethora of these security agencies. Assuming that they had collaborated and pooled manpower and logistics together, insecurity and other threats to life and property would have been drastically mitigated, if not effectively eradicated. Although, the Nigeria Police are the lead agency saddled with the statutory task of maintenance of internal law and order for the protection of life and property of the citizenry, other security agencies have been established to complement this daunting task.

However, it does appear that rather than being an asset, the security agencies in Nigeria have become liabilities. This stems from the fact that the assigned overlapping roles and duplicated duties invariably eventuate into pervasive acrimonious rivalries. More so, the citizenry are often massively confused over which among the array of security agencies to look up to in times of security exigency. As a result, it seems as little or nothing has been, or is being done to combat crime and tackle insurgency in the country. Eventually, the proliferated security agencies appears to have been exacerbating crime rate and insecurity in Nigeria as they dissipate both human and material resources in supremacy rivalry occasioned by jurisdictional conflicts, personality clashes and struggles for operational funding at the expense of other agencies.

In Nigeria, opinions are divided amongst analysts over the motivating force behind this disconcerting trend. As a result, there is no consensus about the factors that provide the fertile ground for inter-security agencies' scuffle in Nigeria. The prevalent view, however, is that it stems from a multiplicity of sources which aggregate to a complex dimension of no love lost amongst the security agencies.

The forum for the Military, Police and Paramilitary Public Relations Officers Forum (MILPOPPROF, 2007) narrowed the incessant conflicts between and among security agencies in

Nigeria to communication gap. This, according to them, is prevalent among the junior officers who, out of ignorance about the complementary roles of other sister agencies, always plunge into unnecessary and avoidable violent clashes. Marizu (2007) attributes the phenomenon to the defense of regime survival. In other words, the conflict is a product of each agency's perception of the other as a threat to its relevance and survival. Thus, in a bid to uphold its ego and assert its relevance, the older security agency would unleash attacks on the personnel of the newer sister agency to crush it out of existence or at least, bully it into subservience.

A few studies have focused on the debilitating inter-agency rivalries. This perhaps explains why Alemika (2003), Omoigui (2006), and Odoma (2014), in their separate studies, lamented that the inter-agency feuds in Nigeria had exposed the country and her citizenry to perpetual threats, nightmares, and insecurity. More so, the ugly trend has dwarfed the giant status of Nigeria as an insecure and unsafe haven for foreign investments. Unfortunately, no one interrogates the security policy implications of this trend and its links with the aggravation of insecurity and how they undermine the war against insurgency in Nigeria. This paper, therefore, attempts to ascertain how the NACTEST policy document promotes inter-agency rivalry with a view to exploring avenues to stemming the tide for effective collaboration and efficient operational agility.

#### **4.7 Dynamics of Boko Haram Strategies, Tactics and Nigeria's Pre-NACTEST Responses**

It is worthy to note that Boko Haram had adopted different strategic approaches that reflected the particular demands and requirements of the conditions in which the insurgents found themselves. According to Eme (2015), between 2003 and 2004, Boko Haram fought security forces on three occasions. On 31st December 2003, roughly 200 of her members clashed with police in Geidam and Kanamma, Yobe State. Some accounts posit that the police provoked them while others

maintain that the group's sophisticated organization implied plans for violence. Whichever was the case the group raided two police stations, killed a policeman and seized some AK-47 rifles. They subsequently attacked other three police stations in the state capital, Damaturu, and confronted other police units near the Borno State capital, Maiduguri. After four days of fighting in January 2004, security forces routed them, killing at least eighteen and arresting dozens (International Crisis Group interview, prominent Islamic preacher in Kaduna and former director of an international Islamic organization, June 2009). The group known now as Boko Haram before 2009 was known as the Taliban and operated primarily in Borno State.

As with the Taliban, the Boko Haram never identified itself as such. It earned that label due to its vocal rejection of "Western education". It was also commonly known as Yusufiyah. It used various names, indicating its members were strict followers of Islamic texts (broadly equivalent to "Salafist"). Tracts found in Bauchi in 2010, and seen by International Crisis Group use the name Ahlissunnah Wallidda'awati Jihad (Salafist group for propagation and jihad). Its leadership, particularly Mohammed Yusuf, showed it was a direct continuation of the Taliban (International Crisis Group, 2010).

Boko Haram did not begin its campaign by indiscriminately attacking civilians. Between 2010 and 2013, most of the group's targets were state security forces or those cooperating officials and individuals. Yet, the group became steadily more brutal over time. As Eme and Ugwu (2016) observe, over three quarters of the incidents involving Boko Haram between 2014 and 2015 are aimed at civilians. Though the group's massacres, suicide bombings, kidnappings, and executions may have succeeded in making international headlines, they also helped to turn the local population against it, enhancing their eagerness of the latter to cooperate with state security forces. For instance, in 2012, as attacks by Boko Haram intensified, former President Goodluck

Jonathan declared a state of emergency, which was subsequently extended repeatedly, in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. The state of emergency gave overly broad emergency powers to the security forces. Former President Goodluck Jonathan set up a Joint Task Force which included personnel from the Nigerian Army, Police Force and other security forces to lead the operations against Boko Haram.

De Montclos (2014) sums up the situation by positing that this action of the Nigerian security forces was a significant determinant in the trajectory of the Boko Haram crisis. He observes that the repression of the sect in July 2009 was followed by repeated massacres, extra-judicial killings, and arrests without trial, actions that widened the gap between communities and the security forces.

The death of Mohammed Yusuf was only a temporary setback for the sect as it became more devastating under a new leader, Abubakar Shekau. The sect conducted a series of attacks across northern Nigeria, particularly in the North East Zone. This is because Boko Haram which initially took the form of sectarian religious violence has metamorphosed into terrorist activities with international linkages making it difficult for the Nigerian government to annihilate (Gilbert, 2014).

The sect under Shekau graduated from armed assault and the use of roadside improvised explosive devices to vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings. The exponential increases in the conflict's overall levels of violence can also be traced to 2013, when a government offensive pushed the group out of its main base of operations in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State and spiritual home of the insurgency. Boko Haram fighters moved to remote communities and camps, such as their headquarters in Sambisa forest, Borno State. From these bases, Boko Haram launched almost daily attacks against civilian targets. In July 2014,

Boko Haram's strategy changed as it retained control over captured towns and villages, collecting "taxes" from residents, and limiting their movements. At its greatest extent, territory under Boko Haram control extended across most parts of Borno, northern Adamawa and into eastern Yobe States. The army took full control of operations against Boko Haram in August 2013.

Inspired by the Islamic State's dramatic seizures of territory in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram began its own campaign of territorial conquest. The sect managed to seize about eighteen of the local government areas in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, as well as bordering territories in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. As a result of this, the territorial integrity of Nigeria was under siege. The size of the area held by the terrorists as at January 2015 equalled the size of Belgium (Comolli, 2015). Though the group's massacres, suicide bombings, kidnappings, and executions may have succeeded in making international headlines, they also helped turn the local population against the group, enhancing their eagerness to cooperate with state forces.

Fed up with Boko Haram's brutality, civilians began to involve themselves in local policing. They came together to form local militias known collectively as the Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) in mid-2013. These armed civilian vigilante groups are playing a significant role in the evolving strategic balance in the northeast. The civilian JTF has, in the past, been active in the fight against Boko Haram's militancy in the area; yet, its operations subsided as the military intensified its counter-insurgency campaign. However, as it became increasingly apparent that the military efforts are oftentimes ineffective in containing insurgency, the civilian JTF revamped its operations.

The Civilian JTF's successful operations confirm local perceptions that such a non-official force is necessary to counteract the deficiencies of the military. While it has proven effective in

combating the militants, growing vigilante operations as some analysts posit may challenge the official state security apparatus running the counter-insurgency operations in the region, undermining the military's operational hierarchy and thus potentially further destabilizing the region.

Similarly, the sect's use of the media (particularly the Internet) for propaganda purposes became more pronounced. It equally graduated from attacks on relatively low profile to high profile targets such as the Nigeria Police headquarters and the United Nations building in Abuja. The complexity and level of sophistication which the sect attained challenged the capacity of security agencies and other institutions involved in the Nigerian government's counter-terrorism effort, particularly as coordination and the needed synergy among them proved inadequate.

Ambushes, improvised explosive devices, kidnappings, apparently random bombings, and selective shootings, for example, prove extremely difficult to combat and can be morally and physically debilitating to the victims. When directed at military or security forces, such tactics incite security forces to overreact, wear away morale, provide weapons and equipment that may be left behind or captured, and keep the counter-insurgency effort off-balance. This was what happened in 2015 when Amnesty International reported thus: In the course of security operations against Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria, Nigerian military forces have extra judicially executed more than 1,200 people; they have arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people, mostly young men and boys; and have committed countless acts of torture. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians have become victims of enforced disappearance; and at least 7,000 people have died in military detention as a result of starvation, extreme overcrowding and denial of medical assistance. (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 6)

Furthermore, Boko Haram's activities have now transcended Nigeria's borders, particularly in terms of training, financing, recruitment, kidnapping, and arms acquisition, thereby raising concerns over border management and Nigeria's relations with her immediate neighbours. Equally significant is the sect's links with international terrorist organizations like the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Shabaab, and lately its pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to the extent of renaming itself as the Islamic State' West African Province (ISWAP). The situation was made worse with the sect's embrace of the ISIS tactics of beheadings of victims. It abducted women and schoolgirls and engaged females (including girls as young as 10 years) for suicide terrorism (Akbar, 2015).

Boko Haram's massive expansion between 2014 and 2015 prompted a re-invigorated state effort to contain the insurgency in line with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which calls for a holistic inclusive approach to counter terrorism. With their own countries threatened, the armies of Chad, Cameroon, and Niger began cooperating with the Nigerian government to prevent it from so easily fleeing across porous borders. The result is the decision to deploy the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), headquarters in N'Djamena, Chad, on July 30th, 2015 to pep up the fight against Boko Haram. This is the same force that Jonathan's administration could not get off the ground in six years. With increased professionalism and better supplied, better armed, and equipped with better intelligence, the counter-insurgency campaign is conducting more targeted operations against insurgent strongholds, which have led to fewer civilian casualties and if government reports are to be believed, the deaths of almost five thousand militants in the past year and a half alone. The total is more than the government managed to kill in the previous four years of counter-insurgency operations (Fund for Peace,

2016). The table below captures the number of deaths occasioned by Boko Haram insurgency in 2015 alone.

President Buhari equally made moves to seek help from outside, such as visiting West African neighbours, the Group 07 in Germany, the African Union during the summit in South Africa and he also visited the United States on invitation of former President Barack Obama. All were aimed at restoring confidence in the country's leadership with allies which had frayed under his predecessor. The government had partnered with foreign forces to "Bring Back our Girls" (Eme, 2015).

Nigeria might have "technically won the war" against Islamist Boko Haram militants as posited by President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015. He told the BBC that the militant group could no longer mount "conventional attacks" against security forces or population centers. It had been reduced to fighting with improvised explosives devices (IED) and remained a force only in its heartland of Borno State. President Buhari had given the army until the end of 2015 to defeat the group. For instance, according to Global Peace Index (2017) report, for the second consecutive year deaths from terrorism declined. Over the two years there was a decrease of 22% compared to the peak of terror activity in 2014. Terrorism deaths have fallen significantly in Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria. In the latter, deaths attributed to Boko Haram in Nigeria fell by 80% as the group faced military pressure.

Nonetheless, critics of the government argue that the presidency has exaggerated the scale of its success against the militants, and that each time the army claims to have wiped out Boko Haram, the militants have quietly rebuilt.

#### **4.7.1 The Threat**

The complex set of actors, relationships, and local and power dynamics which characterizes northeastern Nigeria has created fertile ground for religious struggle. Boko Haram – originally named Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awatiwal-Jihad or ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad’ has emerged as a product of this complex environment. Since appearing as a religious movement in the 1990s, the group has primarily been active in Nigeria’s northern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. It has also had negative influences on other countries, primarily those in the Lake Chad region – Chad, Niger and Cameroon.

Boko Haram claims to adhere to the Salafist school of Sunni Islam. Its main goals are to reject any western influence and to establish an Islamic state in the northeast of the country based on sharia law (Blanchard and Husted, 2016; Smith, 2016; Jane’s, 2018). Since its establishment, the group has seen internal fragmentation which culminated in March 2015 with a pledge of allegiance to the self-styled Islamic State (IS) and a new name – Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyya – or ‘Islamic State’s West Africa Province’. This decision elevated Boko Haram’s stature as a global militant Islamist group.

In August 2016, internal power dynamics resulted in the group splitting into two main factions: one led by Abu Musab Al-Barnawi – officially supported by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the leader of IS in Nigeria – and the other by Abubakar Shekau – the successor of the group founder and spiritual leader Mohammed Yusuf, who was killed by the Nigerian security forces in 2009 in the city of Maiduguri.

In addition to these two main factions, the group’s umbrella includes the Yusufiya Islamic Movement (YIM), Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru), and minor splinter

groups which have emerged following ideological, strategic and ethnic divergences. The group is known to have developed operational links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), offshoots of the Islamic State in Libya, and Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Somalia, though the extent of these relations remains largely unknown (Jane's, 2018a).

In terms of targeting patterns, the group has indiscriminately attacked both conflict and non-conflict actors mainly through hit-and-run assaults, ambushes, assassinations and kidnappings of Western expats and local civilians. Perhaps the most publicized kidnapping took place in April 2014, when 276 girls were abducted from their dormitory in the north-eastern town of Chibok by Boko Haram, sparking global outrage and calls for their safe return. A similar episode occurred this past February, when Boko Haram abducted 110 students following an attack at a girl's school in Dapchi, Yobe State. According to the government, the victims were released unharmed on 21 March (Onuah, 2018).

Despite repeated claims of success by the current political establishment, in 2017 the group was responsible for the death of at least 1,618 people in Borno state alone – the epicenter of the conflict (EASO, 2018, p.9). While the security measures taken under the Buhari administration have to some extent managed to contain the threat in the northeast, the operational environment continues to challenge the security forces, with a total of 145 attacks recorded in Borno and neighboring states since the beginning of 2018 (Jane's, 2018). Overall, the security context in the northeast of the country remains extremely fluid and volatile and the group still has the capability to conduct operations in the broader region of the Lake Chad Basin. According to the International NGO Safety Organization (INSO), 'the spiral of violence between the AOG and local security forces has triggered massive population displacements (more than one million

IDPs), while an estimated 20,000 people have been killed by Boko Haram directly, or collaterally as a result of operations conducted against them' (INSO, 2018).

Presently, according to the UNHCR (2018a), there are 2,244,678 Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the region, including 211,516 Nigerian refugees in Cameroon, Chad and Niger as of the end of April 2018. In January 2018 alone, over 5,000 individuals were forcibly displaced due to ongoing military operations aimed at dismantling Boko Haram in Borno State (UNHCR, 2018b, p.1)

#### **4.7.2 Interagency Cooperation**

Interagency Cooperation: Although, the literature on interagency cooperation is sparse, there is no deficiency of related terms and definitions, which include: inter-organizational relations, intergovernmental cooperation, intra-governmental cooperation, inter-sectoral cooperation, and inter-organizational coordination (Marcella, 2008).

According to Weiss (1987) interagency cooperation exists when two or more organizations that share a problem area agree to deal with the issue by establishing a link via a formal contract that provides for resources and for the adjusting of internal and/or external procedures to adequately support the new arrangements.

The vast area known as the interagency cooperation is the process that makes the development and implementation of policy and strategy possible in a pluralistic decision making system. Nigeria has a plural decision making system and multilayer level of security agencies for both internal and external purposes. Cooperative efforts can foster integration of multiagency capabilities, but making this happen often becomes problematic.

Multiple organizational goals and operational routines can make policy implementation difficult and, therefore, a more formal cooperation process is required. Interagency cooperation becomes

necessary when a single agency cannot adequately address a policy objective, such as the fighting of crimes and maintenance of law and order (Innocent, 2018).

In the discussion of the practical workings of interagency cooperation processes, the terms cooperation, collaboration, and coordination appear interchangeable. It is important to note, however, that policy implementation measures result in the identification of agencies that will collaborate that is to be willing to discuss issues and collectively to find a solution. In every agency there is character, size and complexity which determine the workability of interagency cooperation.

#### **4.7.3 Joint Operation**

Joint means shared by or belonging to two or more people. An operation is a highly organized activity that involves many people doing different things (Collins Dictionary Online, 2019). According to the United States Department of Defense (2009), Joint Operation is a general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by service forces in relationships (E.g. support, coordinating authority) which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces. The Joint Operations looks into 3 main areas of work which are; strategy, preparedness and engagement. The purpose of joint operations is to defend national interests, not only in conflict but through preventative measures to deter potential adversaries who could threaten the vital interests of Nigeria or its neighbors or allies. The principles of joint operations are formed around the traditional principles of war.

The types of joint operation in the Nigeria context may involve; intra, inter, non-conventional and international joint operations. Instances of interagency cooperation in Nigeria were during the civil war 1967-70, the Maitatsine uprisings 1980s, the offensive against Niger delta militants, Boko Haram insurgency since 2009, the Joint Operations against bandits and cattle rustlers in

2019 among others (Mohammed, 2019). Hence, joint operation in Nigeria is the combination of the military and other paramilitary agencies and the police in the containment of various security challenges and threats both internally and externally.

#### **3.7.4 The Janet Weiss (1987)**

“Process Model of Cooperation” determine what factors promote enhanced interagency cooperation. That is to say, the four parts of Weiss (1987) model (external forces, shared problems, resources, and capacity) as a guide to highlight and identify the relevant situation with variables presumed to be essential to encourage interagency cooperation. The model fundamentally explains that local agencies must undergo a three-step process driven by external influences, systematic or random, to be encouraged to engage in the level of cooperation necessary to achieve the maximum implementation of an initiative. The steps in the process include (Weiss, 1987):

Step 1: Perceived problem must be shared across agencies

Step 2: Resources must be available to handle problem cooperatively Step 3: Institutional capacity has to be established to mount cooperation

#### **External Influences**

Weiss (1987) argues that interagency cooperation is most likely to occur when external influences are present to compel agencies to collaborate, coordinate, and ultimately cooperate.

Weiss explains that these external influences may be random or systematic. Random Influences

Weiss (1987) states that random forces include the unexpected intensification of a problem, the unpredictable availability of staff energy or personal ties across boundaries, the sudden flow of external funding for particular projects, the fortuitous fit between existing procedures and new demands for coordination. Some of the assumptions are;

### **i. Shared Problems/Goal Congruence**

Step one in Weiss's "Process Model of Cooperation" is contingent upon external random and systematic factors influencing its initiation. The model suggests or indicates that once external pressures arise, often derived from complex social or economic problems, agencies are faced with a decision about engaging in cooperative arrangements (Weiss, 1987). This notion implies that agencies are not readily willing to engage in a cooperative mode of service delivery if it is not absolutely warranted. Weiss (1987) explains that:

new problems or intensification of old ones trigger a search for solutions. Cooperation may produce relief for many problems through reduced costs, improved service, or broader perspective...Framing problems in ways that made cooperation seem fruitful was a sticking point. Unless cooperation is considered a solution to the problem, cooperation goes no further. If some group within the agency framed the problem to admit the possibility of a cooperative solution, the process moves to the next step (1987, p.111).

According to Weiss (1987), agencies will not cooperate solely to address shared problems, but mostly to comply with complex community and legal demands that merit cooperation, as organizations seek to maintain their functional autonomy. Research is in agreement with Weiss's assessment of agencies' desire to maintain their autonomy (Meyer, Finn & Reed, 2001; Sarkar, Lau, & Sahay, 2001; Serrano, 2003; Das, 2005; Lundin, 2007). Given an agency's reluctance to concede goals, shared problems alone are not enough to influence motivation toward the first step in Weiss's model (Matland, 1995). Weiss explains that a pre-requisite condition for an agency to cooperate is the existence of goals shared between agencies in a particular sector aimed at addressing a perceived shared problem. Hence, an essential preliminary focus encouraging the first step in Weiss's model is the level of goal congruence between agencies. It

seems practical to assume that the extent to which these agency goals are in agreement will be the degree to which a cooperative delivery structure can be made operational.

## **ii. Resources to Institute Cooperation**

Moving to the second step of Weiss's "Process Model of Cooperation" involves agencies identifying resources to support the cooperative process. According to Weiss (1987), if no initiative, energy, money, or adequate staff became available explicitly for cooperative activities, the process grinds to a halt. There are a myriad of resources that could be examined as operational mechanisms for cooperation; however, I only examine the following: agency initiative/energy, monetary resources and adequate staff.

## **iii. Capacity to Mount the Cooperation Effort**

It is the shared problems and resources within Weiss's model that are required to proceed to the third and final step, the capacity to mount the cooperation process. Chaskin (2001) provides an appropriate operational definition of capacity for this paper:

Community capacity is the interaction of human capital, organizational resources, and social capital existing within a given community that can be leveraged to solve collective problems and improve or maintain the wellbeing of a given community. It may operate through informal social processes and or/organized efforts. Institutional capacity is fundamentally dependent upon the influence of external influences driving it (e.g., legal mandates, unexpected societal demands and monetary resources) and the degree/amount of diversity in delivery mechanisms (e.g., technology communication information systems, clear procedures, operational terminology, and professionalism) existing between possible partners (Carmeli & Tishler, 2004). As Weiss (1987) describes it:

Depending on the nature of the activity, this could range from a trivial matter of reliance on existing mechanisms to a major undertaking of building new infrastructure. Unless a legal, workable way could be found not only to begin, but to sustain the cooperative program, the effort to cooperate went no further (p.115).

#### **4.8 Security Agencies in Nigeria: The Nexus**

The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ICPR) describes the security agencies simply as “law enforcement officers and officers of the state” (ICPR, 2008 p. 12). This implies that they are delegated by the state to enforce the law. In line with this description, Reid (1997, p. 24) sees the security agencies as “indispensable formal agency of social control” (Cited in Innocent, 2018).

In his own contribution, Albert (nd) identified three types of security agencies in Nigeria as “armed forces, paramilitary organizations and private security organizations”. Based on this description, the security agencies are not restricted to the officers of the state, or to Reid’s “formal agency of control”. According to him, security agencies are broader both in existence and in performance. Thus, even the private security organizations such as the vigilante services in most states of Nigeria as well as the private security guards fall into the categorization of security agencies. Hence, it can be inferred that there are two types of security agencies in Nigeria; the formal (military, para-military and the police) which are recognize by the constitution and the informal (private securities, vigilante and the community cadets) that are not recognize by the constitution.

Since security is ubiquitous, and its maintenance a herculean task it becomes expedient for the relevant security agencies to cooperate and collaborate to achieve the desired goals. Any wonder that relevant statutes of Federal Republic of Nigeria, such as the Police Act (2007), provides for

synergy amongst the security agencies, and particularly between the Nigeria Police and the military. For instance, section 4 of the Police Act assigns the police with enormous responsibilities which include, but not limited to the performance of “such military duties within and outside the country, as may be required of them by, or under the authority of this or any other act (Asemota, 1993; Oditia, 1993).

Similarly, the military is saddled with the additional responsibility of assistance to civil authority to restore order and maintain internal security as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. Even the United Nations provides this role under Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA).

From the Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA), which monitors issues of national security from outside the shores of Nigeria; the State Security Service (SSS) which is saddled with gathering intelligence internally; the military which is tasked with protecting the territorial integrity of our nation and assisting in maintaining internal peace when needed; the police tasked with the responsibility of detection and prevention of crime; the Customs charged with preventing the flow of contraband, illegal arms and ammunition across our border posts; the immigration whose responsibility it is to ensure that suspected terrorists do not cross into our territory; the prisons mandated to ensure that detained suspects do not escape and convicted terrorists serve their terms; the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) that quickly identify unmarked vehicles which may have been rigged with explosives; to the civil defense corps whose operatives quickly pass information to the appropriate agencies when unusual things are noticed around the country, the importance of enhancing interagency cooperation cannot be overemphasized (Adeniyi, 2012). Security agency cooperation is primarily in the context of low-range military operations, which focus on military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence. The importance of the inter-

agency process, including the priorities, capabilities, and resources of other non-uniformed agencies like paramilitary agencies are indispensable to peace, order and stability in Nigeria.

#### **4.8 The Imperatives of Effective Joint Operation**

The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government, (Section 14 (2b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). A fundamental issue in conducting coordination among security agencies is that each agency must first understand its own roles, objectives, concepts for operating, ethos and the resources it has available. Yet the challenge of strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into calculated effectiveness remains. The complex challenges to national security in the 21st century will require intelligent integration of resources and unity of effort within the government security agencies. At the doorstep of the 21st century, there is a widely held consensus that our institutions of government need to be updated, reformed, and restructured (Marcella, 2008).

Nye (2004) are of the view that it is essential to combine the hard power of coercion or payment with soft power of attraction into a successful strategy. Similarly, civil military relations is very important as the support of the citizenry in the war against insurgents, criminals and the enemies of the state must be organized systematically (Huntington, 1957). How the nation and the government learn from experience and adapt their institutions for the future are keys to understanding the interagency process and cooperation. The large and complex interagency system is a recent innovation, with war being the most important stimulant to its growth.

Imperial found that collaboration as a governance strategy led to “enhanced service delivery, improved a network’s capacity to solve shared problems, supported performance management, promoted information sharing, and encouraged the development of performance measures to enhance accountability (Imperial, 2005, p.4). Based on Weiss’s (1987) results, and given

Imperials (2005) findings, it is easy to hypothesize that it is likely that organizations will engage in cooperative practices when they lack the capability to reposition their processes to respond to random demands. However, if the random demands are too intractable for a cooperative relationship to assist in efficient service delivery, the cooperative relationship most likely will not occur. As a result, the implementation process will suffer and agencies will not meet their goals and objectives (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Barrett, 2004).

Weiss categorized systematic influences that pressure agencies to cooperate as legislative mandates, internal organizational issues, and societal demands. Ansell and Gash's (2007) research corroborates Weiss's findings, but Ansell and Gash (2007), characterize these external influences as critical starting conditions, which is consistent with research presented by Futrell (2003) and Imperial (2005). The studies undertaken by these researchers have produced results that show agencies will be encouraged to engage in cooperation when critical starting conditions are present. Critical starting conditions include but are not limited to the following: (Ansell & Gash, 2007):

- 1) Equal shares of power, resources, and knowledge with other stakeholders.
- 2) Incentives, legislative mandates, and heavy interdependence to meet client demand.
- 3) History of cooperation or conflict. Conflict may reduce resources available to individual agencies, therefore prompting agencies to cooperate in order to utilize shared resources to deliver services efficiently.

What is unique about the current environment is the availability of a communications infrastructure to electronically transfer information, with minimal effort and time lag, resulting in easy availability of information...organizations seeks to reduce the uncertainty in their operations by improving the availability of appropriate information for decision making. Information

asymmetry among the participating units leads to uncertainty, which in turn leads to inefficiency (Weiss, 1987).

#### **4.9 Counter Terrorism Inter-Agency Relations,**

Information Sharing and Privacy the overwhelming domain within the intelligence community remains its emphasis on tight security and security for information being exchanged (Deeks, 2016). The community thrives on a common culture; secrecy. As such, intelligence communities the world over are inherently secretive and are driven by their own desire to provide their country with accurate and timely information that allows their policymakers to make timely and best decisions for their country. Intra-intelligence community and inter-agency agency intelligence and information sharing may jeopardize the confidentiality of the shared intelligence and/or expose their sources and/or methods of intelligence collection. Intelligence communities are reluctant to disclose the details of their sources and methods of used to collect intelligence to the public and to one another. This is also true of different agencies within the same state and also applies to the usage of intelligence as evidence in a court of law (Walsh 2006, 629).

##### **4.9.1 Information Sharing and Privacy**

In addition to protection of sources and methods, different states have different notions of privacy, thus resisting large scale intelligence sharing. This is because the intelligence shared may be shared by a third party or used by the receiving state for purposes it was not intended for by the provider, and without being requested for or informed that it be used for that purpose. Thus, bilateral intelligence exchange between two peer intelligence agencies are guided by the third-party principle whereby the recipient intelligence agency is not obligated to share the received intelligence with a third country without the express permission of the originator agency. As such, intelligence exchange between two peer agencies is like a world within a world,

governed by liaison officers on their own diplomacy, and characterized by elaborate agreements, momerandums of understanding (MoUs') and treaties (Deeks, 2016; 19). Therefore, the security of the intelligence shared and not the intelligence itself, is the main substance and focus of such agreements reflecting how the shared intelligence be circulated within each intelligence community and its respective national system. Because of the disposition to the realist school of thought within the international security cooperation, mistrust between and among intelligence agencies emanates from fear of compromising intelligence sources and methods through intelligence cooperation. This hampers intelligence sharing. Protection of intelligence sources is the most treasured asset of any intelligence institution. Still, the Kenyan intelligence community and its bilateral liaison partners observe the third party principle in sharing counter terrorism intelligence.

#### **4.10 The Role of Intelligence in Counter Terrorism Prosecutions**

The intelligence community mostly targets those who present a risk of involvement in acts of terrorism and strive to prevent them from actualizing their intentions. At times, such targets may commit crimes and may be dealt with in various ways prescribed in respectives statues, which include prosecutions in courts of law. In such cases, intelligence may constitute some of the best evidence to be used in terrorism prosecutions. Still, there are numerous obstacles to using intelligence as evidence in courts of law. These include the methods used in collecting information, which may not necessarily be legitimate since intelligence is designed to provide policy makers with secret information to help prevent future threats. In exceptional circumstances, intelligence may be shared by LEAs to trigger criminal investigations and/or be used as evidence in a court of law (Quirine and Ginkel, 2011). But the courts have powers to rule

which part(s) of evidence are inadmissible and striking them from the records if the methods used to obtain them might have been unlawful. There are various ways that the intelligence community supports counter terrorism operations, which includes profiling and investigations of persons of interest. These are aimed at collection of additional information through interviews and intrusive/passive surveillance actions. Intelligence also informs the executive on actions such as visa decisions, travel bans, and can form the basis for targeted or drone killings (Staberock, 2012; 371).

#### **4.10.1 Counter-terrorism in Nigeria: Policy Framework and Institutional Capacity**

The effort to provide Nigeria with a comprehensive legal framework for combating terrorism was formalized with the introduction of the Terrorism Prevention Act on February 17, 2013. It amended the country's first counterterrorism law, which was passed in 2011. The Act mainly sought to promote inter-agency counter-terrorism efforts, set the responsibilities of the different stakeholders, and define their specific functions, including the possibility for law enforcement agencies to detain and prosecute individuals suspected of terrorism.

Most importantly, the document provides the ONSA with the responsibility for aligning counterterrorism efforts between security and law enforcement agencies, including the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF), which, in turn, ensures that Nigeria's CT framework is in line with international counter-terrorism legal instruments.

The ONSA falls under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Interior and serves the President as the chief advisor on national security issues, particularly in terms of counter-terrorism. The ONSA's primary responsibility is to harmonize and ensure synergy among security forces operating in the realm of counterterrorism – the Department of State Service

(DSS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Police, the Armed Forces, and other government authorities.

While the amended version of the Terrorism Prevention Act provided the country with the necessary legal framework to counter terrorist threats, the policy framework for counter-terrorism is primarily enshrined in the NACTEST. The document was first adopted by President Goodluck Jonathan in April 2014 and was subsequently followed by a second version released by President Buhari's administration in August 2016. The NACTEST institutionalized the position of the Counter-Terrorism Center (CTC) within the ONSA's structure in order to coordinate the implementation of the national CT strategy and oversee security and intelligence operations in the country. The ONSA does not have statutory executive functions but does have an advisory role. This arrangement has been criticized on several occasions as a potential obstacle to the effective implementation of the strategy (Eji, 2016; Onapajo, 2016).

The national CT strategy is developed around five main work streams, each with specific medium and long-term objectives. The five pillars include: Forestall, Secure, Identify, Prepare and Implement:

1. Forestall aims at reducing the risk of radicalization;
2. Secure entails the process of raising the security posture of the country in the face of terrorist threats;
3. Identify aims at pre-emption through detection, early warning as well as the strengthening of the judicial system;
4. Prepare seeks to mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks by increasing the capability of the Government to react to such an occurrence; and,

5. Implement, which aims to foster coordination/cooperation at the operational and strategic levels both within and beyond national boundaries (NACTEST, 2016, pp.15-16)

#### **4.10.2 The Role of Military**

An essential goal of the National CT Strategy is to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack by addressing structural, geographical, and operational vulnerabilities which could be exploited by Boko Haram and its affiliates. In terms of structural and operational vulnerabilities, despite the Federal Government of Nigeria's willingness to foster coordination among all the agencies involved in border security, cross-border crime and CT, at the operational level this has yet to produce any concrete result.

Even though NACTEST clearly envisaged the ONSA/CTC's CT coordination role, the primary responsibility for combating terrorism in the country continues to fall to the Nigerian military. Previously, the military was largely deployed to respond to the crisis in the Niger Delta, but since the successful 2009 amnesty, thousands of troops have been redeployed to the northern battlefields. There, the bulk of the approximately 100,000 strong force is operating within the ongoing operation Lafiya Dole (Peace by Force) to counter Boko Haram and its offshoots in the broader region. The number of Nigerian National Police currently stands at 400,000, however, the some of the personnel do not possess training, and/or technical skills. As for the military, it has been accused of corruption and human rights abuses (Jane's, 2018b, pp.2-23). The military also maintains an operational presence on other internal fronts.

At the operational/tactical level, in early 2014, the Nigerian Ministry of Defence announced the formation of the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) to conduct CT/COIN operations against Boko Haram and its offshoots. The NASOC plugs into the existing special operations forces (SOF) architecture, coordinating its activities with the Special Boat Service

(SBS) of the Nigerian Navy. In addition, a recently established Nigerian Air Force Special Forces Regiment (NAF SFR) will provide SOF with ‘the ability to protect expeditionary landing sites as well as support ground and maritime forces with CAS and a CSAR capability’ (Jane’s, 2018c, p.2).

In June 2015, in a strong sign of President Muhammadu Buhari’s determination to dismantle the Islamic militant networks in the northern states, Abuja took the lead of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF is made up of contingents from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin. It replaced and formalized the structure of the previous ‘ad-hoc’ military coalition and included Benin as a contributing country. The establishment of a command and Control Centre in Maiduguri (MCCC) in early 2015 has provided the military with the capability to monitor, coordinate, and control its operational efforts from the epicentre of the crisis (Ibeh, 2015). In addition, an internal restructuring within the military along with the commitment to increase military expenditures to have better equipped troops on the ground have resulted in the arrest of militant leaders, tactical successes and the recapture of Boko Haram’s strategic strongholds – namely most of Adamawa State, Chibok in southern Borno State and the vast Sambisa Forest. As underlined by Jane’s (2018b, pp.5-6), ‘Boko Haram has made no bids to try and occupy territory since March 2015, when the Nigerian army recaptured the group’s stronghold in the North of the country.’ In 2018, the defence budget will see a 22% nominal increase compared to 2017 – NGN 574 billion (USD 1.6 billion) – 0.4% of Nigeria GDP (Jane’s, 2018d).

It is worth underlining that the EU politically and financially supports the MNJTF with over 200 million euros which have already been allocated to address the humanitarian crisis and to support development in northeastern Nigeria.

At the tactical level, however, the last few years have seen the militant group changing its modus operandi, returning to asymmetric tactics to fill the operational gap created by the new security environment, especially in hit-and-run tactics and suicide attacks (Jane's, 2018a).

Despite repeated claims by the government that Boko Haram has been technically defeated (BBC, 2015), at the end of 2017 Boko Haram cadres attacked a military base in northeast Nigeria to show that they retain the capability to challenge the security forces directly (News24, 2017). In addition, in January 2018, 12 people were killed and 48 others wounded in a concerted suicide attack in Maiduguri (Kingimi and Lanre, 2017). These attacks, along with the kidnapping of the students in Dapchi, resulted in harsh criticism of the Buhari administration, putting into question the ability of the security apparatus to exercise effective control over the northeast.

#### **4.10.3 Intelligence Sharing and Border Security**

The military remains heavily involved in the collection of intelligence for counter-terrorism purposes through the military Joint Investigation Committee. There is little cooperation between the military and law enforcement agencies and collected intelligence is mainly used for tactical purposes, drastically affecting the capacity of the Federal Government to investigate and prosecute terrorist offenders. It is notable that the military and the police continue to heavily rely on local militias – i.e. the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) – to gather the intelligence they need to conduct their operations. As underlined by Felbab-Brown (2018), ‘CJTF claims are often the dominant, if not sole, basis of raids and arrests, yet such intelligence is often completely unreliable, unverified, and random, motivated merely by desire for further financial payments or as a means of revenge for previous perceived grievances against local rivals.’

Law enforcement agencies continue to be characterized by a low capacity in terms of criminal justice, intelligence sharing and effective cooperation/coordination both at the strategic and

operational levels. As an example, at the different control points, border points and at the main airports, police, customs and immigration officials are collecting information and operating without any integrated national information database system. Obviously, in the struggle against Boko Haram and its offshoots, a concerted effort to gather, analyze and share information and intelligence is of paramount importance in the attempt to effectively identify vulnerabilities and counter potential threats.

Border security responsibilities are shared among the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), police, the military and the customs. The challenging security environment in the country is the main obstacle for a government trying to exercise effective control at the borders. This is even more challenging when considering the security constraints, including the lack of sufficient border crossing points, for a government overseeing almost 5,000 km of land borders. Data is mainly gathered manually and therefore highly subjected to bias and mistakes – and not systematically integrated for analysis. The staff of the agencies involved in border management possess limited analytical and operational expertise. This, coupled with the lack of technical equipment and the impossibility for the government to exercise any form of control in large portions of the country, represents a serious constraint in the attempt to mitigate the risk of cross-border crimes, terrorism, and other security concerns.

In addition, Nigeria has partially failed to implement UN Security Council resolutions 2178 (2014), as the current administration has made limited progress in accelerating the exchange of operational information on terrorist movements and networks by creating bilateral or multilateral mechanisms within the country. According to S/RES/2178 (2014, p.4):

All States shall prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.

In recent years, with support from the U.S. Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, police, immigration and customs officials participated in 'Rural Border Patrol Operations' courses to build the law enforcement sector's ability to improve interagency cooperation and coordination to tackle cross-border crime, smuggling, and terrorism. However, communication and coordination of activities between relevant actors remain limited or non-existent (U.S. Department of State, 2016).

It is worth mentioning that within the scope of the Federal Foreign Office of Germany and German Cooperation-funded project 'Facilitating Migration through Supporting the Rollout of Nigeria's National Biometric Identification Card (NBIC) for Intra-ECOWAS Travel, and BIOMETRIC Registration of Foreign Nationals (NBIC-REG Nigeria)', the NIS has recently established a system for the registration of foreign nationals coming from the ECOWAS region to mitigate the risk posed by the common mobility area (IOM, 2018).

Although not directly connected with the overall NACTEST strategy, the last few years have witnessed the creation of the Joint Border Task Force (JBTF), a project sponsored by the British High Commission. The JBTF is a multi-agency project which primarily seeks to foster intelligence sharing to dismantle criminal networks involved in trafficking in persons. The framework of cooperation includes the UK National Crime Agency (NCA), the Home Office, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP)

#### **4.10.4 Border Control and Security within the Region**

The Nigeria governments is ill-equipped to control its borders, safeguard its inhabitants, and combat the many security threats they face. Recurrent movement of persons across borders in the region necessitates, according to Cantens (2021), a strengthening of the capacity of authorities in humanitarian border control. Many checkpoints lack even the most basic instruments for confirming the authenticity of travelers' documents, and the vast majority of border patrol agents in the region have not received proper training on passport examination techniques or the latest trends in document fabrication. Problems with communication and a paucity of vehicles make it tough to keep an eye on the border. Also, most border crossings are not linked to national or international criminal watch-list systems. This leaves a massive opening that could be used by criminals on the run who need to transit this territory (Cantens, 2021).

Moreover, the establishment of official crossing points is not always coordinated with other bordering countries, which contributes to the lack of effective border control mechanisms and encourages irregular migrations across the border and promotes all forms of cross-border crimes, including smuggling of migrants and trafficking of humans, in addition to all forms of illegal smuggling of goods, arms, and drugs, which are known to be among the main financial source for transnational organized crime networks. Lastly, Cantens (2021) argues that the proliferation of arms, drug trafficking, kidnapping, and a massive influx of population (with the risk of infiltration by members of these criminal / terrorist groups) have allowed criminal and terrorist groups to keep a strong presence in the region and effectively compete with national governments for territorial control. IOM will be working inside Niger, Mauritania, Mali, and Burkina Faso to assess and improve their respective border management control processes with the aim of boosting regional security in the Nigeria. Information sharing has been crucial in

promoting the harmonization of capacities and procedures since it was first established at the G5 Sahel 1 Forum in May 2014 as part of the Declaration of Nouakchott. The Sahel countries are urged to create a unified mechanism/platform for information sharing, as emphasized in the declaration. Victims of trafficking, unaccompanied migrant children, and victims of exploitation and abuse require that special attention be paid to the design and implementation of measures related to the gender element of border management (Cantens, 2021).

#### **4.11 NAPTIP**

The National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and Other Matters (NAPTIP) was established on August 8, 2003. The Agency created under the Trafficking in Persons (prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003, is the Federal Government of Nigeria's response to the epidemic of human trafficking in Nigeria and its associated human rights violations in all of their manifestations. This action also fulfills her international obligation under the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime's Trafficking in Persons Protocol (NAPTIP Law Enforcement Act, 2003). Nigeria signed the Transnational Organized Crime Convention and the protocol regarding the trafficking of persons on December 13, 2000. Under Article 5 of the aforementioned trafficking protocol, state parties are required to criminalize all types of human exploitation, including but not limited to sexual and labor exploitation. The Women Trafficking and Child Labor Eradication Foundation (WOTCLEF), is a nongovernmental organization created by Mrs. Titi Abubakar, supported as a private member bill; the adoption of this protocol in the national penal code ([www.naptip.gov.ng](http://www.naptip.gov.ng)). This measure was approved by the House of Representatives on July 7, and President Olusegun Obasanjo signed it into law on July 14. The law's nationwide enforcement commenced on its effective date (Onyekachi&Azubike, 2021).

NAPTIP interacts with other government agencies, such as WOTCLEF, UNICEF, UNODC, IOM, ILO, etc., to strengthen its effectiveness both inside and outside of Nigeria. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) manages a group of contributors. At a regional meeting held in Abuja in July 2006, fifteen states from both ECOWAS and ECCAS signed a declaration on trafficking in persons, notably women and children. ECOWAS and ECCAS arranged the conference together. Section 64 of the NAPTIP Act contains a definitions section. "all acts and attempted acts involving the recruitment, transportation within or across Nigerian borders, purchase, sale, transfer, receipt, or harboring of a person using deception, coercion, or debt bondage for the purpose of placing or holding the person in forced or bonded labor or slavery-like conditions" (Aronowitz & Peruffo, 2004). Under these conditions, anyone of any age, gender, color, religion, or nationality could be deemed a victim of human trafficking. Since "trafficker" is defined in the same section as a person or entity that intends to commit, aids, abets, or consents to an act of trafficking, this definition also includes "attempt," "participation," and "acquiescence" (Onyekachi & Azubike, 2021).

However, the lack of cooperation between security officers is a significant hindrance to NAPTIP's operations both within and without Nigeria's borders. The objective of NAPTIP requires more collaboration amongst Nigeria's law enforcement authorities, such as the Nigerian Police and Immigration Service. Therefore, NAPTIP must collaborate with other security agencies to prevent human trafficking. While synergy is desirable, Onyekachi and Azubike note that it does not always present (2021). Some security companies are rather arrogant, and they are constantly attempting to outdo one another. It has been reported that law enforcement agents, particularly at airports and ports of entry, receive bribes to ignore traffic offences. The free movement of goods and people within the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) has encouraged the inflow of people into urban centers in Nigeria. Every time this agreement is established, it is quickly exploited, resulting in an influx of random entrants. NAPTIP is hence less successful at preventing and punishing trafficking.

#### **4.11.1 Synergy between Sahel Border Agencies**

Cantens and Raballand (2017) assert that, in order to set the stage, it is necessary to clarify the amount of collaboration between national and international border agencies. Multiple conditions, each with their own advantages and downsides, have been observed. It appears that the situation in northern Mali differs from that in northern Chad, since Malian customs has been reduced to a purely symbolic presence in the major cities, whilst Chadian customs continues to maintain customs offices near the front. However, both nations share the governor's responsibility for coordinating border agencies, which is carried out by the military in practice. Customs personnel are periodically recruited into army patrol units to verify seizures are conducted in line with customs protocols, to maintain customs contact in the field, and to give customs officers the opportunity to patrol under acceptable security conditions (Cantens & Raballand, 2017).

According to Cantens and Raballand's analysis, the Sudanese instance is uncommon in terms of border control coordination (2017). Customs shares the same resources, uniforms, and authority as normal law enforcement because it is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior (except for specific intervention groups). Officials of the Sudanese customs department collaborate closely with other law enforcement authorities that collect economic data. Particularly for monitoring transit movements, a formal system of information sharing has been established. However, cooperation with Chad, which has taken the form of a freshly signed agreement between Chad and Sudan, represents the greatest progress. At El Geneina's entry points and along the way to Chad, joint forces are stationed and conducting patrols. According to

everyone engaged, a significant and positive improvement has taken place. West Darfur's police chief and customs officer concur that the situation has greatly improved, offering concrete evidence that international cooperation can work to ensure security when carried out by combined soldiers on the ground. The relationship between state institutions and religious or cultural authorities is another type of cooperation that could profit from a more rigorous empirical investigation (such as sultans in Sudan, heads of villages or tribes in Mali). The current state of affairs appears to vary from country to country. It appears from interviews that traditional authority (such as the sultans in El Geneina) has lost some of its influence in contemporary Sudan (Cantens & Raballand, 2017).

In the absence of a strong central authority, traditional rulers have played a significant part in donor strategies for peace-building in countries such as Mali. Since their authority is anchored in ancient societal institutions, local chiefs in northern Mali are often viewed as a barrier to advancement. Meagher believes that donors and state institutions may be perceived as cooperating with the privileged (2012). Despite the likelihood that there is no one model for border cooperation, three important conclusions can be drawn at this time. First, with the exception of Tunisia and the Sudan, customs officials are often not seen as essential members of national security systems. This is the case despite the fact that, unlike their counterparts in other security organizations, customs officers may examine the situation from both a security and economic perspective. Additionally, the military may play an important part in joint border management. Specialists often associate border cooperation with civilian or paramilitary organizations (such as customs, police, border guards, health and sanitary services). In unstable regions, the army is sometimes the only actor with the technical means to patrol the borderlands. Additionally, customs officials and soldiers have a "patrolling culture" in border regions,

whereas police officers prefer to focus on urban areas. Third, show caution while engaging with locals; traditional and religious leaders may not play as great a role as first appears, and corporate elites, such as merchants, may provide more considerable support for state services (Ireland & Raballand, 2015).

#### **4.11.2 Local Importance of Custom**

The presence of the state near porous borders also leads in power disputes between state services, despite the fact that policymakers and experts urge cooperation between governmental entities. Reduced insecurity, shifting power dynamics, and new information sources are just a few of the factors that could spur rapid changes in leadership. According to Ireland and Raballand (2015), competition between customs, military, and police services for control of the border's "ground zero" has become an issue in several countries. When it comes to monitoring the border and closing it in an emergency, the agency in charge of point zero may obtain more equipment and resources from the federal government. Customs officials in one country boosted their seizure volume when they were stationed at an entry point after the military.

Therefore, the government reorganized the border's security, putting customs at the frontier's epicenter and giving it the power to close the border in an emergency. This has elevated customs' status locally among the security forces. This methodology may not be transferable to other countries due to its reliance on a wide variety of parameters. Although this may be the case, it nonetheless demonstrates that there is no unique framework for security policy in which customs would play a subordinate role. When countries limit their access to currency, customs authorities in those countries become more powerful. State services rely heavily on the availability of cash because wages and bonuses paid to civil servants, as well as local service providers to state authorities, are often paid in cash. This is especially true in areas where the banking system is

less developed due to economic factors (market size, high transaction costs, or lack of bank branches). In order to exercise power and keep their own services running smoothly, governors and municipal governments rely on tax revenues and other forms of monetary inflow. Customs is a major source of income in such settings. This is why local state officials frequently request a large customs presence to assist them in their work (Meagher, 2012).

#### **4.11.3 Outposts of Customs as Service Providers and Intelligence-gathering agencies**

Some customs administrations have established outposts in addition to the main customs office on the main road. These customs checkpoints are typically placed in areas where smuggling is done using only the most basic of techniques, such as near a small town or along an unofficial trade route. Outposts are protected by nearby military outposts and may play a role in government-instituted state control policies. Between the border and the border cities is where you'll find most customs outposts (Cantens & Raballand, 2017). To avoid the possibility of riots or generating political instability by blindly applying the same tax burden to all, customs authorities there tend to tolerate petty smuggling. Goods cannot be cleared at outposts by importers since it is against the law. Officers will typically issue a laissez-passer to the owner of a vehicle or shipment instructing them to clear their items at the main customs office. Building customs posts near the border to give facilities like telephone and electricity to the locals has been an explicit strategy in at least two countries. During colonial periods, when outposts were established to attract nomads or travelers for purposes of control, taxes, or intelligence gathering, policies like this were common. The strategy has been successful in at least one nation. Two terrorists were apprehended by customs authorities at the outpost after they were alerted to their impending crossing of the border. It also demonstrates that the focus of customs is shifting from revenue collection and smuggling crackdowns to information gathering.

#### **4.11.4 Impact of intelligence on terrorism and counterterrorism**

The finest intelligence about Islamic terrorism in Nigeria may be obtained from HUMINT interviews with local tribal members. However, there is a delicate interplay between the exploitation of civilians for intelligence gathering and their international law-granted rights as civilians. For foreign forces operating in Nigeria, these ethical and strategic concerns are therefore inescapable.

Nakhleh (2020) thinks that military action or the deployment of troops addresses the causes of terrorism only partially. Combating international terrorism and undermining extremist narratives takes nothing more than traditional intelligence and cooperation from the community. In this way, Nigeria is hardly exceptional. Human intelligence (HUMINT) has been effectively exploited by American intelligence personnel in regions where the US military is not the major instrument for countering terrorism. They were able to infiltrate criminal organizations, recruit local informants as assets and sources of information about criminal activity, and employ signals intelligence (SIGINT) to track the locations of violent extremists. This targeted operation has enabled intelligence personnel to collect vital information on radicalizers and recruiters over a large portion of the Middle East and Africa. They have been able to establish the social, political, economic, and religious environments in which various terrorist groups operate, as well as identify and track the groups' current and emerging leaders. Both the terrorists' use of cyber warfare, hacking, and recruitment and communication tools, and the intelligence community's capacity to access their social media platforms, have been utilized to great advantage (Nakhleh, 2020).

Osama bin Laden, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, and others were among the world's most prominent terrorists who were tracked down and eliminated with the help of intelligence collection. By

understanding the languages, cultures, nuances, and allegiances of terrorist organisations and the communities in which they operate, intelligence operatives become experts on terrorist groups and the locations in which they operate. As terrorist organizations have grown in recent years, intelligence operators and collectors in the Sahel and throughout West Africa have depended on the military, drones, and other weapon systems to combat them.

#### **4.11.5 Importance of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Other Intelligence Collection Techniques**

Successful counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations necessitate collaboration from interested parties and judicious resource management. HUMINT provides a foundation for acquiring more information that will throw light on the political and socioeconomic complexity that Islamic Jihadist groups want to conceal from the public. The unfamiliarity of foreigners with ethnic tribal rivalries, connections, and fanaticism can lead to misunderstandings and blunders, further complicating problems for HUMINT. In Africa, HUMINT operations are already difficult due to widespread skepticism of centralized governments and the idea that Jihad terrorist organizations provide superior security and employment prospects. The region's poor health, education, environmental (resource and water contamination), and living conditions exacerbate the dilemma. HUMINT remains the most feasible tool for obtaining and utilizing intelligence in the Nigeria (McDowell, 2020).

McDowell (2020) contends that HUMINT can offer light on how rival projects and competition between government authority, terrorist groups, traffickers, and gangs undermine regional peace and development. Observing all drivers of instability and insecurity in this region collectively, as opposed to singly, helps military intelligence. HUMINT provides clearer and more useable intelligence than SIGINT, COMINT, and IMINT. There are connections between Nigerian

extremist groups and transnational criminal organizations that have dominated regional trafficking routes for decades. While the majority of trade now occurs via water or air, pre-colonial land routes are still in use.

To neutralize the threat posed by extremism in Nigeria, it is essential to deploy SIGINT and IMINT to monitor the locations and activities of terrorist groups utilizing full-motion video obtained from location-based data. Information and intelligence (IMINT) provides a comprehensive view of the globe, from the spread and movement of extremists across Nigeria to the operational readiness, capabilities, and growth of terrorist organizations. SIGINT helps strengthen counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities by intercepting, analyzing, and reporting terrorist communications. Nigeria is a breeding ground for transnational Islamic extremism and criminal activities, and SIGINT assists by collecting important voice, data, and video conversations as well as Internet transmissions. In theory, successful military intelligence operations in Nigeria to limit the ability of Islamic jihadist and criminal organizations to exploit tribal grievances and weak government institutions are hampered by the region's vast size, large number of participating actors (state and non-state), and overlapping agendas (Delaporte, 2020). Blind spots in intelligence collection undermine the readiness, preparation, and operations of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency initiatives when governments and villages lack interaction and trust. Non-state actors in Nigeria use these blind spots as safe havens, thriving in the complexity and overlap of state and foreign backers' objectives.

To overcome transnational concerns including border control, human advancement, globalization, and poverty will require a concerted effort from both state actors and international institutions. As a result of a diminished emphasis on unilateral national interest, cooperation among the Sahel G5 countries and their international sponsors improves, giving these

governments and their backers better access to the intelligence required to combat the region's burgeoning extremism (Delaporte, 2020).

McDowell (2020) asserts that focusing on criminal activities and Islamic extremism without adequate military information exacerbates the security situation in the region. Military intelligence entails developing effective solutions to the delicate balancing act between the informal regional economy and widespread poverty. Combining human intelligence (HUMINT), machine intelligence (IMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) in military intelligence operations can assist in providing alternatives to unlawful behavior and violent extremism.

### **Converting intelligence to evidence**

Below are some of the methods that have been employed to convert intelligence into evidence:

#### **1. Anticipative Criminal Investigation**

This is where the traditional roles of investigation and intelligence are blended. Evidence gathering tools are included in the intelligence function. It pursues information gathering for crime prevention while at the same time it pursues the gathering of evidence that meets the standards of a criminal trial.

#### **2. Parallel Construction**

This is a law enforcement process of creating a separate evidentiary basis for an intelligence operation. This is done in order to obscure the sensitivity of sources of information and surveillance methods from public forums. It involves the transfer of information from the intelligence agency to the relevant law enforcement agency. The law enforcement agency then commissions an evidence gathering investigation based on the information. Parallel construction is used to protect undercover agents and informers. It is also used to protect classified techniques that are used to collect information. However, when using parallel construction, it is

important to ensure that the criminal trial process remains fair. No falsified evidence or illegally obtained evidence should be included.

### **3. Incorporating Open-Source Intelligence**

This is where intelligence teams rely on open sources of intelligence produced from publicly available information together with other more discreet sources. Open-Source intelligence protects sources of information and methods of information gathering which the intelligence agency may not want to disclose. The main difficulty in using Open-Source Intelligence is identifying relevant and reliable sources of information.

### **4. Intelligence Sanitization**

This is the process of removing material which may identify a source or sensitive law enforcement methodology that is not supposed to be disclosed in public fora. Once the intelligence is sanitized, the information available can be used as evidence in a court of law.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Conclusion

In conclusion, the world of globalization in which insecurity, threat, fear and mistrust pervade world, nations such as Nigeria and its security, agencies are not keenly sensitive to intelligence gathering and sharing. Terrorists, transnational criminals, insurgents have taken over Nigeria because of the technological availability and ability to use them effectively for information dissemination at their disposal. Terrorism, insurgency, trafficking and kidnapping are now very common in Nigeria and security cannot but vitiated from lack of intelligence sharing among the Nigerian security agencies with antecedent factors of lack of motivation, government insensitivity, ego boosting and other related factors conversed in this paper. Considering the role of the security agencies mentioned in this paper, if these constitutional roles are well played, violent conflict, terror and all forms of insecurity in Nigeria will be nipped to the bud.

Finally, intelligence is able to avert imminent threats to a country by providing timely, processed information to national security decision makers. This is achieved through the acquisition of secret information by secret means on the capabilities, actions, and policies of other nations. The information acquired, is collected, analyzed and disseminated for use to support action. Thus, the role of intelligence is to support action that may be deemed necessary in the furtherance of national interests.

## **5.2 Recommendations**

The focus for this study was to make modest contributions to the few available sources of reference on the intelligence community and counter terrorism in Nigeria. The results of this study have provided a number of recommendations that can be used in Nigeria.

1. The Nigerian Security Organization should be overhauled with educated personnel trained on intelligence gathering and sharing. Recruitment of intelligence personnel, must not be political, installing the relations or best friends and ethnic of the president into sensitive positions.
2. Improved welfare package will uplift the morale of security personnel and reduce unnecessary frictions among the security agencies. Enhanced remuneration will lessen friction among them; each will concentrate on their constitutional duties instead of looking for extra income.
3. The media too can help by toning down the reportage of such clashes so as to stem the tide of such tension and prevent escalation of such crises.
4. Retreat and sports: efforts at creating meeting points for all security agencies as in retreat and sporting activities should be intensified. This will encourage social interaction and understanding among various agencies;
5. There should be joint training at all level where officers and men can interact intellectually to better appreciate and understand each other for improved cooperation at all times;
6. There should be clear and well defined communication links between the different hierarchies of the services, including the establishment of liaison officers in all the barracks

and units at all levels of command to entertain complaints from aggrieved personnel of other services.

7. Mutual respect for one another with the belief that all services are performing different functions towards achieving a common goal.
8. The Nigerian state has always underperformed in the area of governance. This has by extension affected its counter-terrorism policy implementation. This is as a result of corruption, decades of military rule which has alienated Nigerian citizens from the political process, bureaucratic inefficiency and ethno-religious tensions (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2012; Nkechi, 2013). The need for proper governance is expedient in handling matters of the country and counterterrorism.
9. Corruption has been a major problem of the Nigerian state and society: it impedes effective implementation of some aspects of these policies. Those that have been named in allegations of corruption should be prosecuted. Anti-corruption should not be based on party, religious or ethnic sentiments: those involved in corruption should be swiftly prosecuted and convicted. The public should be public enlightened on anti-corruption, on the need for Nigerians to abstain from corrupt practices and to report anyone suspected of being involved in corrupt matters with anonymity of the reporters' identities . The NFIC and POC bills should be signed into law so that anti- corruption drive will be engendered.
10. Intelligence should be taken as paramount. Intelligence and surveillance through the co-operation of communities, security agencies deploying plain clothed operatives to gather information, use of CCTVs, and drones should be properly harnessed.
11. Security agencies should not see intelligence sharing amongst themselves as a mirage. They should see security not as a competition but as an achievement if there is co-operation

amongst them. Territories reclaimed by the military should not be stabilised by the military as this puts too much stress on the military. Sister security agencies like the police, NSCDC in collaboration with DSS and CSOs should help stabilise such territories so that the military can reclaim more territories hitherto occupied by Boko Haram.

12. Steady power supply will also go a long way in aiding the constant functioning of the CCTVs. This will enable the cameras work for 24 hours and be connected to a control room. The CCTVs should be installed beyond Lagos and Abuja. It should extend to all parts of the country this will in turn boost surveillance and intelligence gathering.
13. Security agents should be well equipped with modern arms and ammunition so as to match the fire power of terrorist groups. The issue of security personnel running away from Boko Haram's attacks will be checked through this. It will also boost the morale of the security agencies.
14. The immigration and customs officials should be well equipped to be better able to protect borders in order to check illegal migrants and arms smugglers. Drones and surveillance aircraft should be deployed to border communities to give surveillance and intelligence support for border securities.
15. Security agencies should not betray or divulge informants.

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